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Chapter I
The Bower of Puioommendatlon of the General Assembly.
The apparent consensus of opinion emerging from the statements of principle
in the agenda debates suggests that little could be obtained from a study of
the substantive debates on these items* The majority of States whioh have
considered the problem of defining intervention considering that any sub¬
stantive discussion on or recommendation concerning a domestic matter consti¬
tutes intervention and on that ground having sought to have sueh items deleted
from the agenda altogether, it is to be expected that similar statements of
principle would be found in the substantive debates* This is indeed what has
happened and no less that twenty-three States have. at various times during the
ocurae of the debates on the various items, made the claim that as a particular
matter was domestic the United Nations had no oompetenoe to deal with it* These
States includes Australia, Argentina, Albania, Belgium, Bulgaria, Byelorussian
S.8.R., Colombia, Costa hiea, Czechoslovakia, Dominican Republic, France, Hungary,
Netherlands, Portugal, Pakistan, Republic of South Africa, Romania, Spain,Turkey,
Ukrainian S«3*R*, U*S*S*R*, United Kingdom and Venezuela."**
1* The following is a list of references where such statements can be found*
Because of the massive amount of practice on this point, it does not
purport to be exhaustive,
Australia; Case 2: U»A,,(v), Ad Ifoe Pol*Com,, 42nd mtg., para, 39? ibid, Plen.,
315th mtg*, paras# 24*25? ibid, 7th session, Ad Hoc Pol* Com*, 10th mtg.,
paras* 13-16; ibid, Oth session, Ad Hoo Pol•Com., 18th mtg*, paras* 23-25;
ibid, 20th mtg,, paras, 8-12; ibid," 'i'l'th session, Sp•Pol,Com*, 7th mtg.,
para* 32? ibid, 10th iatg,, paras, 42-43? ibid, 12th session, Sp,Pol .Com.,
6lst mtg., para. 24? Case 11; G*A,,(VIl), Ad Hoo Pol.Com., 16th mtg.,
paras* 34-49? ibid, 11th session, %*Pol.Com., 15th mtg,, para* 11? ibid,
12th session, 3p*.Pol,Com,, 57th mtg., paras. 22-23? ibid, 13th session,
Sp.Pol.Coau, 94th mtg,, paras* 20-23; Case 24: ibid, 11th session, 1st
Com*, 849th mtg., paras* 22-33? ibid, 12th session, 1st Com. 931st mtg.
paras. 19-28? ibid, 13th session, 1st Com,, 1000th ratg., paras. 19-21;
Case 27: S*A*,(Xl), 1st Com., 844th mtg*, paras, 8-9? ibid, 12th session,
1st Com*, 924th mtg*, para* 13-18?
i\trqntina: Case 1; C*A,,(3/2), 1st Com., 36th ratg., p* 246? ibid, 3rd session,
2.
seoond part, 1st Com#, 260th atg., p. 20/+.; Case 2: ibid, 3rd session, 2nd
part, 1st Com*, 266th mtg*, pp* 284-285;
Albania: Case 30: G®A.,(ES-H), PIen., 568th mtg*, para. 74; ibid, 11th session,
Plan.,Vol.1, 584th stg., para. 131; ibid, 14th session, Flen., 849th mtg. para.
136.
Belgium: Case 2: G*A*.(Vin), Ad Hoc Pol.Com., 14th mtg., para. 16; ibid, 3rd
session, 2nd part, lat Com*, 266th mtg., pp* 287-289; ibid, 11th session, %>*
Pol.Com., 9th mtg., paras* 10-11; ibid, 12th session, Sp.Pol.Com., 61st mtg.,
paras. 34-36; CTaae Hi G,A.f (vil), Ad Hoc Ptol.Com*, 16th mtg., paras. 70-76;
ibid, 21st mtg., para. 24; ibid, 8th session, Ad Hoo Pol.Com.. 32nd mtg.,
paras. 27-39; ibid, 10th session. Ad Hoo Pol.Com., 11th mtg., paras. 13-15;
11th session, 3p.Pol,Com., 12th mtg., para. 18; ibid, 12th session, Sp.Pol,
Com., 57th mtg., poroa# 24-26; ibid, 13th session, Sp.Pol.Com., 88th mtg.,
paras. 12-13; ibid, 94th mtg., para. 27; Case 24: G.A.,(Xl), 1st Com.,
853rd mtg., paras. 4-10; ibid, 12th session, 1st Com*, 930th mtg., paras.
31-32; Case 27: G.A.,(Xl), Plen., Vol.11, 654th mtg., para. 108; ibid,
13th session, 1st Com,, 1022nd mtg., paras. 53-54.
Bulgaria: Case 30: G*A.,(ES-Il), Plen., 568th mtg., paras. 57-69; ibid,
573rd mtg., paras. 22-28; ibid, 11th session, Plen., Vol.1, 583rd mtg.,
para. 165; ibid, 14th session, Plen., 850th mtg., para. 15.
Byelorussian 3,3,11.. Case 30; G,A.#(ES*Il), Plen*, 569th mtg., paras. 45-54;
ibid, Uth session, Plen., Vol,I, 584th mtg,, para* 12;
Colombia: Case 11: G.A.,(VIIl), Ad Hoo Pol.Com., 33rd mtg,, paras. 41-47i
ibid, 38th mtg., ptiras. 21-33; ibid, 11th session, 1st Com., 843rd mtg., paras.
5-7*
Costa Rioa: Case 1: G«A», (3/2), let Com., 35th mtg,, p. 232.
Czechoslovakia: Case 7: G«A.,(lll/l), 6th Com., 137th mtg., p. 748; Case 30:
ibid, (ES-II), Plen., 569th mtg., paras. 2-10; ibid, 573rd mtg., paras. 32-36;
ibid, 11th session, Plen., Vol. I, 583rd mtg., para, 118,
Dominican Republic: Case 11: G.A., (XIIl), Sp*Pol*Com,, 94th mtg«, paraa.
17-19*
Franoe: Caae 11: G,A#,(VII), Ad Hoo Pol.Com., 21st mtg., para. 3; ibid, 8th
session. Ad Hoo. Pol.Com., 38th mtg., paras. 2-6; ibid, 11th session, 3p.
Pol.Com., loth mtg., para. 34; ibid, 13th session, 3p.Pol.Com., 94th mtg.,
paras. 14-16; Caao 24: ibid, Uth session, 1st Com., 852nd mtg. paras.
27-33; ibid, 12th session, 3at Com., 930th mtg., paras. 33-39; Caae 27:
ibid, 11th session, lat Com., 830th mtg., paras. 1-2; ibid, 843rd mtg.,
para. 34.
Hungary: Case 30: G.A.,(£2>»Il), Plen., 568th mtg., paras. 3-5; ibid, 11th
session, Plen., Vol, I, 582nd mtg., para. 28; ibid, 604th mtg., para. 3,
Netherlands: Case 31: G.A.,(VIl)f Ad Iioo Pol.Com., 16th mtg., paras. 31-32;
Case 27: ibid. Htli session, 1st Com., 844th mtg., pora. 29; ibid, 12th
session, 1st Com,, 924th mtg., para. 3*
1. Bdd-stan: Case 11; Cr.A., (VII), Ad Hoc Pol.Com., 15th mtg., para. 17.
Portugal: Case 11: G.A., (XI), Sp.Bol.Com., 16th mtg., para. 58; Ibid, 12th
session, Sp.Pol.Com., 57th mtg., para. 40; ibid, 13th session, 3p.Pol.Cora.,
94th mtg., para. 24; Caae 24; ibid, 11th session, 1st Com#, 853rd mtg., paras.
53*54; ibid, 12th session, 1st Com., 931st mtg., paras. 57-62; Case 27:
ibid, 11th session, 1st Com., 846th mtg., para. 65; ibid, 12th session, 1st Com.
922nd mtg., paras. 46-47; ibid, 13th session, 1st Com., 1023rd mtg., paras.
15-16.
Republic of South Africa: Case 2: S.A.,(lIl/2), 1st Com., 265th mtg., p.
277; ibid, Plan., 212th mtg., pp. 443-444; ibid, 5th session, Plen., 315th
mtg., paras. 8-15; ibid, 8th session, Ad Hoc Pol.Com., 14th mfcg., para. 2;
Caae 11: (J.A., (VII), ELen., 401st mtg., paras. 80-84; ibid, 8th session,
Ad Hoc Pol.Com., 52nd mtg., paras. 2-6; ibid, Hen., 469th mtg., paras. 15-28;
ibid, 10th session, Ad Hoc Bol.Com., 3rd mtg., paras. 5-7.
Romania: Case 30: O.A.,(ES-II), ELen., 568th mtg., paras. 107-114.
Spain: Caae 11: G.A., (XIII), Sp.Bol.Conu, 90th mtg., paras. 32-56;
Case 27: 13th session, 1st Cos., 1018th mtg., paras. 8-10.
Turkey: Case 24: G.A., (XL), 1st Com., 848th mtg., para. 16.
Ukrainian S.S.R.: Case 7: O.A., (lll/Z), ELen., 197th mtg., pp. 157-158; ibid,
(ES-H), ELen., 569th atg,, paras. 15-14; ibid, 11th session, Plen., Vol. II,
635th mtg., para. 61.
U.S.S.R,, Case 7: Q-.A., (lIl/2), ELen., 196th mtg., p. 155; Case 50: ibid,
(ES-II)" 573rd mtg., paras, 11-14; ibid, 11th session, ELen., Vol. I, 582nd
mtg,, para. 81; ibid, 605th mtg., para. 60; ibid, 14th session, Elen.,
849th mtg., para. 42.
United Kingdom: Case 11: G.A., (VIII), Plen., 401st mtg., para. 108; ibid,
8th session, Ad Hoc Pol.Com., 54th mtg., paras, 3-11} ibid, 10th session,
Ad Hoc Pol.Com., 5th mtg., para. 25; ibid, 9th session, Ad Hoc Pol.Com.,
43rd mtg., paras. 1-2; ibid, 15th session, Sp.Pol.Coxa., 94th mtg., paras.
9-13; Ca3e 24: ibid, 11th session, 1st Com., 847th mtg., para. 60; ibid,
12th session, 1st Com., 927th mtg., para. 3: Case 27: ibid, 11th session,
1st Can., 834th ratg., paras. 1-4; ibid, 12th session, 1st Con., 915th mtg.,
para. 55.
Venezuela: Case 2; (J. ,.., (VI), Ad IIoc Pol.Com., 52nd mtg., para. 53.
4.
The depth of the oppoaition to any United Nations action with respect to a
matter whioh is considered to fall essentially within the domestio jurisdiction
of a particular State is shown by the fact that some States have indicated that
they could not even accept a general recommendation whioh, though It deals with
a particular problem in a vague general way and is addressed not to one nation
but to all, originates in a discussion of the domestio affairs of a particular
State,1
Few States, liowever,have supported the technical definition of intervention
1, See the statements of Belgium: G.A.,(vil), Ad Hoo Pol.Com., 21st mtg., para.
24:
"The Belgian delegation would abstain on the
Soanlnavian draft resolution as & whole. That
draft was acceptable as far as its ideas were
oonoerned, but having been submitted in the course
of the debate it had acquired a concrete significance
whioh was contrary to the Belgian delegation's view
that the General Assembly was not competent to
discuss apartheid in the Union of South Africa."
Franoe held the same opinion} see G.A.,(VIl), Ad Hoo Pol.
Com., 38th mtg., para. 15} as did the United Kingdom: see
&.A»,(VIl), PIen., 4dst para. 108. 'Hie South African
view of suoh resolutions was explained at the seventh "session
in the following tomo} see G.A., (VIl), Plen., 401st mtg.,
paras. 83-84*
"•••• % delegation asserts that any resolution
relating to the present item, whatever its nature,
would be a contravention of Article 2, paragraph 7#
of the Charter,«...
Allow mo to refer, first of all, to the draft
resolution whioh was originally sponsored by the
delegations of Denmark, Iceland and Norway. Now,
it is true, of oourse, that this draft resolution
seeks to set out a general statement of principles
whioh do not refer specifically to the Union of
South Africa, I submit, however, that it does,
by implication, seek to criticise and, in fact,
condemns the policies of the South African
Government# lioreover, it emanates from a
discussion and the consideration of South Afrioa's
domestio affairs and is therefore, in the view of
my Government, unconstitutional. It is the asser¬
tion, consequently, of my delegation, that the reso¬
lution constitutes intervention in the sense in whioh
that word was used in Article 2, paragraph 7 of the
Charter."
in the substantive debates. In fact, only eight appear to have done so with
any conviction, vis., Ceylon, Ecuador, Egypt, Guatemala, Indonesia, India, the
Philippines and to some extent, Bur:aa.^
1. Ceylon: G.A., (XII), 3p.Bol.Caa., 61st mtg., para. 50.
Egypt: Gr.A., (XT), 1st Com., 838th mtg., paras. 21-22 where the Egyptian
delegate said that:
On the otherhand, he wondered how one could say that the con¬
sideration of a question and a recomaend&tion by the General Assembly
constituted interference in matters which fell essentially within
the domestic jurisdiction of States within the meaning of Article
2, paragraph 7, of the Charter. The word ♦intervene* used in
Article 2, had been defined by Professor Rousseau as follows:
(Droit international public /Paris, Recueil Sirey, 1955J7 P* 321)
* Intervention is the action of a state which is
carrying out an act of interference in the internal
or external affairs of another State to require the
performance or non-performance of a specific thing.
The intervening State acts in an authorative way,
seeking to impose its will, to exercise pressure in
order to make its view® prevail.*
The act of including the question of Algeria in the agenda
of the Assembly, the act of discussing that question or making a
recommendation could not in any case constitute intervention or
interference in the internal affairs of France. Moreover,
United Nations practice had always upheld that interpretation
of Article 2, paragraph 7. ......That interpretation had been
accepted in writings on the subject j it had been supported by
Professor Ilersch Lauterpacht
However, Egypt has not been a perpetual supporter of the technical
definition. In particular, where there was some danger that she
herself might have been the subject of an ♦investigation* under the
aegis of the Economic and Social Council, she invoked Article 2(7)
in an effort to prevent this, although such an investigation does
not come within the prohibited degrees of intervention as seen by
Professor Lauterpacht. The patent contradiction in these two
positions renders Egypt *s statements somewiiat suspect. See
E. & S.C. (VIII), 256th mtg., p. 375 - The infringement of
Trade Union Rights.
Ecuador: G-.A., (VIII), Ad Hoc. Bol.Com., 36th mtg., paras. 25-41; and ibid,
10th session, JE Hoc Bol.Com., 7th mtg., para. 25.
Guatemala: G.A., (X), Ad Hoc Bol.Com., 8th mtg., para. 2.
Indonesia: Gr.A.,(V), Ad Hoc Bol.Com., 42nd mtg., para. 57;
India: G.A., (X), Plen., 550th mtg., para. 251.
Philippines: G.A., (V), Ad Hoc Bol.Com.. 43rd atg., para. 8.
Burma: G.A., (XI), 3p.Ibl.Com., 10th mtg., para. 31, where her representative
said that:
6.
"•••• the Government of the Union of South Africa continued
to maintain that, under article 2, paragraph 7, of the Charter,
the United Nations was not competent to diecuaa the question
of the treatment of people of Indian origin in the Union of
South Africa, Resolutions previously adopted lay the General
Assembly had been disregarded, thereby malduog the situation
worse. It was true that the United nations could not ls»*
pose a decision on any Member, but it should continue to pro¬
mote the effective observance of human rights and fundamental
freedoms for all and to endeavour to disprove the lot of the
victims of racial discrimination in the Union of South Africa."
This statement does not appear to commit Burma irrevocably to supporting
the technical interpretation of intervention.
The position assumed by Greece, however, is 3aaewbat unsatisfactory. In
the agenda debate on the Cyprus Question at the ninth session, her delegate
supported the inclusion of this item because, in his opinion, intervention
bore the technical meaning attached to it by Rrofeasor Lantarpacht. But, Just
prior to this, at the eighth session, her delegate had made a statement rele¬
vant to the racial situation in South Africa which both contradicted and to
some extant laid the foundations for her later one. The extant of the contra¬
diction in Cbreeoe's thinking will be evident from the following passage:
G.A.,(VIII), Ad Hoc Bel.Com,, 33rd mtg., paras. 39-39:
"His delegation •••• had throughout contested the General
Assembly's competence to consider the question, and Its atti¬
tude on that point had not changed. It held that the matter
was essentially within the domestic Jurisdiction of South
Africa and that consequently the United Nations had no
right to intervene in the case. +«»•
Ilia delegation had nevertheless voted for the in¬
clusion of idie item in the agenda of the present session.
It bad done so in deference to the resolutions previously
adopted by the Assembly, but had made it clear that ita
vote did not in any way prejudice its position on the
question of the Assembly's competence. Furthermore,
it had hoped that the report of the Coramieslon appointed
to study the racial situation in the Union of South Africa
set up by the General Assembly at its seventh session would
throw new light on the problem.
The Greek delegation's position was dictated by its
concern to safeguard the principle set forth in the Charter
that the United Nations should not intervene in matters
essentially within the domestic Jurisdiction of Member
States, The Greek delegation which had already chal¬
lenged as unconstitutional the General Assembly's Juris¬
diction on the question of the treatment of persons of
Indian origin in South Africa, could not but take the
same attitude on the question of racial conflict in South
Africa, since it was convinced that the racial situation
in the Union could not be invoked as Justifying application
of Article 14 of the Charter."
The Greek delegation here seemed to indicate that where a
matter fell essentially within the domestic Jurisdiction of a
particular State, the United Nations was incompetent to deal
with it* But having made this impression, the Greek dele¬
gate went on to say}
"The South African Government was in fact being charged,
first, with having created, by its policy of apartheid, a
dangerous situation that constituted a threat to international
peace and security and, second, with having flouted the princi¬
ple of respect for human rights* »*** With regard to the second
charge, in reply to those who contended that any action on the
part of the United Nations might be precluded if the principle
of non-intervention was invoked to debar application of the
Charter provisions relating to human rights, he would say that
it was wrong to suppose that the provisions of Article 2, para¬
graph 7, were completely irreconcilable with those of the various
articles of the Charter relating to human rights* A distinction
should be mads between the Assembly's power to discuss a matter
and to initiate investigations, and its power to make recommenda¬
tions. 13% Assembly would not be able to make a recommendation
cm a matter within the domestic Jurisdiction of a State without
intervening in its internal affairs, but the discussion and
examination of such a question by the Assembly might not con¬
stitute interference In the domestic affairs of States, if the
Assembly took no further action*
In including the question of racial conflict in South
Africa in the agenda on two occasions, and by setting up
the Commission, the Assembly had reached the extreme limits
of its powers* It should avoid creating a dangerous
precedent and should be careful not to pass Judgement on the
racial situation in Sough Africa* It should not regard it¬
self as authorised to dictate the racial policy which the
South African Government should adopt*"
On the one hand, the Greek delegation seemed to indicate
that any consideration of a domestic matter was outwith the
competence of the General Assembly* Then it modified its
view somewhat and indicated that discussion and investiga¬
tion might not constitute intervention. This contra¬
diction would have been hard enough to deal with. But
then at the next session, the Greek delegation maintained
that intervention bore the technical meaning attached to
it by Brofessor Lauterpacht, i.e., even recommendations con¬
cerning domestic matters were within the powers of the
General Assembly. These contradictions render Greek con¬
tributions to this controversy of doubtful use*
8.
The only other substantial measure of support for the technical defini¬
tion of intervention is to be found in the first report of the United Nations
Commission on the Racial Situation in the Union of South Afrioa. This Com»
1
mission, after a detailed analysis of the arguments cm the subject, came to
the conclusion that the majority of the Members were of the opinion that the
word 'intervene * means dictatorial interference. Hence, it concluded that as
discussions of items and the adoption of recommendations thereon do not amount
to dictatorial interference, neither of them amounted to intervention within
2
the meaning of the Charter. Furthermore, the Commission claimed that this
conclusion was in keeping with the intentions of the San Francisoo Conference
on International Organization.3
With all respect to the distinguished members of the Commission it is
4.
submitted that their conclusions are not valid. The San Franeisoo records
do not bear out their findings. To interpret these records otherwise re¬
quires substantial effort. Furthermore, while the Commissioners might; have
had access to unpublished information from the Members on this subject, it
certainly does not appear from the practice of the General Assembly that the
majority of them do believe that intervention as that term is used in Article
2(7), means dictatorial interference. Admittedly only a minority of Members
have expressed an opinion on this matter. Nevertheless, of those who have
expressed an opinion, a majority supports, in principle, the opposite
1. The Commission was set up at the seventh session of the General Assembly,
pursuant to Res. 616A(VH).
2. C.A.,(VIII), Suppl. No. 16, Bart I, Chapter II, lection Vl(a), para. 154 et seq.
5. ibid.
4. The Members of the Commission were, Mr. Neman Santa Cruz of Chile, Mr.
Dantes Bellengarde of' Haiti, and. Brofesscr Henri Laugier of France.
A
9.
interpretation. Ho other conclusion is possible from an examination of the
General Assembly records.
In principle then, a majority of the Members of the United Nations who
have considered this problem appear to favour the broad or non-technical
interpretation of the term 'intervene', and view as illegal discussion of or
recommendations concerning matters which fall essentially within the domestic
jurisdiction of any particular State or group of States.^"
1. Before proceeding further with the examination of the subsequent practice
of the General Assembly on this point, it is convenient here to notice
one variant of the technical definition which was put forward by a small
group of Latin American States. Guatemala, Mexico, Banana, Uruguay and,
to a lesser extent, Cuba have suggested that the prohibition of inter¬
vention in the domestic affairs of Member States cannot apply to col¬
lective action by the Members of the United Nations, taken under the
Charter. Hence, they conclude, as a recoranendation is an example of
collective action, it does not amount to intervention.
Referring to the relations of Member States with Franco Spain and
the various proposals which had been put forward on that subject the
Guatemalan delegate said that: (l/2), 1st Com., 58th mtg.,
p. 265J7.
"*»• his Government had always supported the principle of non¬
intervention in its true sense, understanding it to be the
interference of one State in the affairs of another by mili¬
tary means, economic pressure or similar measures. He thought,
however, that the United Nations could take action to defend a
principle of law or the fundamental rights of man and, for this
reason, sought collective action against Franco, believing it
not contrary to Article 2, paragraph 7."
Elaborating this same theme later in the same session, the Guatemalan
delegate further said: / G.A*, (l/2), ELen., 59th mtg., p. 1204J7.
" Collective repudiation of the Franco regime, the sympathy
of the democratic countries towards a people which fought
heroically for thirty-two months against the invading armies
of Hitler and Mussolini, cannot possibly be confused with the
old unilateral interference in the internal life of weak
nations by a single great-Bower, and not wholly in defence
of President Roosevelt's four freedoms.
This collective action which the conscience of the
civilized world will take in support of Spanish democracy
.... does not conflict with the act of Chapultepee in
so far as concerns the aspirations of human beings to
justice and freedom.all the delegations to
thi3 world Assembly refused unanimously to admit Franco to
this world organization, and, .... it did not occur to
anyone to describe that decision as a sin of intervention
or a violation of the frlangist sovereignty of Don Erancisco
Franco*
Again at the first session of the General Assembly the same view was put
forward by the delegation of Mexico during a debate on the treatment of people
of Indian origin in the Union of South Africa. Mr* de la Colina saidi
/G.A.,(l/2), HLen,, 51st ratg*, p. 102*7*
" The third port of w argument relates to a point
particularly dear to the countries of America. The prin-
ciple of non-intervention has in fact been raised by us
to the status of an inter-American axiom* It is an active
principle of incalculable value in the relations between
States, the sovereignty and legal equality of which are
laid down in Article 2, paragraph 1, of the Charter*
But this does not mean, even if the most specious
subtleties are invoiced, that mere recommendations by the
General Assembly, baseddireotly on the actual provisions
of the Charter, an international instrument which we have
all freely signed and ratified, solemnly pledging outselves
to carry out in good frith the obligations we have con¬
tracted in virtue of the Charter - all this, 1 say, does
not mean that such recommendations constitute interference
by the Assembly in matters which are essentially within
the domestic jurisdiction of any State, as stated in Article
2, paragraph 7, of the Charter*
It is a dangerous play on words and a sophism to speak
of interference when the only thing that is involved is
legitimate collective action by the Assembly, expressed in
a moderate, restrained, courteous, and conciliatory recom¬
mendation that is based on the Charter and introduces no
implied obligation contrary to paragraph 7 of Article 2 of
the Charter mentioned above*
Let us properly apply the word •interference* to the ar¬
bitrary action of one or more States which influence or wish
to influence the internal or external affairs of another State.
We vigorously condemn such action and reject it with indigna¬
tion* Thus, the representatives of ny country have ardently
upheld the principle of non-intervention in International
assemblies and, with exemplary firmness, in diplomatic
negotiations*
Our seal, therefore, must not be swayed by the mere
sound of words* Let us extract the true meaning and signi¬
ficance of terms from international life as it is.
Let us examine objectively the contents of the docu¬
ment which was signed at San Francisco, and let us not, at
each step, hide behind Article 2, paragraph 7, in an attempt
to evade our fundamental obligations. Let us not invoke it
as a clause which frustrates the other purposes and principles
of the United Nations,"
The most detailed exposition of this view was given by the Rinamanian
delegation at the first session of the General Assembly, during the debate
on the relations of Member States with Franco Spain, In the debate in
the First Committee, Mr, Alfaro said on behalf of Ifcnama that:
/c.A.,(l/2), 1st Com., 36th mtg., p. 240_7.
(1) In barring Franco Spain from membership in the United
Nations, the latter had done more than break relations with
Franco, since they had formally declared that they would
not maintain any relations with him so long as his regime
had not been replaced by a democratic one. Therefore it
was not consistent to hesitate now over some action likely
to produce the desired ohange in regime.
(2) The word intervention had been misused and misinter¬
preted, The principle of nan—intervention had blinded
Members to realities and prevented them from seeing that
the favoured system that they had set up in San Francisco
was baaed on collective action or intervention in order to
consolidate the peace and security of the nations as well
as the freedom and dignity of men. The essence of the
United Nations is collective action. The Security Council
which acts an behalf of fifty-four nations does nothing else
but take collective action, and the General Assembly acts In
the same manner when It makes a resolution with regard to one
or more nations. Intervention was a word used In bygone
days when big Bowers resorted to unilateral action suoh as
military occupation or punitive expeditions in order to
assure their political control of certain countries.
Article 2, paragraph 7, of the Charter, frequently
quoted, did not prevent either collective action from being
taken to enforce the principles set forth in the Charter. To
deny the United Nations the right to act collectively would be
tantamount to destroying the very purposes on which it was
based. The principle of collective action had been re¬
peatedly reaffirmed in the Charter in Articles 5, 9, 41, 42
and also in Article 2, paragraph Q» There fore the word
intervention should not be used but rather the word inter¬
dependence should be applied to the relations between nations
of the world,
(3) On the other hand, the severance of diplomatic relations
with Spain was not an act of intervention since it was a well-
known principle of international law that the independence
of States did not depend on their being recognized by other
countries. Recognition or severance of diplomatic relations
rested within the national jurisdiction of every State,"
Returning to the same subject in the first plenary session of the General
Assembly Mr, Alfaro said: 2f"G,A,(l/2), HLen,, 58th mtg., p. 1219J7.
Here we are, the delegations of Latin American Republics,
and the delegations of all the other countries of the world,
which unanimously declare our abhorrence of intervention by
one State in the internal or external affairs of another
State, In these words an American multilateral pact de¬
fines the universally respected principle of non-intervention;
the meaning of the treaty clause, as well as the history of
its establishment, combine to show in an indisputable manner,
that it had only in mind unilateral intervention, arbitrary
intervention, unauthorized military intervention of the type
we saw in Spain when Hitler and Mussolini entered into a
conspiracy to convert that noble and unfortunate country into
a field of experimentation for their future aggression, to
destroy its democratic government and to build up between the
Mediterranean and the Pyrenees a redoubtable bulwark of fas¬
cism.
That is the kind of intervention we all hate; that is
the kind of intervention which is barred, condemned, outlawed,
by the principle of sovereignty and by the principle of equality*
But the dogma of non-intervention has nothing to do with the
great system of collective action that we have set up by the
Charter of San Ifrancisoo* Arbitrary Intervention infringes
upon the principles of independence. Collective action is
based upon the doctrine of interdependence. Collective action
is foreseen, authorized, and agreed upon in specific provisions
of the Charter*; it is indispensable far the United Nations to
exert this collective action, because without it we cannot
have peace and security, we cannot promote human righto, we
cannot liave disarmament, we cannot sake the trusteeship
system work, we cannot have international, co-operation, we
cannot put into effect any of the great vital, basic princi¬
ples far which we have organized the world community of
States,
But, despite all this, the argument against the pro¬
position under consideration is reduced to hurling, at tnose
of us who advocate it, that hateful word •intervention*,
>Vliere is the intervention? What does the resolution say?
Nothing that implies physical or material action in Spain;
nothing that is not within the sovereign rights of any and
all Bowers to do; nothing that goes beyond expressing con¬
demnation of the present Spanish. regime ; nothing that is
not inabsolute conformity with the opinions, the desires and
the aspirations that we have all expressed, namely, that the
Eranoo Government must go, that it must be replaced by a
democratic government, because it is the incarnation of
everything we condemn, everything we hate, everything we
have fought against, everything we yearn to see disappear
from the face of the earth.
15.
To invoke .Article 2, paragraph 7, of the Charter against
this resolution is to miss the point entirely. lie are not
dealing here with any matter essentially within the domestic
jurisdiction of Spain. We are making reooramandations that
concern only the individual sovereignty of the Members of the
United Nations, because each nation is absolutely free to
maintain or not to maintain ambassadors or ministers in any
given country.
... .situations that are an actual or potential danger to
the peace of the world, and constitute a continuous, notorious,
grave and shocking violation of the most elementary human rights,
are not matters within the domestic jurisdiction of any particular
State; they are essentially within international jurisdiction,
essentially within the powers of the United Nations."
The Uruguay**, delegate, Mr. Mora, said, during the debate in the first session
of the General Assembly on the relations of Members with franco Spain, that the
General Assembly was competent to pass recommendations to help to realise human
rights and fundamental freedoms, i.e., he inferred that the matter of conditions
in Spain was not a domestic issue and for this assertion he relied on Article
15(1}(b). However, irrespective of this assertion, he claimed that a re¬
commendation did not amount to intervention. He said: /"&.A.,(l/2), ELen.,
59th mtg., p. 1211J7.
"The UrugUa^m Government, for its part, believes that
certain concepts should be established in connection with
various assertions, made in the course of debates, on the
principle of non-intervention and the way in which that princi¬
ple might affect the application of the Charter in the matter
we are now considering. It feels that to evoke the principle
of non-intarvention in order to paralyse collective action
organs expressly constituted to act on behalf of the inter¬
national community is a manifest contradiction.
Uruguay respects, and always has supported, the principle
adopted by inter-american conventions repudiating intervention
by any State in the internal or external affairs of other States;
but it holds that this principle refers always to unilateral
intervention only, or possibly to intervention by a group of
States acting arbitrarily en* cm their own initiative. it
cannot be maintained that the principle, as accepted at San
Francisco, could apply to the basic organs of the United
Nations community."
The position of these four States, whatever its substantive merits, is at
least reasonably dear. No recommendation can constitute intervention even
though it is addressed to a particular State, because if it did the entire
system of collective action, envisaged by the Charter system would, in their
opinion, break dewm.
The position of Cuba was not so linequivocal, however. In one and the
same debate iier delegates made statements which were rather contradictory
and it is therefore not too easy to give any valid assessment of her views
on this subject. Thus at the first session of the General Assembly,
during a debate on the relations of Member States with Franco Spain, her
delegate said that: ^/"G.A.,(l/2), 1st Com♦ , 56th mtg., p. 241y
*•••*• the United States and Colombian resolutions were both
in accordance with the stand taken by Cuba during the past
year in suggesting a plebiscite fear the Spanish people.
Because of the cruel civil war which established the Franco
regime and because of personal sympathy with the suffering
of the Spanish people under Franco's oppression, the Latin-
American republics were particularly concerned with the
situation. The many exiles and thousands of people de¬
prived of fundamental freedoms made it a world problem.
While the Cuban Government bad not broken relations
with the Franco regime it load opposed any tyranny and was
most interested that the Spanish people should regain a
peaceful and democratic government without the horrocrs of
another civil war.
The small Latin-American countries wished to protect
their independence by upholding the principle of non¬
intervention as expressed in Article 2, paragraph 7, of
the Charter, but this case was not a question of inter¬
vention in the old sense because it was the collective
action of the United nations as a whole* If the resolu¬
tion did not receive the required majority vote, because of
this principle, the disastrous result would be to strengthen
Franco."
This statement would seem to suggest that in the opinion of the Cuban
•.Government collective action by the Members of the United Nations did not
constitute intervention. Yet, later in the very same debate the Cuban
delegation said thati jTGUA., (l/2), 1st Con., 58th mtg., p. 265^7
the United Nations were unanimously agreed that democracy
and freedom should be restored to the Spanish people, but did
not agree on the method to achieve this purpose. Cuba w&s con¬
vinced that if the United Nations did not interfere, toe Spanish
people could solve their problem themselves. The principle of
non-intervention in Article 2, paragraph 7, should not be vio¬
lated and, while individual action by States was not inter¬
vention, collective action was."
This statement would appear to completely contradict the one made earlier
in the debate.
In toe plenary session of this debate, however, it appeared that Cuba did
not altogether favour collective intervention, irrespective of what was involved.
Here her delegate indicated that United Nations action was not Justified Just
because it was collective. Rather some regard had to be had for the type of
action which was to be taken collectively. % this statement, the Cuban
delegation seemed to take its stand somewhere in between its two previous
opinions. Her delegate saidi ^fu.A.,(l/2), Plen., 58th mtg.» p. 1179y*
M The proposal to withdraw heads of missions in no way
affects my Government's foreign policy. I can only confirm
that Cuba has not and has never had any ambassador accredited
to the Franco Government. Nevertheless, the Cuban delegation
Cannot vote in favour of this motion because, in cur view,
collective action of this kind constitutes Intervention in
a State's internal affairs, although to a lesser degree than
does the collective severance of relations. We shall not
vote against this motion because we do not wish to pre¬
judice it, since its rejection might strengthen the Franco
regime, with whose doctrines and politics we do not agree*n
The view that collective action by the Members of the United Nations is not
intervention, is not held by all Latin-American countries. El Salvador, for
example, was opposed to the collective withdrawal of ambassadors from Nadrid
in an effort to oust Franco because such collective pressure would, in her
opinion,amount to intervention in Spain's domestic affairs. In the plenary
session the delegate from El Salvador explained his country's point of view
thus: i£~G.A.,(ty.i), ELen*, 58th mtg., p. 1187-1190j see also G.A.,(lIl/2),
1st Com., 262nd mtg., pp. 257-258._/
" Nobody can doubt that the question of maintaining its
present government car of changing this government is a matter
that belongs to the internal Jurisdiction of Spain. Therefore,
the contemplated action of the United Nations which has as its
purpose to isolate the Spanish people and to surround them with
all sorts of difficulties that might lead to a state of (Inspira¬
tion and might compel them to overthrow their government, is an
act of positive intervention on the part of the United Nations
in a matter which is essentially within the internal Jurisdiction
of Spain. Such intervention is a flagrant violation of the
Charter of our international Organization.
It is true that paragraph 7 of Article 2 of the Charter of
the United Nations contains an exception to the strict prohibi¬
tion of intervention in the internal affairs of a State, and
that exception consists of the coercive measures which are
enumerated in Chapter VII of the Charter of the United Nations.
But we may here put a special emphasis on the two following
circumstances.
Firsts the coercive measures which are contemplated in
Chapter VII of the Charter of the United Nations are within
the special Jurisdiction of the Security Council, which is the
executive organ of the United Nations. For this reason, the
name of the General Assembly is not mentioned, not in a single
instance, in Chapter VII of our Charter.
"Secondly, the Security Council has recognized, in its resolu¬
tions concerning Spain, that this nation is not at present a
menace to peace} for this reason, the Security Council has
abstained flrom adopting the coercive measures which are within its
exclusive jurisdiction*
If we approve the draft resolution under consideration, the
General Assembly will not only have violated the Charter of the
United Nations by performing a positive act of intervention in
affairs which belong to the internal jurisdiction of Spain, but
it will at the same time commit a second violation of our Charter
when it encroaches upon the exclusive attributions or powers of
the Security Council* •«•*
• the collective pressure of the United Nations against
Spain to compel it to change its government is an intervention
in a matter which would constitute a violation of the stipu¬
lation contained in paragraph 7 of Article 2 of the Charter of
the United Nations. •••«•
I place special emphasis on the fact that, as we have just
noticed, the rupture of diplomatic relations, of which the first
step is the withdrawal of ambassadors and ministers of the United
Nations accredited to Madrid, is a coercive measure which can
only be required of the United Nations by the Security Council."
This attempt to justify certain types of action by the General Assembly
has not found favour among the Membership at large and has not been pursued
by those States which advocated it during the first session* This is fortu¬
nate for the arguments on which this particular idea was based were essen¬
tially specious* It is true that intervention, as conceived in the nine¬
teenth century applied to the arbitrary action of one State in trying to
influence the actions of another* But how those Latin-American States con¬
cerned were able to jump from this premise to the conclusion that collective
action by the United Nations cannot be intervention, is difficult, if not
impossible, to appreciate* The Uruguayan delegate maintained, supra, that the
principle of non-intervention could not apply to the basic organs of the United
Nations community. The only possible riposte is: Why? This is the ostensible
intention of the provisions of the Charter* This is the apparent reason
why this provision was included in the Charter.
The logical consequence of this Latin-American approach to intervention is
that the United Nations can do anything because it represents the collectivity
of States* But it was precisely to exclude such collective action that Article
2(7) was inserted in the Charter. It was to prevent collective interference
that this restriction was placed upon the powers of the United Nations.
This Letin-American approach is indeed a good example of the defective reason¬
ing complained of elsewhere - the argument which maintains that as intervention is
necessarily some tiling arbitrary and dictatorial, recommendations cannot, a priori,
constitute intervention. But cannot a recommendation be arbitrary? Does the
fact that an action is taken by the collectivity of States make it any the less
arbitrary where in fact it is dealing with matters it has no right to touch?
However, while this conclusion is the only possible one if regard is had
to the positions which the various nations have adopted on this point, in
principle, substantive practice in the General Assembly displays a curious
tendency to adopt a somewhat milder approach. There has been evident, in
the debates which have ensued on the merits of each item, even among nations
which have objected to mere discussion of the domestic affairs of particular
States, a tendency to tacitly accept suoh discussions and even to allow the
passage of some kind of mild resolution thereon. The resolutions which
they have been prepared to accept have usually amounted to no more than an
expression of concern about a certain situation or perhaps an offer of good
offices on the part of the United Nations. Nevertheless, no matter how mild
these resolutions are, their acceptance by some States represents a considerable
change of position, for, in principle, they had espoused the view that any
resolution, irrespective of its character, amounted to intervention.
Corresponding to this modification there has been, among those States
which had in principle adopted the technical view of intervention, a similar
tendency to back away from their extreme position. AH, of course, continued
to maintain, in general, that discussion did not amount to intervention. But
with regard to recommendat ions, they were much more cautious and at times re¬
fused to vote for certain resolutions, or parts of them, which they considered
to constitute intervention.
There has, in fact, been evident among both sets of States a tendency to
1. cantd.
Action does not become permissible just because it is collective.
To say so is to advocate the abolition of minority rights and to lay a
minority of States, inevitably weak or vulnerable ones, open to massive
intervention in affairs which all States consider as their own business.
The jurisdiction of the United Nations cannot possibly be constructed on
such a foundation.
examine the terms of & recommendation and decide on the basis of the substance
thereof, -whether or not it constitutes intervention. In very many instances.
States have neither asserted that as the matter was domestic, no recommendation
was legal, nor that as intervention was something dictatorial no recommendation
could be intervention. There has been, on the contrary, a general tendency
to adopt, in practice not in principle, a compromise definition of interven¬
tion which allows the General Assembly to at least discuss almost anything
and to adopt some kind of mild resolution thereon. The tendency is ill-
defined and not even continuous, as the following case histories will show.
But the over-all trend is indisputable and is only masked by the fact that
those States which have made contrary statements of principle do not in fact
appear to be aware of what they are, in practice, doing.
Chapter 1J.
The Relations of Members States with Franoo Spain
1# The First Session
(a) Background to the oaae.
The question of tho relations of Members of the United Nations with Franoo
Spain was raised at tho first, second, third and fifth sessions of the General
Assembly, the question of intervention being discussed at the first, third and
fifth sessions only*1
At the first port of the first plenary session, the General Assembly
2 ' * ' ' 1
adopted resolution 32(1) whioh recalled "that the San Francisco Conference
adopted a resolution? according to whioh paragraph 2 of Article 4 **> of the ...
Charter *cannot apply to States whose regimes have been installed with the help
of armed forces of countries which have fought against the United Nations so
long as those regimes remain in power1 "• The resolution also noted that at
the fbtadam Conference, the Soviet Union, the United Kingdom and the United
States agreed that they would not support a request for admission to the
United Nations by tho State of Spain, as long as that country was represented
by the Blanco regime. Finally, in endorsing these two statements of intention,
the resolution reoomendod that "the Members of the United Nations should act in
aooordance with the letter and spirit of these statements in the conduct of their
future relations with Spain"•
During the discussions which led up to the adoption of this resolution, it
1, At the sixth session, a special aspect of the Spanish question was disoussed,
i.e., the question whether a request to a State for a stay of execution of
death aentenoes constituted intervention* This is dealt with separately;
see infra, Chap. VIH, p. 248.
2, G.A.,(3/1), Plen*, 26th mtg*, p. 361.
3, UNCIO, Vol. 6, pp. 127-136, Doo. 1167, 3/10.
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does not appear that the problems of domestic Jurisdiction and intervention
were raised.
At the seoond port of the first session, the subject of the relations
with franco Spain was again brought up. By a letter dated 31st Ootober
the representatives of five States - Belgium, Czechoslovakia, Denmark, Norway
and Venezuela * requested that as the question of the attitudB of the United
Nations towards the regime in Spain was of great concern to the Members, an
item concerning this matter be included in the agenda. It was included
2
without debate.
(b) General tenor of the ensuing discussion.^
During the consideration of this item, it was recalled that the Sub*
Committee established by the Security Council to examine the Spanish question*'
had found that althou$i the continuance of the situation in Spain was likely to
endanger the maintenance of international peace and security, it did not con¬
stitute an actual threat to the peace within the meaning of Chapter VII of the
Charter. Hence it was contended that the question of the form and nature of
the Spanish Government still fell essentially within the domestic Jurisdiction
of Spain and that therefore Article 2(7) prohibited the General Assembly from
exerting any pressure on that country in order to bring about a ohange of
regime therein. In particular, It was oontended that the General Assembly was
debarred from recommending that Member States should sever diplomatic relations
1. g.a.,(]/2), 1st Com., pp. 351-352, Annexes - annex H(a/BUB/45) •
2. G.A.,(3/2), HLen,, 46th mtg., p. 923$ the above statement of background
facts is taken from the Repertory, Vol. I, pp. 61*62.
3. Per Repertory, ibid, p. 62.
4. S.C., 1st Yr., 1st Series, No. 2, 39th mtg., p. 245»
with Spain or even recall their ambassadors or ministers plenipotentiary be¬
cause suoh a recommendation would constitute intervention both in the domestio
affairs of Spain and of the States to whloh it was addressed#
These contentions v?ore disputed by other States which adopted contrary
points of view*
(o) Resolutions presented during the course of the debate in the first
Committee,
In the course of the debate in the First Committee, a great variety of
proposals woe put forward# Resolutions or amendments thereto were proposed
by} the Byelorussian S»S#R#, Poland, the United States, Colombia, Norway,
Belgium, Cuba, jointly by Mexico, Venezuela, Guatemala, Panama and Chile,
and by Yugoslavia#
(i) The First Palish Draft Resolution#3,
The General Assembly recalls that on 9 February 1946,
without a diasonting vote, it condemned the Franco regime
in Spain, reaffirmed Its exclusion from membership in the
United Nations in accordance with the decisions of San
Franoisoo and Potsdam, and oailed upon the Member States
to take this into account *±n conducting their future re¬
lations with Spain**
In May and Juno, 1%£, the Security Council oonduoted
an investigation of the possible further action to be
taken by the United Nations* The Sub-Committee charged
with the investigation found unanimously:
"(a) In origin, nature, structure and general conduct
the Franco regime is a Fascist regime patterned on, and
established largely as a result of aid received from
Hitler's Nazi Germany and Mussolini's Fascist Italy*
"(b) During the long struggle of the United Nations
against Hitler and Mussolini, Franco, despite continued
.Allied protests, gave very substantial aid to the enemy
Power# • First, for example, from 1941-1945 the Blue
Infantry Division, the Spanish Legion of Volunteers and
the Salvador Air Squadron fought against Soviet Russia
on the Eastern front# Second, in the summer of 1940
Spain seized Tangier in breach of international statute,
and as a result of Spain's maintaining a large army in
Spanish Morocco large numbers of allied troups wore
1# G#a#,(i/2), 1st Com#, Annexes, annex 11a, p# 352, Doo# a/C#l/24#
immobilised in ITorth Africa#
"(o) Incontrovertible documentary evidence establishes
that Franco was a guilty party, with Hitler and Mussolini,
in the conspiracy to wage war against those countries which
eventually in the oouraa of the world war banded together
as the United nations. It was part of the conspiracy
that Franco* s full belligerency should be postponed until
a time to be mutually agreed upon."
The Subcommittee also found that "the Spanish situation is one whioh
has already led to international friction" and concluded that the existence
and activities of the Franco regime constitutes a situation "likely to en¬
danger the maintenance of international peace and security" • Since that
time the situation in Spain has deteriorated and continues, increasingly,
to disturb and endanger international relations#
Therefore, the General Assembly recommends that eaoh Member of the
United Nations terminate, forthwith, diplomatic relations with the Franco
regime#
Hie General Assembly expresses its deep sympathy to the Spanish
people# The General Assembly hopes and expects that in consequence of
this action the people of Spain will regain the freedom of whioh they were
deprived with the aid aid contrivance of Fascist Italy and Nasi Germany#
Hxe General Assembly is convinced that the day will came soon when it will
be able to welcome a free Spain into the community of the United Nations#
(ii) The Second Polish Draft Resolution.1
Vfliereaa tho admission or participation of the Franco Government
in Spain in organs end agamies established by or brought into
relationship with the United Nations would contravene the purpose
and intent of the resolution of 9 February, 19k6,pexoluding this
government from membership in the United Nations;
The General Assembly recommends that the Franco Government
be baired from mcnbcrsliip and participation in any of the
organs and agencies mentioned#
(ill) The Byelorussian Amendment to the Polish Draft Resolution, (±) supra.3
The General Assembly roooagaenda that each Member of the
United Nations toxmnate diplomatio and economic relations
with Franoo Spain, such action to include the suspension of
ooomunioations by rail, sea, air, post and telegraph*
(iv) The United States Draft Resolution.^
The peoples of the United Nations, at San Francisoo, Potsdam
1# ibid, annex lib, p# 353, Doc. //C.l/25.
2. Res# 32(1), supra, p# 19.
3# ibid, annex 11c, p. 35k, Doo. h/Z.2/35 *nd Coir# 1*
4# ibid, annex lid, p# 35k, Doc# A/C .2/100.
and London condemned the Franco regime In Spain and
decided that, as long as that regime remains, Spain may
not be admitted to the United Nations*
The peoples of the United Nations assure the Spanish
people of their enduring sympathy and of the cordial wel¬
come awaiting them when circumstances enable them to be
admitted to the United Nations*
Therefore the General Assembly.
Convlnoed that the Franco Fascist Government of Spain,
which was imposed by force upon the Spanish people with
the aid of the Axis powers and which gave material assis¬
tance to the Axis powers in war, does not represent the
Spanish people, and by its continued oontrol of Spain is
making impossible the participation of the Spanish people
with the peoples of the United Nations in the international
affairs;
Recommends that the Franco Government of Spain be debarred
from membership in international agencies set up at the
initiative of the United Nations, and from participation in
conferences or other activities which may be arranged by the
United Nations or by these agencies, until a new and accept*
table government is formed in Spain*
father#
Desiring to secure the participation of all peace-loving
peoples, Inolndfn/* the people of Spain, in the community of
nations.
Recognizing that it is for the Spanish people to settle
the fbrm of their government;
Plaoea on record its profound conviction that in the
Interest of Spain and of world co-operation the people of
Spain should give proof to the world that they have a
government which derives its authority from the consent
of the governed; and that to achieve that end General
Franco should surrender the powers of Government to a
provisional government broadly representative of the
Spanish people, committed to respect freedom of speech,
religion, and assembly end to the prompt holding of an
election in which the Spanish people, free from force
and intimidation and regardless of party, may express
their will; and
Invites the Spanishpeople to establish the eligibility
of Spain for admission to the United Nations*
(v) Colombia*Amendment to the Draft Polish Resolution, (i) Supra*1
Whereas the General Assembly, at the first part of its
first session held at London, adopted on 9 February 1946
the following resolution*
1* ibid, annex He, p* 355$ Doc, A/C*1/102
"1* The General Aaaaablv reoalls that the San Franoisoo
Conference' 'actoptod a resolution according to which paragraph
2 of Artiole 4 of Chapter II of the United Nations Charter
'oannot apply to States whose regimes have been installed
with the help of arnod forces of countries which have fought
against the United Nations so long as these regimes are in
power*.
"2# Pie General Assembly recalls that at the Potsdam
Conference the Govacments of the United Kingdom, the
United States of .America and the Soviet Union stated
that they would not support a request for admission to the
United Nations of the present Spanish Government 'which
having been founded with the support of the Axis Powers,
in view of its origins, its nature, its record and its
olose association with the aggressor states, does not
possess the necessary qualifications to justify its
admission*.
"3. The General Assembly, in endorsing these two state¬
ments, reoommonua that the Members of the United Nations
should act in acoordonee with the letter and the spirit of
these statements in the conduct of their future relations
with Spain."
Whereas a great many of the "embers of the United Nations
do not maintain diplomatic relations with Spain and various
others are prepared to suspend suoh relations; and
Whereas it has been proposed to this General Assembly that
it should recommend to all Members of the Uhited Nations which
have not yet done so that they should sever their diplomatic
and economic relations with the Franco regime in Spain forth¬
with; and
Whereas it is a fact that the political and sooial con*
ditiona which gave rise to and justify the declarations made
at San Francisco, Potsdam and London are still prevailing in
Spain; and
Whereas. however, Artiole 4 of the Charter of the United
Nations lays down that membership in the United Nations is
open, not only to original members of the Organisation, but
also to all those which accept the obligations contained in
the Charter end. in the judgement of the Organisation, are
able and willing to oarry out these obligations; and
Whereas., in accordance with Artiole 55 of the Charter, the
United Nations shall promote universal respect for and ob-
s ervanoe of human rights and fundamental freedoms for all
without distinction of race, sex, language or religion,
Therefore, tlie General Assembly resolves;
1. To express its wish that the Government and people of
Spain should seek and find a method of brining into being,
by peaceful means, within the shortest possible time and in
accordance with the principles and purposes of the Charter
of the United Nations, the new sooial and political condi¬
tions necessary to enable Spain to be admitted as a Member
of the Organisations
2, To reoorxiond to the Latin-iUaerioan Republics that they
should offer to the Government of Spain their good offices,
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should the latter think them useful in order to aohlevs the
purposes of this resolution}
3* To defer until the meeting of the next General Assembly
the dissuasion and adoption of the resolution proposed by the
delegation of Poland as well as the amendment proposed by the
delegation of the Byelorussian S.S.R.
(vi) Belgian Amendment to fee United States Draft Resolution#1
Add the following paragraph;
that if, within a reasonable time the political
conditions enumerated above are not realised, the Security
Council consider the adequate measures to be taken in order to
remedy the situation, and
Reoommends that all Members of the United Nations immediately
reoall from Madrid, by way of warning, their ambassadors end
ministers pleipotentiory, aocredit/ed there*
(vii) Amendment to the United States Draft Resolution submitted jointly
he delegations of Mexioo. Venezuela, Guatemala, Panama, and
Replace the last two paragraphs of the United States resolution by the
following*
"And inasmuch as the United Nations, by the actions they took in
San Franoisoo, in Potsdam, in London, and oven more recently in
Lake Success, have in fact, collectively refused to maintain re*
lotions with the Sfconoo regime, does hereby recommend that the
Members of the United Nations take, individually, the same atti¬
tude they have taken collectively and refuse to maintain diplo¬
matic relations with the present Spanish regime*
"The Assembly further recommends that the States Members of
the Organisation report to the Secretary General and to the next
Assembly what action they have taken in accordance with this re¬
commendation*"
C®U) Yugoslav Ameadnont to the United States Craft Resolution."*
1* In Hie second last paragraph replace the words:
"General Franco should surrender the powers of government to a
provisional government" with the words "that there should be formed
in Spain a provisional government"*
2* At the end of tlic resolution add the following new paragraph:
Reoommends to all Member States of the United Nations to
sever diplomatic relations with the Government of General Franco*
1* ibid, annex llh, p* 357, Boo* A/C*l/W7
2* ibid, annex Hi p. 358, Boo* A/C.1/1Q8,
3* ibid, annex llj p* 350, Boo* VC.1/105•
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The amendments submitted by Cuba and Norway are not pertinent to the present
discussion,^
(a) fttWde, .9? vPFftTfo, tfteqe yayiou? pyoposplfl.
The proposals put forward in the First Committee had one thing in common -
the desire to see the substitution of the Franco regime in Spain by another, more
representative one. However, opinions varied as to the moans which should be
employed to achieve tills end. This difference of opinion was due to differenoes
in the opinion among the Members of the United Nations on the issue of domestic
jurisdiction and also on what constitutes intervention.
Some States either expressly or by implication, contended that the matter
was not domestic anyway and that the question of intervention did not therefore
arise. Others do not appear to have considered the issues of domestic juris*
diction and intervention at all, Canada, for example, confined her remarks to the
political expediency of the various measures proposed and did not make any state*
2
ment on domestic jurisdiction or intervention. Similarly, Luxembourg and Denmark
supported the proposals of tine United States, but without apparently considering
the issues of intervention and domestic jurisdiction/*
I
However, the opinion of a considerable number of States did oryatalize round
the issue of intervention.
The most extreme measure suggested was the rupture of relations, diplomatio
and otherwise, with Frcr.oo Spain, Notunnaturally States like Guatemala and
Mexico, which expressed the view that no collective action by the United Nations
1, Norway* ibid, annex llf, p, 357, Loo, //C.l/lGk,
Cuba* ibid, annex llg, p, 357, Doc. A/C,3/106,
2, G,A.,(3/2)» 1st Com,, 37th mtg., pp, 2V**2k5»
3, Luxembourg: ibid, 38th ratg,, p, 262,
Denmark* ibid, 39th mtg,, p, 26k,
2$.
oould oonstitute intervention,1 wore of the opinion that this particular measure
would not amount to intervention in the domestic affairs of Spain*
Speaking on behalf of Guatemala Mr* Saenz said thats^
Hie breaking of relations with ETanoo Spain was a
passive measure and not intervention, but maintaining
relations with Kranao would amount to intervention in his
favour, Franco was a product of fascism and the United
Nations should break relations with his regime.
Giving the view of Headoo. Mr, de la Colina said that: ^
««, the breaking off of diplomatic relations was not
an aot of intervention, Hie recommendation to adopt
such a measure was merely an invitation addressed to the
Members to do individually what they had already decided
to do collectively in San Franoisoo and London,
On the other hand several States opposed the oolleotive severance of rela¬
tions with ITanoo because they felt that such collective pressure on Spain to
change its government would amount to an aot of intervention in its domestic
affairs. However, it is important to note that oven those States were pre¬
pared to vote for aomo kind of recommendation, provided it aid not amount to
intervention. The delegations of several States indicated that though they
were opposed to any resolution which they felt constituted intervention in the
domestic affairs of Spuin, they were not opposed to all recommendations on the
aubjeot, even though they did consider that the subject under discussion fell
essentially within the domestic jurisdiction of Spain, The States talcing this
attitude Included Nicaragua, the Philippines, the United States, Peru, the
United Kingdom, Colombia, Ecuador, Costa Rica, El Salvador and China,
The Nioaraguos delegate pointed out that:*4-
1, Supra, Chap, I, pp.9-10.
2, G.A»,(l/2), 1st Com,, 35th mtg,, p, 233? also, ibid, 39th mtg,, P» 268.
3. ibid, 43rd mtg., p. 296,
4. ibid, 35th mtg., p, 234.
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• ••••the General assembly had already resolved that
Spain should he barred from membership to the United
Nations. Nicaragua would again support such a resolu¬
tion, but would vote against measures which disregarded
the principle of non-intervention and which had been
one of the corner stones of the inter-Amerioan system
since 1953. .... The United Nations should respect self-
determination and non-intervention and far these reasons,
the Nicaraguan delegation accepted the United States
resolution.
Later in the same debate, the Nicaraguan delegate added that he:"*'
• ••••considered the United States proposal the most appropriate.
The small nations had been glad to hear Mr. Connolly uphold
the principle of non-intervention.
The representative of Panama, in analysing the United
States proposal, had not given sufficient attention to
Article 2 paragraph 7. of the Charter. The United Nations
must not violate the principle of non-intervention, far the
Franco regime was merely a potential threat to peace. ••••
The delegate of the Philippines also opposed a recommendation of the
2
collective rupture of relations with Spain. He said that:
• ••••he could not vote for the Polish resolution or the
Byelorussian amendment and thought that the United States
resolution should be the basis of discussion. The right
of intervention had been replaced by the principle of self-
determination. When the Monroe Doctrine had lost its
meaning, the small Latin-American Republics established the
law of non-intervention in domestic affairs which was later
accepted asa principle of international universal law and
was recognised in Article 2, paragraph 7, of the Charter.
The Philippine delegation agreed with the principles
of the United States resolution which reaffirmed the principle
of non-intervention and left the overthrow of the Franco re¬
gime to the Spanish people.
The Latin-American countries could not allow the prin¬
ciple of non-intervention, which was the only right of
small weak countries, to be made void by a General Assembly
resolution.
2
On behalf of Paraguay. Mr. Acosta said that:
1. ibid, 38th mtg., p. 262.
2. ibid, 35th mtg., p. 234—255
3. ibid, 36th mtg., p. 255.
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.... the itolish proposal was not satisfactory because the
breaking of diplomatic relations was an attempt to modify
an internal regime and was therefore an act of inter*,
vention. Furthermore a severance of diplomatic re¬
lations could be justified only where there was an
act of aggression or a definite menace to peace. In
regard to the Spanish situation, no such menace was
found but only a potential danger.
The representative of Paraguay was more in agreement
with the American proposal although he thought it con¬
tained some contradictions} it rested on the principle
of non-intervention but, at the same time, suggested
the formation of a provisional government to which General
Franco should surrender his powers. He was also more in
agreement with the Colombian proposal which, he believed,
was more in keeping with the principles of the Charter.
He declared himself in favour of a solution which would
permit the Spanish people to find its place among the
United Nations.
In commending the American resolution to the Committee, the United States
representative, Mr. Connally said thatj*
.••••••.Breaking diplomatic relations and imposing economic
sanctions would only result in making worse the situation of
the Spanish people and increasing in Spain a political and
economic chaos conducive to civil strife. This situation
would provoke international complications, ednce both the
opposing factions in Spain would be likely to receive the
support of different Members of the United Nations. This
was not the proper time to take coercive measures against
Spain.....
The situation which led the Security Council to defeat
the Polish proposal to sever diplomatic relations with Spain
had not changed. The Franco regime was not a direct threat
to the maintenance of peace.
Mr. Connally reiterated the readiness of his Government
to take steps against the Franco regime when it was found to
be a threat to international peace.....
The representative of the United States concluded by
stressing that the basis of the foreign policy of his
Government was the principle of non-intervention in the
internal affairs of other countries, recalling that the
policy of non-intervention was a principle laid down in
Article 2, paragraph 7, of the Charter. The only course
of action which would be prudent and wise, in the present
state of affairs, would be to remind the Spanish people of
1. ibid, pp. 239-240,
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the reasons why they vrere not eligible for membership in the
United Nations and to suggest to them the conditions they
should create to regain their place among the United nations.
Later on in the sane debate, Mr. Connally, objecting to the terms of the
Polish draft resolution and the Byelorussian amendment thereto, said that:"'*
Unlike the Polish resolution and the Byelorussian S.S.R.
amendment, the United States resolution made a direct appeal to
the Spanish people* #10 by an aroused public opinion could bring
pressure to bear on the leaders to bring about a change of govern¬
ment. Breaking economic relations would be intervening with the
force of hunger and, by disrupting normal commercial relations and
bringing hardships to the people of Spain, would strengthen the
Franco regime.
Similar opposition to coercive measures was voiced by the delegation of
2
Peru, on behalf of which, Mr. de Lavalle said that:
.... Peru had adhered to the principle of non-intervention through¬
out its history and thought it should be carefully defended without,
however, prejudicing collective action for the maintenance of peace
and security. The United Nations could take coercive measures only
when the Security Council had determined the existence of a threat
to the peace, a breach of the peace, or an act of aggression under
Article 59. Since the Security Council's investigation had proved
that Spain was only a potential threat to the peace, which did not
allow measures to be taken tinder Articles 41 and 42, the situation
must be considered internal. ••••••
The maintenance of diplomatic relations did not mean the
approval of the Franco regime and Beru adhered to the three de¬
clarations prohibiting the admission of Franco Spain into the
United Nations. This exclusion reaffirmed the principles of the
Charter. tie favoured a recommendation vtiich would tend to re¬
establish a peaceful and democratic situation in Spain.
The United Kingdom adopted a similar position. Won only did she disapprove
of the adoption of coercive measures on the grounds that it would be politically
unwise, but maintained that to do so would be to intervene in the domestic affairs
of Spain. Yet, at the same time, the United Kingdom was able to give its
support to the American draft resolution* Sir Hartley Shawcross said that the
1. ibid, 39th mtg., p. 268.
2. ibid, 36th mtg., p. 242; emphasis added,
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United Kingdom:1
,,,,.approved the United States resolution as the means most
likely to rid Spain of Franco and return the Spanish people
to the community of nations with a truly democratic regime.
He emphasised that his delegations belief that the United
Nations ought pot to intervene more actively was not because
the United Kingdom hod any delusions about the Franco Govern¬
ment or any lack of sympathy for the Spanish people which
suffered under its yoke. The Spanish people should be left
in no doubt as to the contempt with which their present
government was regarded, or as to the resolute refusal of
the rest of the world to admit them into the community of
nations while that government remained in power. The United
3tates resolution oontained that message*
However, his Government opposed any action which might
precipitate the catastrophe of a Spanish oivil war, which
a resolution such as that submitted by the Yugoslav dele¬
gation appeared to invite. ......
Even if diplomatic or eoonomio sanctions were wise, he
deolared, at the present stage of development of the United
Nations, interference in the domestic affairs of other
Governments would set a very grave precedent. No matter
was more obviously the exclusive concern of the people of
a State than the form of its own government. Since the
Security Council had expressly refrained from deolaring
that the Spanish question constituted a threat to the
peaee, his Government maintained it to be a domestic matter....*,
he felt that to interfere and make an exception, in wloat was
alleged to be a 'vary special* oase, would only lead to the
temptation to intervene in other, no doubt *very special*
oases* *...*.*
Although his Government had previously questioned the
usefulness of a resolution whioh would exclude Spain from
membership on specialised agamies, his delegation would
support both parts of the United States resolution.
Colombia, in commending its own draft resolution to the First Committee,
also expressed her disapproval of any recommendation which would constitute
intervention in the domestic affairs of Spain* Speaking on Colombia*s
behalf, Mr. Lopes said that:2
1. ibid, 37th mtg., p. 2^7; emphasis added.
2. ibid, p. 2if9-250; emphasis added.
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.... although he shared the interests of every one of the
Members of the United Nations in brining about a change in
the social and political situation of Spain, he was definitely
not in favour of any intervention. The Polish proposal
sought to throw Franco out of the government of Spain. As
far the American draft resolution, sane interpreted it as an
invitation to do the same, whereas others viewed it as a
stimulant to civil strife in Spain. Although Mr, Connally
said this was not his intention, it was hard to understand
how it was possible to throw Franco out of office without
his consent or without bringing about civil strife in Spain.
The Colombian proposal attempted to reconcile the purposes
of the tiarae motions before the Committee but differed from
them as to the methods to be followed.
The Colombian proposal approached the Spanish question
from another angle. Instead of recommending coercive measures
or intervention, it laid emphasis on co-operation between the
Spanish people and its present government to luring about a
change in the existing social and political system.
Ecuador also stated her opposition to any proposal which implied inter¬
vention, but did not elaborate on which of the proposals before Committee
she felt fell into that category.* Costa Rica, also opposing any intervention
in the domestic affairs of Spain, expressly objected to the Relish resolution.
2
Mr. Fournler said that.
•••••The Relish resolution, which sought to put foreign pressure
on Spain to change its form of government, was clearly an inter¬
vention. It would be wrong both legally and historically to
intervene on the grounds that the Franco regime had been es¬
tablished with the help of Hitler and Mussolini.
• ••••He would not vote for any proposal providing for inter¬
vention.
Mr. Castro of El Salvador added his country' s voice to those who objected
to the coercive measures foreseen in the Polish resolution and the Byelorussian
5
amendment thereto. He said that:
1. ibid, p. 251.
2. ibid, p. 252.
5. ibid, p. 255.
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.,. . .The Polish and Byelorussian proposals would have the
effect of isolating the Spanish people with the object
of overthrowing the Spanish Government and was clearly
intervention. Since the defeat of Germany and Italy,
the Spanish people had received no outside aid and
could decide the question of their government far
themselves. Under Articel 2, paragraph 7, of the Charter,
coercive measures, such as the breaking of diplomatic re¬
lations , could be taken only by the Security Council and
the Council had established that the Franco regime was not
a threat to the peace.
Analysing the various proposals which had been put forward in the First
Committee in the course of the debate, Br. Wellington Kbo of China divided them
1
into three categories and said that:
• ••• The first were those favouring enforcement action in
some form and included the Fblish resolution and amendments
of the Byelorussian 3.S.R., Belgium, Norway and Yugoslavia,
The Security Council had determined that the Franco regime
was a potential rather than an imminent threat to the peace
and therefore such drastic action as the application of
Article 41 was not called far. He could not support
these proposals.
The second category was the United States resolution,
Mr. Koo thought that the proposal to bar Franco Spain
from the United Nations agencies was an appropriate step
since this resolution also safeguarded the principles of
non-intervention and self-determination. He would support
the United States proposal which attempted to meet the
Polish view half way.
The third category was the Colombian resolution which
was in substance collective mediation. .»•«.
It is inherent in this analysis that China too was prepared to support a
recommendation which did not go as far as to intervene in the domestic affairs
of Spain, but would oppose one which, in her opinion, did do so.
It is clear from the statements quoted above that those delegations were
unhappy about the possible outcome of the debate on the Spanish question. On
the one hand, they wished to see the France regime replaced by one which paid
some attention to democratic principles. On the other, each of the States
1. ibid, 39th mtg., PP. 2G4-265.
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dealt with, either expressly or by implication, recognized that the question
of the form of the government of any State is a matter to he dealt with by the
people of that State and therefore a matter of domestic jurisdiction which, "by
the terms of Article 2(7) of the Charter, is immune from United nations inter¬
vention. In addition, it was recognized ty some of them that the exception
provided for in Article 2(7) did not apply in this case because the Security
Council Sub-Committee^ had found that the Eranco regime did not constitute a
direct threat to peace within the meaning of Chapter VII of the Charter.
Nevertheless, while all those States made plain their intention not to be
a party to any intervention in the internal affairs of Spain,such as, in their
opinion, would have been the case if they had voted for resolutions of the
type proposed by Poland, equally they indicated that they were not averse to
all recommendations. The fact that they considered the question of the form
of the government of a State to be an internal matter did not induce than to
maintain as a consequence that any and all recommendations on the subject would
constitute intervention in the affairs of Spain. On the contrary, they all
indicated their willingness to vote for some kind of resolution dealing with
the matter.
This is a most important development in the interpretation of the Charter
provisions relating to intervention, for it has already been seen that, at a
later stage in United Nations practice, States like the United Kingdom have
maintained that where a matter is essentially domestic, it cannot even be
discussed or included in the agenda of the General Assembly. However, this
was not the approach adopted at this early stage. At this early stage in the
practice of toe United Nations the approach adopted towards this question was
1. Supra, p. 20.
that whereas some recomrnendations addressed to particular States regarding their
do;nestio affairs, or which, though addressed to States in general, also treat
with the domestic affairs of a particular State, constitute intervention, not
all such recommendations necessarily do so* It is evident that an attempt was
being made here to distinguish between different types of recommendations and to
classify them as intervention according to their terms and not dismiss them all,
just because the natter dealt with was domestic to a particular State.*
Confronted with these different proposals and the divergent opinions of the
various delegations on both their suitability and legality, it was decided at
the 59th meeting of the First Committee to refer the matter to a Sub-Committee,
consisting of the authors of resolutions or amendments thereto, plus the perma^
nent members of the Security Council, which was instructed to seek any common
ground among the many resolutions and amendments thereto and to produce an
2
original resolution which might be unanimously acceptable. The result of the
labour of this committee was the following resolution:^
1. This conclusion is not, however, without some qualification, for it appears
that the opposition of certain States to the coercive measures suggested by
Poland and the Byelorussian S.S.R., was to a certain extent due to the fact
that such measures could be taken only by the Security Council, under the
powers given to that body in Chapter VII of the Charter; see, e.g. the
statements of El Salvador, supra, p. 32 and of Peru supra, p. 30 .
However, the other States which adopted this approach to the question of
intervention did not voice this objection to the Polish and Byelorussian
proposals. Their objections were of a more general nature, and were re¬
lated to the powers of the United Nations as an entity, not to the internal
constitutional limitations on the powers of the respective organs thereof.
These States maintained that as the question of what kind of government
ruled Spain was within the domestic jurisdiction of that country, the
United Nations could not intervene, and therefore certain kinds of re¬
commendations were ultra vires altogether. The opinion of those other
States was not, it appears, conditioned by any consideration of the
internal division of power within the United Nations, but rather by
what any United Nations organ could do in the circumstances.
2. ibid, 39th mtg., p. 270
3. ibid, 45rd mtg., p. 304. Mien adopted, this resolution was numbered Res. 59(l).
The peoples of the United Nations, at San Francisco,
Potsdam and London, condemned the Franco regime in Spain
and decided that as long as that regime remains, Spain
may not be admitted to the United Nations*
The General Assembly in its resolution of 9 February
1946, recommended that the Members of the United Nations
should act in accordance with the letter and the spirit of
the declarations of San Efcancisoo and Potsdam*
The peoples of the United Nations assure the Spanish
people of their enduring sympathy and of the cordial wel¬
come awaiting them when circumstances enable them to be
admitted to the United Nations*
The General Assembly recalls that in May and June 1946,
the Security Council conducted an investigation of the possible
further action to be taken by the United Nations* The Sub-
Committee of the Security Council charged with the investi¬
gation found unanimously:
(a) In origin, nature, structure and general conduct,
the Franco regime is a fascist regime, patterned on, and
established largely as a result of aid recieved from,
Hitler's Nazi Germany and Mussolini's Fascist Italy;
(b) During the long struggle of the United Nations
against Hitler and Mussolini, Franco, despite continued
allied protests, gave very substantial aid to the enemy
Powers* First, far example, from 1941 to 1945, the Blue
Infantry Division, the Spanish Legion of Volunteers and
the Salvador Air Squadron fought against Soviet Russia on
the eastern front* Second, in the summer of 1940, Spain
seized Tangier in breach of international statute, and as
result of Spain maintaining a large amy in Spanish Morocco,
large numbers of Allied troops were immobilized in North
Africa;
(o) Incontrovertible documentary evidence established
that Franco was a guilty party, with Hitler and Mussolini,
in the conspiracy to wage war against those countries
which eventually, in the course of the world war became
banded together as the United Nations* It was part of
the conspiracy that Franco's full belligerency should be
postponed until a time to be mutually agreed upon.
The General Assembly, convinced that the Franco Fascist
government of Spain which was imposed by farce upon the
Spanish people with the aid of the Axis Powers and which
gave material assistance to the Axis Powers in the war, does
not represent the Spanish people, and by its continued control
of Spain is making impossible the participation of the Spanish
people with the peoples of the United Nations in international
affairs:
Recommends that the Hranco Government of Spain be
debarred from membership in international agencies estab¬
lished by, or brought into relationship with, the United
Nations, and from participation in conferences or other
activities which may be arranged by the United Nations
or by these agencies, until a new and acceptable government
is formed in Spain.
37.
The General Assembly further, desiring to secure the
participation of all peace-loving peoples,including the
people of Spain, in the community of nations:
Recommends that if within a reasonable time there is
not established a government which derives its authority
from the consent of the governed, committed to respect
freedom of speech, religion and assembly, and to the
prompt holding of an election in which the Spanish
people, free from force and intimidation and regardless
of party, may express their will, the Security Council
consider adequate measures to he taken in order to remedy
the situation and,
Recommends that all Members of the United Nations
immediately recall from Madrid, their ambassadors and
ministers plenipotentiary, accredited there.
The Assembly further recommends that the States
Members of the Organization report to the Secretary-
General and to the next Assembly, what action they have
taken in accordance with this reconsnendation.
This compromise resolution was adopted by the whole committee by 25 votes
to 4, with 20 abstentions.'''
(e) The subsequent attitude of States - the ffirat Plenary Session.
In the subsequent debates on this matter at the first session, States which
addressed themselves to the question of intervention were concerned not so much
with the question of whether any discussion of or recommendation concerning the
nature of the Spanish Government constituted intervention in the domestic affairs
of that State but rather with what kind of recommendation was acceptable. No
great emphasis was placed on the argument that as the matter was domestic, the
United Nations was not competent to deal with it. There seems, on the oontraxy,
to have been an acceptance, among States which did consider that the matter fell
1. ibid, p. 504. In flavour: Australia, Belgium, Brazil, Byelorussian S.S.R.,
Chile, Czechoslovakia, Denmark, Ethiopia, Erance, Guatemala, India,
Luxembourg, Mexico, New Zealand, Norway, Banama, Poland, Sweden, Ukrainian
S.SJR., United Kingdom, U.S.S.R., Venezuela, Yugoslavia.
Against: Colombia, Costa Rice, Dominican Republic, El Salvador.
Abstentions: Afghanistan, Canada, China, Cuba, Egypt, Greece, Honduras,
Iceland, Iraq, Lebanon, Netherlands, Nicaragua, Paraguay, Peru, Riilippine
Republic, Saudi-Arabia, Syria, Turkey, Union of South Africa, United States
of America.
essentially within Spain's done stic jurisdiction, of the fact that, neverthe¬
less, some kind of recommendation was within the competence of the General
Assembly.
When the statements and voting patterns of States which took part in this
debate are examined and compared with the rigid attitudes cm the question of
intervention adopted at later stages in the practice of the United Nations,
it is apparent that at this early stage in the life of the United Nations an
entirely different approach to the question of intervention was being prac¬
ticed. At this early stage, there was present a reasonably clear tendency
to differentiate between types of recommendations. States dealing with the
question of intervention in this oase declined to oppose all recommendations
just because the matter was considered to fall essentially within the domestic
jurisdiction of Spain* On the contrary, States which did oppose proposed
resolutions did so, not because they were addressed to Spain, or though
addressed to States in general dealt with the internal affairs of Spain, but
because, in their opinion, those resolutions recommended measures which sought
directly or indirectly to coerce the people of Spain into changing their form
of government and hence constituted intervention In an internal Spanish ques¬
tion. The question of intervention was decided on the basis of an examination
of the terms of the various proposals, on an examination of what those resol-
lutLons were trying to do rather than on the basis of any a priori reasoning
that any recommendation constituted intervention. No attempt was made to give
a rational basis for tliis distinction. Theoretical questions were, in the
main, avoided. But in the light of the statements made in the coirse of the
debates, it is reasonable to impute to those States a desire to come to 30100
compromise definition of intervention vfiich would allow the General Assembly
a reasonable amount of freedom of action even where the matter concernsd was
essentially within the domestic jurisdiction of States,
-y ;
While, however, the majority of States dealing with the question of inter¬
vention did appear, by their actions, to approve of this approach to the pro¬
blem, no consensus emerged as to what type of recommendation the General Assembly
was able to adopt. This lack of unanimity is evident from the attitudes adopted
towards the compromise resolution recommended by the First Committee.
The resolution recommended to the General Asseiably by the First Committee
was adopted by the plenary session by 54 votes to 6, with 15 abstentions.''"
As in the debates in the First Committee, in the plenary session, the
majority of States contended that the matter was not domestic, and hence the
question of intervention for them, did not arise. However, a few did expound
their theories of intervention, and how far this allowed the United Nations, in
general, and the General Assembly, in particular, to act where the matter was
within the domestic jurisdiction of a State. Unfortunately, however, the
number of States which held that the proposed resolution did constitute inter¬
vention is almost equally matched by those which held that it did not. The
States which, in the first plenary debate, held that the proposed resolution
on the relations of Members of the United Nations with Franco Spain did
1, G-.A., (l/2), ELen, 59th mtg., p. 1222* The details of voting were as follows:
In favour! Australia, Belgium, Bolivia, Brazil, Byelorussian S.S.H., Chile, China,
Czechoslovakia, Denmark, Ethiopia, France, Guatemala, Haiti, Iceland, India,
Iran, Luxembourg, Liberia, Mexico, New Zealand, Nicaragua, Norway, Panama,
Paraguay, Hiilippines, Daland, Sweden, Ukrainian S.S.R., United Kingdom,
United States, Uruguay, U.S.S.R., Venezuela, Yugoslavia.
Against: .Argentina, Costa Rica, Dominican Republic, Ecuador, El Salvador,
Peru.
Abstentions: Afghanistan, Canada, Colombia, Cuba, Egypt, Greece, Honduras,
Lebanon, Netherlands, Saudi-Arabia, Syria, Turkey, Union of South Africa.
See G.A., (l/2), Plen. 59th mtg., p. 1222.
constitute intervention were j Cuba, El Salvador, Costa fiica, Ecuador, Argentina
and Peru, Those which, either expressly or by implication, held that it did
not were; Chile, Prance, the United Kingdom, Nicaragua, Paraguay, and the
Hiilippines.^"
Because of this even split of opinion, it cannot be said with any certainty
how far the General Assembly can act where the matter falls within the domestic
jurisdiction of a State# However, one thing does emerge from these statements.
Almost all of the States which dealt with this question of intervention con¬
centrated their attention on the element of coercion to be found in the pro¬
posed resolution. States which objected to it did so because, in their opinion
it represented an attempt to coerce, either directly or indirectly, the Spanish
people to overthrow their Government. On the other hand, States which sup¬
ported this resolution and dealt with the question of intervention seemed, on
the contrary, to be of the opinion that as no element of overt coercion was
present, it was within the competence of the General Assembly.
The acceptability of this resolution seemed, for those States which were
concerned to avoid intervention in Spain*s domestic affairs, to lie in the
absence of the element of coercion. Different States held varying views on
what constituted coercion, and whether or not the fact that it was indirect or
disguised made it permissible. Nevertheless, the fact remains that it was
the presence of this element of coercion which was the criterion of accept¬
ability, and not any a priori reason such as the illegality of all recommen¬
dations.
(i) States which opposed the resolution because in their view it
constituted intervention in Spain's domestic affairs.
Of the States which voted against the resolution in the plenary session,
1. In tiiis enumeration, no account is taken of States which imintain that no
recommendation constitutes intervention, or that no collective action can
constitute intervention.
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Costa Rica, Ecuador, El Salvador and B»ru had indicated their willingness in
committee to vote for any resolution which did not amount to intervention in
the domestic affairs of Spain. However, the resolution recommended to the
General Assembly by the First Committee did, in their opinion, do so and in
this they were joined by Cuba and -Argentina.
As already noted, Cuba and El Salvador opposed the collective withdrawal
of ambassadors and ministers plenipotentiary from Madrid because such a
collective act would, in their opinion, constitute intervention in Spain'3
domestic affairs.'1'
& the debate in the First Committee, the Costa Rjcan delegation had
indicated its opposition to any proposal which amounted to intervention in
Spain*s domestic affairs* However, apart from indicating disapproval, on those
grounds, of the Bolish resolution to sever diplomatic relations and the Byelo¬
russian amendment thereto, Costa Rica did not indicate how far the General
Assembly would still be allowed to act on the matter. Her statement in the
plenary session again does not indicate what the General Assembly could do,
positively, but it does indicate her opposition to measures which sought to
coerce a State regarding its domestic affairs. Voicing his country's disapproval,
2
Mr. de FAula Gutierrez saidi
The delegation of Costa Rica considers it appropriate
and necessary, now that ws have reached the final stage of the
Spanish question, to set forth its reasons for voting against
* all the proposals submitted to the Assembly. ...»
We agree with neither the form nor the substance of the
proposal under discussion. The purpose of this proposal,
according to the categorical statements of its supporters, is
to bring about positive action to cause a change of government
in another State. Costa Rica cannot agree to any sort of
1. Cuba, see supra, Chap. I, p. 14 ; El Salvador, see supra, Chap. I, p. 15.
2. G-.A., (l/2), HLen., 58th ratg.. pp, 1182-1185 j Emphasis added.
intervention, either open or disguised, against any govern¬
ment, whatever that government may he. It takes this view
as a matter of doctrine and in order not to infringe concrete
principles laid down in the United Nations Charter, which in
.Article 2, paragraph 7, prescribes non-intervention 'in matters
which arc essentially within the domestic jurisdiction of any
State*. It could never he claimed that the creation and farm
of a government were not matters within the domestic jurisdic¬
tion of a State.
Having reviewed the action which the United Nations had already taken on
the subject, the declarations of San Stancisco, Potsdam and General Assembly
resolution 52(1), Mr. de Baula Gutierrez continuedJ
We believe, therefore, that, as regards recommendations
and declarations, there is no more to be done and that the
ground is fully covered by those already adopted* It seems
quite clear that the United Nations will not accept Spain so
long as the cow try is governed by the present regime# The
recommendations and declarations already mentioned suffice as
notification of this fact to the Spanish people. The dele¬
gation of Costa Rice therefore considers that there is no
point in repeating now what has already been said on several
occasions# .....
The delegation of Costa Rica maintains, moreover, that the
resolution adopted at San Prancisco cannot compel any govern¬
ment to approve the present proposal. To declare that a State
shall not be admitted to "the United Nations is not the same thing
as initiating measures to compel its government to abandon power
or inciting its people to overthrow their government. lhat is
manifest intervention. The admission c*r non-admission of a
State to the United Nations is a matter far the free decision
of each Member. Each country may vote without giving a reason,
without having to explain its vote, and it may even happen that
a nation fulfilling all the conditions required by the Charter
will not obtain the number of votes necessary far membership
owing to the pretexts ar sympathies of the voting Governments
or their delegations. The present case is quite different;
it is not a question of accepting a government, or of not
accepting it, but of coercing a people to change its govern¬
ment,even though it may be mde to appear that this is being
done with the desire to enable the country to become a Member
of the United Nations.
On behalf of Ecuador. Mr. Illescas said:"*"
I repeat, General franco's position does not interest us,
even though, according to the Security Council, he does not at
1. ibid, p. 1197.
present constitute a real menace to the peace of Europe. But
the action which it is proposed that we should take against
General Franco's regime would endanger the existence and impair
the efficiency of the principles of non-intervention and self-
determination in Internal matters far each nation, and in our
view those principles are fundamental and cannot he changed or
altered if we really desire to form a society of nations
united hy justice, free from fear, from outside pressure, from
material and moral poverty, and, above all, from despotism.
Likewise, Argentina and Peru maintained that the measures proposed con¬
stituted intervention in Spain's internal affairs.^ amplifying Peru's ob~
2
.lections to the proposed recommendation, Mr. de Lavalle said:
• *. •.Peru hy tradition and by political and legal conviction, is
a determined supporter of the principle of non-intervention, one
of the fundamental conceptions of American law. Peru believes
that that principle must he zealously guarded, hut without pre¬
judice to oases of collective action envisaged in the United
Nations Charter as a safeguard against any threat or danger to
peace#
The principle of non-intervention is the supreme safeguard
of the small States, and a legal instrument like the United
Nations Charter cannot he allowed to become a threat to their
sovereignty and independence. The formula proposed by the
Committee thus strikes at one of the most solid foundations
of the Inter-American system which is based an non-intervention
agreementsj that is why the Peruvian delegation votes against
any proposal which directly or implicitly involves any farm of
intervention#
As the Security Council has not decided that any actual
threat to world peace exists, the measures proposed in the
resolution do not conform to Article 59 of the Charter, and
the Government of Peru considers that the withdrawal of am¬
bassadors and ministers constitutes a collective measure not
provided for in Article 41 of the Charter. Owing to the
same lack of legal justification, the Peruvian delegation
voted against the proposal for economic sanctions against
Spain.
Thus, while these States, in principle, were prepared to accept some kind of
recommendation on the Spanish question, the fact that the one proposed sought to
exert pressure, directly or indirectly on the Spanish people to change their form
^SSgntjna, see ibid, 59th ratg., p. 1206-1208; Peru, see ibid, pp. 1216-1217.
2. ibid, pp. 1216-1217.
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of government classified it, in their opinion, as intervention in Spain's
domestic affairs.
(ii) States which supported this resolution, contending that it did
not amount to intervention.
States which supported this resolution and which dealt with the question
of intervention, contrary to those dealt with in the preceeding section, main¬
tained that this resolution did not constitute intervention in Spain's domestic
affairs. Their reason for so doing appears to have been that it did not seek
to compel the people of Spain, directly or overtly, to change their form of
Government.
The Chilean delegation did not make it clear whether,in that country's
opinion, the matter fell essentially within the domestic jurisdiction of Spain
or not. However, the Chilean delegate, Mr. Nieto del Bio, maintained that in
any case the proposed measure did not amount to intervention. lie said:^"
•••• These measures are not *sanctions' within the technical
meaning of the Charter, but a political attitude imposed by
logic and good morality, for the present regime in Spain is
a reminder of episodes that were always considered an obstacle
to international harmony.
Chance, more by implication than by express statement, maintains d that the
matter did not fell essentially within Spain's domestic jurisdiction. Never¬
theless, she also supported the thesis that, in any case, the measures proposed
2
did not amount to intervention. The French delegate, Mr. Jbuhaux said:
I have seen men, bowed down with the weight of their
legal learning, ooiae to this rostrum, and affirm that the
severance of diplomatic relations would constitute an in¬
tervention in Spain's internal affairs. Yet these same men
used to declare elsewisere that the rupture of diplomatic
relations was an act of national sovereignty on the part of
each State, and that a decision taken by one government "to
sever diplomatic relations with another should in no sense
1. G.-a. ,(l/2), Hen., 57th mtg., p. 1168.
2. ibid, 58th ratg., pp. 1192-1195.
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be considered intervention. How can they explain can legal
grounds that an action would no longer be an exercise of
national sovereignty if it were the application of a re¬
commendation by the United Nations Assembly. There is no
denying that it would still be action by each government
and consequently an act of national sovereignty.
The United Nations resolution, as has been pointed out,
is not a compulsory one. It is nothing more than a request
to each government; governments remain free to do as they
wish. The severance of diplomatic relations can not,
therefore, be considered an intervention on the ground that
it took place at the request of the United Nations General
Assembly. I am no legal expert, but I do not think that any
legal expert could maintain such a view. ....
This statement by Prance has important implications. Although she infers
that the matter is not domestic, she nevertheless adds that in any case the re-
coranendat ion proposed does not amount to intervention. This is, in reality, the
same as saying that even if the matter were within Spain's domestic jurisdiction,
a recommendation to all Members to withdraw their ambassadors from Madrid in an
effort to induce a change of government within that country does not amount to
intervention.
The reason given by France for this view should be noted. The recomnendation,
she reminded Members, was not compulsory. It was only a request to States which
remained free to do as tliey pleased. 31 seems to be implied that because of
this, no element of compulsion is exerted on Spain to change its form of govern¬
ment. It will however be remembered that elsewhere France opposed any re¬
commendation which dealt with matters which were within her domestic jurisdiction.
Thus, by this statement, France seems to advocate an approach to the ques¬
tion of intervention different from that \hich sloe adopted elsewhere. She
seems to indicate that whatever the domestic nature of a matter, not all re-
coimendations are barred as a consequence. Secondly, it seems to be France's
opinion here that recommendations which are tree from the element of compulsion
are within the competence cf the General Assembly, even where the item is within
the domestic jurisdiction of a particular State.
Of the States which supported this resolution, the United Kingdom,
lilcaraffua, Baraguay and the Philippines had all indioated in committee,
either expressly or by implication, that the matter of the change of govern¬
ment in Spain was within the domestic jurisdiction of that country. On this
basis they opposed any resolution which seemed to them to exert overt pressure
on that country to charge its government. However, it seems that, in their
opinion, this defect did not apply to the recomnendatian under discussion in
the plenary session.
The United Kingdom, despite the fact that in the First Committee she had
expressly declared the matter under discussion to be within Spain's domestic
jurisdiction, found no difficulty in supporting the proposal to withdraw
ambassadors and ministers plenipotentiary from Madrid. This fact is all the
more interesting because of the attitude which the United Kingdom took to one
of the paragraphs in this resolution. Mr. Bottomley said that his Govemment
objected to the following passage in the proposed recommendation
Bgogmagnds that, if within a reasonable time, there is
not established a government whioh derives its authority from
the consent of the governed, committed to respect freedom of
speech, religion and assembly, and to the prompt holding of an
election in whioh the Spanish people, free from force and
intimidation end regardless of party, nay express their will,
the Security Council consider the adequate measures to be
taken in order to remedy the situation.
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Of this paragraph of the recommendation, Mr. Bottomley said:
In the view of ivy Government it is not for the General
assembly, but for the Security Council itself to decide
whether to take action in this matter in the light of Its own
consideration of the question. Moreover, the paragraph as it
stands implies that the existence of a government in Spain
which does not completely fulfil the conditions laid down in
1. ibid, 59th ratg., pp. 1198-1199.
2, ibid.
this paragraph is in itself a ground for action by the Council
to remedy the situation. This is contrary to the Charter,
which limits action try the Council to cases in which it has
determined that there is a danger to the maintenance of inter¬
national peace and security.
Because of these objections, Great Britain requested a rote on the resolu¬
tion by paragraphs. However, the adoption of this paragraph did not prevent
/
her from supporting the resolution in its entirety*
The fact that the United Kingdom was able to support one type of General
Assembly action, and this where the matter was, in her opinion, within the
domestic jurisdiction of Spain, tfiile at the same time opposing another, albeit
on internal constitutional grounds, highlights the distinction elaborated above.
At this early stage in the practioe of the United Mations, the United Kingdom,
which later on adopted a very rigid attitude towards the question of inter¬
vention, determined her attitude on the question of intervention, not so much
on the basis of-the farm of the proposed action, i.e., a recommendation which
wets addressed to a particular State or which dealt with its affairs, but rather
by the content of that recomaendatian. Furthermore, as was the case with France,
she seemed to view with favour recommendations which did not seek to apply overt
pressure on a State regarding its domestic affairs. For, whereas she viewed
with disfavour the imposition of any ' sanctions' on Spain in order to realize a
change of regime in that country, her support for this recommendation would seem
to indicate that the measures foreseen did not fall into that category.
The Nicaraguan delegate reviewed the position his country had taken in the
debate in the First Committee, and recalled that whereas his delegation had
opposed the imposition of the coercive measures proposed by Roland, it had
supported the United States draft resolution because it did not involve a contra¬
vention of the principle of non-intervention. Recalling the opinions of several
other States on this question, he declared his country's support for the draft
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resolution bs fore the CJeaeral Assembly, lie said"!
In the presence of such legal opinions as to the inter¬
pretation of the principle of non-intervention, our legitimate
fears hare been set at rest. Thus, in our sincere desire to
defend this principle against any violation, we are naturally
glad to note that if jurists of standing from various parts
of the world maintain that the collective severance of diplo¬
matic relations with & specific country is not intervention,
still less can the mere withdrawal of heads of missions ac¬
credited to a country be taken to mean intervention.
I wish therefore to state, on behalf of my Government, that
the Niosraguan delegation will vote in favour of the resolution
approved by the 3ub-0oraaittee and by the Hrst Committee, in
the form new before as, on the firm understanding that the
withdrawal of heads of missions from Spain does not in soy
way violate the sacred principle of •non-intervention*, and
that la accepting that withdrawal, we thus give Spain the
opportunity to obtain a truly representative government, so that
without delay she may take her place among us, the representatives
of world sovereignty as constituted by the free peoples of the
world.
In the opinion of Xtaraguay, the Assembly was only adopting a 'preventive
measure for the sake of security and peace* and as such was not guilty of inter-
2
vention as prohibited by the Charter.
Similarly, the Philippines was prepared to support this resolution, though
in Committee, she had epressed her disapproval of any attempt to Intervene in
5
Spain*s internal affairs. Mr. Hoaulo said:
Although we may have differed in the Cocaaittee on the
specific course of action we should take on the Franco CJovern-
rasnt, we cannot at this critical moment vacillate my longer.
The resolution before us represents a compromise arrived at
after lorr* debate between opinions and proposals of extreme
diversity; between a complete handa-off policy, on the one
hand end, on the other, a policy of violent intervention
through the severance of diplomatic relationswith, and
the imposition of sanctions on, i^ranco Spain.
1. ibid, p. 1202.
2. ibid, p. 1204.
3. ibid, p. 1209.
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(ill) Conclusions.
From the statements of the twelve countries considered in the above section,
no sweeping conclusions can be drawn. Six of them appeared to oppose any form
of pressure on a State regarding the form of its government, and this whether
the pressure was overt or disguised. On the other hand, six appeared only to
oppose measures which applied pressure overtly.
However, it is important to note that of these States all, with the excep¬
tion of Chile and France, had, cm the one hand indicated their support for some
resolution, while on the other, opposing others cm the grounds that they con¬
stituted intervention. Thus, while it may not be possible, on the basis of
this debate, to say what type of recommendation the General Assembly is competent
to adopt where a matter falls within the domestic jurisdiction of a particular
State, it is plain that those States which devoted some thought to the problem
of intervention did not conclude that all discussions of or recommendations con¬
cerning domestic matters were incompetent because of Article 2(7). Some com¬
promise was clearly envisaged.1
1. While not strictly relevant to the subject presently under discussion, the
speech of the Colombian delegate regarding this resolution is of great
interest for it sets out exactly the problems which had to be faced by
States vhich voted for it. His conclusions, however, are not strictly
accurate far he is of the opinion that by adopting this resolution, the
General Assembly had concluded that indirect or negative measures were
not intervention. This conclusion would only have been correct had the
majority of States which voted for the resolution considered that the item
fell within Spain's domestic jurisdiction, which they did not# Nevertheless,
....we are faced with a new contradiction. The great majority
of this Assembly is not and cannot be in favour of intervention
by the United Nations in the internal affairs of any country,
whether a Member of this Organization or not. •••••
In order not to give the impression that we are openly departing
from the letter and spirit of the Charter, we have agreed, at any
rate in principle, that indirect or negative measures are not
interventions, and these include action vthioh the United Nations
may take on the recoraaendatlcaa of the General Assembly, even
though It may involve external pressure as strong as the threat
to sever diplomatic relations or the application of such measures
as might be ordered by the Security Council to give force and
effect to the wishes of the General Assembly*
But it has been stated in this very Assembly that the
United Nations have agreed to limitations upon their sovereignty
which not only prevent them from legislating in opposition to the
principles of the Charter, but have already given rise to the
serious problem of whether, and, if so, when they should take
steps to bring their own legislation into line with those princi¬
ples*
Only yesterday we passed a resolution stating that this
Assembly agrees that the treatment of Indians in the Union of
South Africa should be in conformity with the international
oblig&tions under the agreements concluded between the two
governments, and the relevant principles of the Charter* ••*•
With equal justification, fcr the very same reasons and
on the same principles, it might be argued that the United Nations
should recommend that all Members alter their legislation and their
administrative organisation so as to put an end to all racial dis¬
crimination* Sooner or later, we shall have to decide whether we
intend to oontinue along the road on tfiich we have set out or whether,
as the Colombian delegation believes i3 necessary, we should plan
methods of procedure, fix time limits, provide for exceptions, so
that we may organize the world according to the new principles of
the Charter* We shall have to decide whether we propose to leave
individual States to reform their institutions at their own dis¬
cretion, that is, to bring them into line with the provisions of
the Charter of the United Nations, whenever and in whatever way they
consider advisable*
If it is not possible to request other States to do what we
have asked the Union of South Africa to do, we feel that very
soon it may become necessary to revoke the precedent we have just
established in the case of the laws governing the activities of
Indians in that part of the world*
We have no wish to suggest that we are in any degree afraid of
the dangers which the future nay hold in store far small nations,
once this principle is accepted that intervention in a negative
form is not the kind of intervention which they unanimously reject. *.
But neither should we like to refrain from saying that we attach
great importance to defining at the appropriate time the new
political and legal positions which we are adopting; for the
evolution of international relations leads us to take action
whereby one State today, another tomorrow, and a third the next
day, at our direct or indirect, positive or negative command, nay
feel obliged to change its government within a specific period, on
pain of suffering the loss of normal relations with the United
Nations end suffering the consequences of exclusion ft*ora all
agencies*
Today we are dealing with Spain. But Spain is not the
only country in which all the fundamental freedoms are not
respected; nor is it the only one to which an invitation
might he extended to change its government and revise its
institutions and political practices in the manner desired
by & majority of the United Nations. We are in the act of
imposing on a State which does not belong to our organization
standards of political life which are not yet fully applied
in several of the Member countries*
But it does not cause me apy jnisgivings that a start is
being made with Spain in introducing a new order of government
into the world. What does seem to me to be wrong it that this
should be done without making it clearly understood that this is
the path we intend to follow*
In the case of Spain* we understand that it has become an
urgent matter to decide whether, notwithstanding the provisions
of Article 2, paragraph 7* of the Charter, which are so cate¬
gorically opposed to the intervention of the United Nations
in the internal affairs of States - whether or not thsy are
Members of the Organization - it is admissible for the Assembly
to adopt forms of indirect or negative intervention to produce
the same effects as open intervention*
We know that this time the aim is that Spain should* with¬
in a reasonable period, have a government constituted with the
consent of the people* a government which has committed itself
and does commit itself to respect freedom of speech* freedom
of the press, freedom of religion and freedom of association,
in order that elections may be held at once in which the Spanish
people* free from intimidation, violence or pressure* may express
their will without any party restrictions. •••••
The Colombian delegation does not deny*.* the facts set
forth in the preamble of the resolution adopted by the Political
Committee with regard to the origin, characteristics and actions
of Generalissimo Franco. But if* in the opinion of the General
Assembly, this resolution does not in any of its parts involve
one of the types of intervention which are prohibited in Article
2, paragraph 7, uy delegation wishes to have it made entirely
clear that, in approving it* the Assembly deliberately esta¬
blishes a precedent which can from now on be adduced for the
United Nations to assume the same attitude, and formulate
similar preventive measures, in regard to any of its Members
within whose Jurisdiction there is no liberty, no freedom of
speech, no freedom of the press and no freedom of association,
or in vhich due respect is not paid to the express will of the
people.
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2. The Second, Third and Fifth Sessions.
At the second, third and fifth sessions, it became obvious that the majority
of delegations were no longer in favour of maintaining in force the resolution
59(1) adopted at the first session of the General Assembly. Of the States
which spoke in these debates a considerable number considered that this res¬
olution was incompatible with the terms of Article 2(7) of the Charter, end
eventually at the fifth session, it was expressly revoked. It must therefore
be concluded that resolutions of the type adopted by the General Assembly in
resolution 39(l), which sought indirectly to pressure Spain into changing her
form of government are not within the competence of the General Assembly.
However, it is important to note that in all the debates which took place
on this subject, none of the States which had, in the first session, differen¬
tiated between different types of recommendations, recanted its views. Practi¬
cally nothing was said on this subject in the debates in the second, third and
fifth sessions* On the other hand, no State supported the argument that as this
subject was witliin the domestic jurisdiction of tipain, all recomiiiendations were
outwith the competence of the General Assembly. It is therefore reasonable to
conclude that those States continued to adhere to the position which they
adopted during the first session, and were prepared to allow some recommendations
which dealt with internal Spanish affairs, but not others.
(a) The Second Session.
At the second session the item dealing with the relations of Member States
with franco Spain was included on the agenda without any opposition,"'" and at the
118th meeting of the plenary session, the General Assembly adopted a resolution
which expressed the confidence of the Assembly that the Security Council would
1. G.A. ,(ll), ELen., Vol. I, 91st mtg., p. 2S9,
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exercise its responsibilities under the Charter whenever the situation in Spain
1
merited it. However, the Assembly rejected another paragraph of the same
resolution which would have confirmed the resolution 59(1) of the previous
year.
(b) The Third Session.
At the third session, in the debate in the First Committee, two draft
resolutions were introduced; one by Brazil on behalf of Brazil, Bolivia,
Colombia and Peru, and the other by Poland.
2
The Latin-Aiasrican joint draft resolution read as follows:
The General Assembly.
Considering, that, during its second session in 1947,
a proposal to confirm the resolution of 12 December 1946 an
the political regime in power in Spain failed to obtain the
approval of two-thirds of the votes cast;
Considering: that certain Governments have interpreted
the negative vote of 1947 as virtually revoking the clause in
the previous resolution which recommended the withdrawal of
heads of mission with the rank of ambassador or minister pleni¬
potentiary accredited to the Spanish Government;
Considering that, in view of the doubt regarding the
validity of this interpretation, other Governments have con¬
tinued to refrain from accreditir^5 heads of mission to Madrid,
thereby creating inequality to their disadvantage;
Considering that such confusion may diminish the prestige
of the United Nations, which all Members of the Organization
have a particular interest in preserving;
Considering that in any event the 1946 resolution did not
prescribe the breaking of political and commercial tie3 with the
Spanish Government which have been the subject of bilateral agree¬
ments between the Governments of several Member States and the
Madrid Government;
Considering that, in the negotiation of such agreements,
Governments which have complied with the recommendation of 12
December 1946 are placed in a position of inequality which works
to the disadvantage of economically weaker Governments;
Decides, without prejudice to the declarations contained in
the resolution of 12 December 1946, to leave Member States full
freedom of action as regards their diplomatic relations with
Spain.
1. ibid, Vol. II, 118th mtg., p. 1096; Hes. 114(H).
2. Gr,A. ,(IIl/2), Plen., Annexes, a.i,12(55)„ p. 60, Doc. a/852
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1The preamble to the Polish draft resolution, recalled, inter alia, the
origins and nature of the franco regime, General Assembly resolutions 59(1)
and 114(11), and the pronouncements made on the subject at Potsdam and San
o
francisco. The operative part stated:
The General Assembly,
«•••••••
(9) Calls upon the Members of the United Nations to comply
with the letter and the spirit of the above enumerated pronounce¬
ments, declarations and resolutions;
(10) Recommends that all Members of the United Nations should
as a first step forthwith cease to eapcrt to Spain arms and amu-
nition as well as all warlike and strategic material;
(11) Recommends that all Members of the United Nations
should refrain from entering into any agreements or treaties
with franco Spain both formally and de facto.
The Latin-American draft was adopted by the First Committee by 25 votes to
g
16, with 16 abstentions, but was rejected by the General Assembly in plenary
4
session because it failed to receive the necessary two-thirds majority. The
5
Polish draft resolution was rejected both in the First Committee and in the
6 7
plenary session. The debates in neither the First Committee nor the plenary
1. G.A. ,(lIl/2), Plen., Annexes, a.i.l2(55), Doc. a/860, p. 84.
2. ibid.
5. G.A.,(lIl/2), 1st Com., 262nd mtg., pp. 238-240.
4. ibid, Plen., 214th mtg., p. 501. The details are as follows:
In favour: Ecuador, Egypt, 31 Salvador, Greece, Honduras, Iceland, Iraq,
Lebanon, Liberia, Nicaragua, Bald.stan, Paraguay, Beru, Philippines, Saudi-
Arabia, biara, Syria, Turkey, Union of South Africa, Venezuela, Yemen,
Argentina, Bolivia, Brazil, Colombia, Dominican Republic*
Against: Guatemala, India, Israel, Mexico, New Zealand, Panama, Norway, Poland,
Ukrainian S.S.R., U.S.S.R., Uruguay, Yugoslavia, Australia, Byelorussian S.S.R.,
Czechoslovakia.
Abstaining: Ethiopia, France, Haiti, Iran, Luxembourg, Netherlands, Sweden,
U.K., U.S.A., Afghanistan, Belgium, Burma, Canada, Chile, China, Denmark.
5. ibid, 1st Com., 262nd mtg., pp. 240-244.
6. ibid, Plen., 214th mtg., p. 504.
7. See, for example, the speeches of: U.S.S.R., pp. 196-201; Czechoslovakia, pp.
202-204; Ukrainian 3.S.R., pp. 219-222; Bolivia, p. 254; Argentina, p. 255;
Colombia, p. 255; and Poland, p. 256.
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session contributed much that is of value for the present purpose and at tines
became bogged down in cold war attitudes.
* t " '
Of the statements mode in favour of the joint four power draft resolution,
those of Peru and Ecuador are of most interest."*"
In supporting the joint four power draft resolution, the Peruvian dele¬
gate stressed that resolution 59(l) constituted a double violation of the
Charter. On the one hand it sought to cast doubt on the legitimacy of the
Spanish Government, a power which, he contended, the United Nations did not
have. On the other, by this resolution, the General Assembly sought to apply
sanctions, a function which, he claimed, was confided by the Charter exclusively
2
to the Security Council. He said that}
The General Assembly could recommend that a State should
respect human rights, but whether that State was a Member of
the United Nations at not, the State concerned had the right
of be leg heard and of appealling to a legal authority.
But the United Nations could not pass judgement on the
legitimacy of a government, or outlaw that government. ....
Thus the distinction was clear. The General Assembly
could be seized of questions concerning human rights, and make
recommendations on that subject,after hearing the party con¬
cerned, and it oould ask the International Court of Justice
for an advisory opinion. But the General Assembly could
not pass judgement on the legitimacy of a government. ....
The case raised by the delegation of Chile concerned
the coadtas gentium, end the United Nations had been entitled
to formulate a recommendation on that question. 5 But there
1. For other statements condemning resolution 59(1) as an intervention in
Spain's domestic affairs, see G.A., (Hi/2), 1st Com.. Colombia, 258th
ratg., pp. 185-I87j 262nd ratg., p. 255; El Salvador, ibid, pp. 257-258;
Bolivia, 259th mtg., p. 201; and ibid, Plen., El Salvador, 214th mtg.,
p. 477; Argentina, ibid, p. 481.
2« G.A.,(lIl/2), 1st Com,, 258th ratg., p. 197.
5. This was a reference to a Polish allegation that Peru was adopting a
double standard in this case and in the case concerning the violation
of human rights in trie U.S.3.R; see ibid, p. 187.
56.
ms no question of taking aay action whatsoever against the
U.S.S.R. That question had nothing in congaon, therefore,
with the question of Eranco Spain, where it was actually being
attempted to bring about the downfall of a government by an
actual intervention in the internal affairs of that country.
Later in the same debate, the Peruvian delegate added
.....The General Assembly had no functions other than these
specifically conferred upon it by Member States. »••.«*»•••
The Charter was a contract and the General Assembly had no
greater powers than those conferred upon it by the Charter,
namely, to make recommendations concerning the respect of
human rights. The Security Council had jurisdiction solely
with respect to the maintenance of international peace and
could Impose sanctions only when there was a threat to or
breach of the peace* The severing of diplomatic or com¬
mercial relations could be considered as a punitive measure,
such as could be imposedgOnly by the Security Council and not
by the General Assembly. It was neither a power nor a function
of the United Nations to set up governments or to brand them with
infamy. It could only regulate their operation. The organ
whose function it was to take appropriate steps, particularly
those indicated in the Charter, whenever a Government violated
its international obligations in a manner constituting a threat
to the peace, was the Security Council.
Any other procedure would be both unjustified and dangerous
and would tend to transform the United Nations into a super-State.
An organ of that kind, able to decide the fate and determine the
1* ibid, p. 194.
2* While the merits of the argument that only the Security Council is
competent to impose sanctions on States when there is a threat to or
breach of the peace, is not relevant here, (such a contingency defi¬
nitely not falling within the domestic jurisdiction of states), it is
worth while noting that the Soviet bloc was in favour of allowing the
General Assembly to carry out such a function. This attitude con¬
trasts strangely with the views of the Soviet bloc on the legality
of the Uniting fear TPace Resolution. This innovation in communist
thinking was not lost on some delegates even at this stage in United
Nations practice, long before the Uniting for Beace resolution was
adopted. Commenting on the Tblish draft resolution, presented at
the third session, on the question of Eranco Spain, the Colombian
delegate said that: £~G.A., (III/2) 1st Cam., 262nd mtg., p. 255...
"....The proposal provided that sanctions which, according to Article
41 of the Charter, came within the exclusive jurisdiction of the
Security Council, could be approved by a vote of the General Assembly.
That was a new orientation towards a more democratic system on the
part of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and the five States
which followed in its wake and created a precedent which might be of
use in the future."
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legitimacy of Governments would be categorically rejected
by the peoples of the American continent. There had been
doubts in the minds of the representatives at the San
Francisco Conference that the aim of the Conference was
not to create a super-State. They had known that the
General Assembly would be a forum for world public op¬
inion rather than a parliament promulgating laws to be
applied by the Security Council as an executive organ. ....
The statement made by the delegation of Ecuador is of considerable interest*
for it gives some kind of indication of the type of recommendation the General
Assembly is competent to adopt where the matter concerned falls within the
domestic jurisdiction of a particular State. The Ecuador©an delegate said
that:1
....however, there was no doubt that the resolution of which
Ecuador had not been in favour in 1946 and the one which had
been reintroduced and on which it had abstained in 1947 were
alien to the Charter which consistently stated that the Members
of the United Nations must not intervene in the domestic affairs
of States.
The Members of the Committee should not believe that
everything outside the Organization was bad or false or
assume that they had a kind of monopoly over the truth.
There were two kinds of jurisdiction one of which affected
sovereignty and the other the international character of every
State* However, General Assembly resolution 59(1) on Franco
Spain went beyond that and constituted an interference into
the internal jurisdiction of a State. It was impossible to
distinguish between the substance and the farm of a State and
it was not proper for the General Assembly to refer to
particular oases of the constitutional life of a country. It
could only ask a nation to take certain measures, to follow
certain roads, and to give heed to certain aspirations in
accordance with the spirit of the United Nations. The 1946
resolution directly affected the juridical integrity of a
country and of a people and that integrity and unity were with¬
in the internal jurisdiction of that same people.
So far in the debates on the Spanish question, States had been concerned
to show, on the one hand, t'nat they were prepared to accept some kind of re¬
solution even though they regarded the question as within the domestic juris¬
diction of Spain, but on the other to oppose any recommendation which they
1. G.A.,(Hi/2), 1st Com., 25Sth mtg. , p. 205-206.
58.
considered exerted illegal pressure of that State. However, here, for the first
time, the delegate of Ecuador, while deprecating resolution 59(l) as an example
of intervention, gave some indication, in a general my, of what the General
Assembly could do in such a situation. The Ecu&dorean delegation seems to
suggest that the General Assembly would be competent, in such circumstances, to
make recommendations of a general character to the State concerned, requesting
it to take some account of the "spirit of the United Nations" when formulating
its domestic policy.
(c) The Fifth Session.
At the fifth session of the General Assembly, & joint resolution, submitted
by the delegations of Bolivia, Costa Rica, Dominican Republic, El Salvador,
Honduras, Nicaragua and the Philippines, which provided for the revocation of
resolution 59(l) was adopted by 58 votes to 10 with 12 abstentions.
During the debates on this subject in the Ad Hoc Political Committee
numerous States voiced their objection to resolution 59(1) on the grounds that
it constituted an intervention in the domestic affairs of Spain. None, however,
made any significant addition to the material already set out above. Objections
were confined to resolution 59(l) alone and no significant indication was given
1. G.A.,(V), Hen., 304th ratg., para. 124. The details of voting were as
follows t
In favour: Saudi-Arabia, Syria, Thailand, Turkey, Union of South Africa,
U.S.A., Venezuela, Yemen, Afghanistan, Argentina, Belgium, Bolivia, Brazil,
Canada, Chile, China, Colombia, Costa Rica, Dominican Republic, Ecuador,
Egypt, El Salvador, Greece, Haiti, Honduras, Iceland, Iran, Iraq, Lebanon,
Liberia, Luxembourg, Netherlands, Nicaragua, Pakistan, Panama, Paraguay,
Psru, Philippines.
Agalnafr: Ukrainian S,S.R., U.3.S.R., Uruguay, Yugoslavia, Byelorussian
S.S.R., Czechoslovakia, Guatemala, Israel, Mexico, Poland.
Abstentions; Sweden, U.K., Australia, Burma, Cuba, Denmark, Ethiopia,
Prance, India, Indonesia, New Zealand, Norway.
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of what type of resolution would have been acceptable in the circumstances.
5. Conclusions.
The material in these debates concerning the nature of intervention is not
plentiful and too much cannot be made of it. Nevertheless, it is important
to note that the general trend in the statements of those who were concerned
to avoid intervention in Spain's domestic affairs was not to eschew all United
Nations action. There was a quite pronounced tendency to examine proposals
with reference to their substance and to weigh their potentialities as inter¬
vention on that basis, rather than on the basis of some preconceived academic
theories. Most of the practice of interest is, in this case, to be found in
the first session. This, however, does not detract from its usefulness, but
rather adds to it* It is dear that early in the practice of the General
Assembly there was not the same predisposition to adopt rigid attitudes an
intervention as later became evident.
1. G.A.,(V), Ad Hoc Bol.Comi Bolivia, ibid, 25th ratg., para. 28; Colombia, ibid,
paras. 44-47; Costa Rica, ibid, para. 51; Ecuador, ibid, 29th rnkg., para. 35;
ffgypt, ibid, 28th mtg., para. 40; Greece, ibid, para. 44; Haiti, ibid, 25th
mtg., para. 41; Lebanon, ibid, 29th mtg., paras. 59-40; Liberia, ibid, 27th
mtg., para. 25; Pakistan, ibid, 26th mtg., paras. 15-20; Peru, ibid, 25th
mtg., para. 10; South Africa, 27th mfcg., para. 26; Thailand, ibid, 29th
mtg., paras. 57-58.
Chapter III
The Treatment of People of Indian Origin in South Africa.
The general trend towards the apparent acceptance, in practice, of a modi¬
fied approach towards the question of intervention, evident in the previous case,
is continued here, though admittedly intermittently and in varying degrees by
different States. It becomes noticeable, for example, that the attitude of
certain States towards what they consider as intervention hardens as the case
history prooeeds.
Throughout the disoussions on this topic, grave doubts were continually ex¬
pressed by many Members on the competence of the United Nations to entertain it.
Furthermore, continual requests were made by some of those Members for the matter
of, oompetenoe to be submitted to the International Court of Justice for an ad¬
visory opinion. However, these pleas were never accepted by the voting
-
• majorities in the Ceneral Assembly and hence doubts on the legal aspects of the
oase remained unassuaged. It is important to note, however, that these doubts
did not compel the majority of States entertaining them to vote against or abstain
on all resolutions which were proposed during the discussions of this item. On
the contrary, States which either maintained that the matter was within the domestic
Jurisdiction of South Africa, or at least that the subject of competence was doubt¬
ful, voted for resolutions which did not, in their opinion, violate the prohibi¬
tion of non-intervention in the domestic affairs of States. The majority of
\
States which considered the question of intervention seriously did not claim that
the matter being within the domestic jurisdiction of South Africa, all recommendations
were incompetent, or that there being a substantial doubt as to the competence of
the United Nations to deal with this item, no recommendations could justifiably be
adopted until the question of oompetenoe was settled. On the contrary the pre¬
vailing opinion seems to have been that while they could not vote for any
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recommendation which would constitute intervention in South Africa's domestic
affairs, were this item within that country's domestic jurisdiction, they could
vote for a recommendation which, despite the domestic status of this question,
did not constitute intervention anyway. This rationale is not stated ex¬
plicitly, but as in the previous case, follows from the actions of the States
in question.
The type of recommendation which these 'doubting' states were preapred to
accept was generally one which called on the parties to enter into negotiations
to settle their differences. However, it will be seen, as the material is
presented, that these same States immediately objeoted to any clause in such
recommendations which seemed to pronounce judgement on the merits of the case,
or to impose conditions on the States concerned, subject to which the requested
i
negotiations were to be carried out.
1. The First Session.
The General Assembly, at the second part of its first session adopted, at
its 52nd meeting,1 the following resolution on the subject, the text of which had
2
been proposed jointly by the delegations of France and Mexico:
The General Assembly.
Having taken note of the application made by the
Government of India regarding the treatment of Indians in
the Union of South Afi*ica, and having considered the matter:
1. States that because of that treatment, friendly
relations between the two Member States have been impaired
and,unles3 a satisfactory settlement is reached, these re¬
lations are likely to be further impaired;
2. Is of the opinion that the treatment of Indians in
the Union 3houid be in conformity with the international
obligations under the agreements concluded between the two
Governments and the relevant provisions of the Charter.
3. Therefore requests the two Governments to report at
the next session of the General Assembly the measures adopted
to this effect.
1. G.A.,(l/2), Plen., 52nd mtg., p. 1061.
2. ibid, 50th mtg., p. 1007; Resolution 44(l).
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This resolution was adopted by 32 votes to 15, with 7 abstentions."'"
Of the States voting against or abstaining on the vote on this resolution,
South Africa,^ the United States,^ El Salvador,'1" the Netherlands,^ Belgium,^ the
7 8 9
United Kingdom, New Zealand, and Argentina all expressed their doubt on the
competence of the United Nations to deal with this matter and supported the idea
of a request to the International Court of Justice for an advisory opinion thereon.
The Belgian delegate put the case for having an advisory opinion succinctly when
he said:
In my view, a question a3 important for everybody as
that of the respective limits of the principles of inter¬
vention and non-intervention in the domestic affairs of
Member States should never, if brought up seriously, be
deoided by omission and without the most careful consideration. .....
1. The details of voting were as follows:
In favour: Afghanistan, Byelorussian S.S.R., Chile, China, Colombia, Cuba, -
Czechoslovakia, Dominican Republic, Egypt, Ethiopia, France, Guatemala,
Haiti, Honduras, Iceland, India, Iran, Iraq, Lebanon, Liberia, Mexico,
Norway, Panama, Philippines, Poland, Saudi-Arabia, Syria, Ukrainian S.S.R.,
U.S.S.R., Uruguay, Yemen, Yugoslavia.
Against: Argentina, Belgium, Canada, Costa Rica, El Salvador, Greece,
Luxembourg, Netherlands, New Zealand, Nicaragua, Paraguay, Peru, Union
of South Africa, United Kingdom, United States.
Abstentions: Australia, Bolivia, Brazil, Denmark, Eouador, Sweden, Turkey.
2. G.A.,(l/2), Plen., 50th mtg., p. 1009.
3. ibid, pp. 1010-1014.
4. ibid, PP. 1014-1015•
5. ibid, 51st mtg., pp. 1031-1032
6. ibid, P. 1032.
7. ibid, PP. 1033-1036.
8. ibid, 52nd mtg., pp. 1046-1047
9. ibid, PP. 1047-1048.
10. ibid, 51st mtg., pp. 1032-1033
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It had been shown that, for the United Nations, this
question implies a very serious choice between two methods:
the purely political method, which claims absolute supremacy,
and the politico-legal method which required that questions of
law shall be decided legally and political questions politically.
Although there were significant doubts on the competence of the United
Nations to entertain this question, States did not at this time place too
great emphasis on the problems surrounding the prohibition of intervention in
the domestic affairs of another State*
2. The Second Session.
At the second session, there was again little treatment of the question
of intervention. Again, however, as at the first session, a significant number
of States expressed their doubts on the competence of the United Nations to
1 2 3 i
deal with the subject. South Africa, New Zealand, Denmark, Belgium,
Nicaragua,^ Greece,^ Costa Rica,^ Canada,^ and Ecuador,^ all, either ex¬
pressly or by implication, indicated their doubts on the competence of the
10 11 12
United Nations to deal with the item. Argentina, Brazil, Norway and
1. G.A.,(ll), 1st Com., 106th mtg., pp. 419-422.
2. ibid, 107th mtg., pp. 433-434-.
3. ibid, pp. 434-^435•
4. ibid, p. 439.
5. ibid, p. 440.
6. ibid, 108th mtg., p. 447.
7. ibid, 111th mtg., p. 464.
8. ibid, p. 470.
9. ibid, 112nd mtg., p. 478.
10. ibid, 109th mtg., p. 449.
11. ibid, p. 450.
12. ibid, 111th mtg., pp. 464-^465.
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EL Salvador"'" all favoured an application to the International Court for an
advisory opinion on the legal aspects of the matter. As a result of these
doubts on competence and on the exaot extent of the legal obligations involved,
the General Assembly failed to adopt any resolution on the subject.
Of the draft resolutions submitted during the course of the debates, two
received serious consideration - that proposed by the Indian delegation, and
that proposed jointly by Belgium, Brazil, Cuba and Denmark,
2
The terms of the Indian resolution, were as follows:
1, Wherea3 in resolution 44(l) dated 8 December 1946 the
General Assembly, taking note of an application made by the
Government of India regarding the treatment of Indians in the
Union of South Africa, observed that because of that treatment,
friendly relations between the two Member States had been im-
. f paired and, unless a satisfactory agreement was reached, their
» relations were likely to be further impaired;
2, Whereas after careful consideration of the matter, the
1 General Assembly wa3 of the opinion that the treatment of Indians
in the Union of South Africa should be in conformity with the
international obligations under the agreements concluded be¬
tween the two Governments and the relevant provisions of the
Charter, and
3, Whereas the General Assembly requested the two Govern¬
ments to report at the next session of the General Assembly the
measures adopted to that effect,
4, The General Assembly,
Having considered the reports submitted by the Govern¬
ment of India, and the Government of the Union of South Africa
pursuant to the aforesaid resolution,
Reaffirms its resolution dated 8 December 1946;
5, Requests the two Governments to enter into dis¬
cussions at a round table conference on the basis of that
resolution without any further delay and to invite the
Government of Pakistan to take part in such discussions.
6, Requests that the results of such discussions be
reported 6y the Governments of the Union of South Africa
and India to the Secretary-General of the United Nations,
who shall from time to time make inquiries from them and
submit a report on the action taken on this resolution by the
two Governments to the Assembly at its next session.
1, ibid, Plen., 119th mtg,, Vol, II, pp. 1122-1125,
2, ibid, Plen., Vol, H, Annexes, a.i, 98, annex 26, p, 1616, Doc. A/492,
Report of the ELrst Committee; 3ee also, ibid, 119th mtg,, p, 1111,
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1
The terms of the joint four power draft resolution were a3 follows:
The General Assembly.
Considering the reports submitted by the Governments of
India and the Union of South Africa following upon the res¬
olution of the General Assembly of 8 Deoember 1946 which drew
their attention to the desirability of their reaching an agree¬
ment;
Considering that, according to the opinion expressed by
the 3aia resolution, the treatment of Indians in the Union
should be in conformity with the international obligations
under the agreements concluded between the two Governments and
the relevant provisions of the Charter; that, in consequence, if
no direct agreement should be reached between the two Governments
it is, above all, necessary to determine the rights and obligations
of the two States; that, according to the Charter and to the
Statute of the International Court of Justice, the Court is part¬
icularly designed to deal with such questions,
Calls upon the two Governments, after inviting the Govern¬
ment of Pakistan to take part in their negotiations, to continue
their efforts with a view to reaohing an agreement settling their
dispute through a round table conference or other direct means or,
(i if necessary^ by mediation or conciliation, and, should they fail
! to reaoh such an agreement, to submit the question of the extent
' of the said obligations under the agreements concluded between them
and under the relevant provisions of the Charter to the International
Court of Justice#
These two resolutions were very similar. Both called on the Govern¬
ments concerned to enter into negotiations to find a solution for their dif¬
ferences. But in the four power draft provision was made for judicial
determination of the legal aspects of the dispute, while in the Indian draft,
it wa3 not. The Indian draft also recommended that negotiations be carried
out on the basis of resolution 44(l) to which condition a considerable number
of States objected#
These differences between the two drafts, though small, were responsible
for the defeat of both of them. The Indian draft resolution, though accepted
1# G#A#,(ll), Plen#, Vol# II, Annexes, a.i.98, annex 26a, p. 1616, Doc .
A/496.
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by the First Committee,was rejected by the plenary session a3 it did not
2
receive a two-thirds majority. It should be noted, however, that a majority
of States which voted against or abstained in the vote on the Indian draft
resolution were able to vote for the similar four power draftFurthermore,
the majority of States which doubted the competence of the United Nations in
this matter voted in favour of the four power draft, while they either voted against
or abstained on the vote on the Indian draft.
Little attention was paid to the question of intervention in these debates
and it would therefore be unwise to draw great conclusions on the legal aspects
1* The details of voting in the First Committee were as follows:
'See G.A.,(ll), 1st Com., 112nd mtg., p. 481;
:In favour: Afghanistan, Byelorussian S.S.R., Chile, China, Colombia,
I Czechoslovakia, Egypt, Ethiopia, France, Guatemala, Haiti, Honduras, India,
Iran, Iraq, Lebanon, Mexico, Pakistan, Panama, Philippines, Poland., Saudi-
Arabia, Syria, Turkey, Ukrainian S.S.R., U.S.S.R., Venezuela, Yemen,
Yugoslavia,
Against: Australia, Belgium, Canada, Costa Rica, Denmark, Greece, Luxembourg,
Netherlands, New Zealand, Nicaragua, Norway, Sweden, Union of South Africa,
U.K., U.S.A.
Abstaining: Argentina, Hrazil, Cuba, Dominioan Republic, Ecuador.
2. The details of voting in the plenary session were as follows:
See ibid, Plen., Vol. II, 120th mtg., p. 1169:
In favour: Afghanistan, Byelorussian S.S.R., Chile, China, Colombia,
Czechoslovakia, Egypt, Ethiopia, France, Guatemala, Haiti, Honduras, Iceland,
India, Iran, Iraq, Lebanon, Liberia, Mexico, Pakistan, Panama, Philippines,
Poland, Saudi-Arabia, Syria, Turkey, Ukrainian S.S.R., U.S.S.R., Venezuela,
Yemen, Yugoslavia.
Against: Argentina, Australia, Belgium, Brazil, Canada, Costa Rica, Denmark,
El Salvador, Greece, Luxembourg, Netherlands, New Zealand, Nicaragua, Norway,
Paraguay, Sweden, South Africa, U.K., U.S.A.
Abstaining: Bolivia, Cuba, Dominican Republic, Eouador, Peru, Uruguay.
3. The details of voting in the plenary session are as follows:
See ibid, p. 1170:
In favour: Argentina, Australia, Belgium, Brazil, Canada, Costa Rica, Cuba,
Denmark, Dominican Republic, Ecuador, El Salvador, Greece, Luxembourg,
Netherlands, New Zealand, Nicaragua, Norway, Paraguay, Peru, Sweden, Union
of South Africa, U.K., U.S.A., Uruguay.
Against: Afghanistan, Byelorussian S.S.R., China, Colombia, Czechoslovakia,
Egypt, Ethiopia, France, Guatemala, Haiti, Honduras, Iceland, India, Iran,
Iraq, Lebanon, Liberia, Mexico, Pakistan, Panama, Philippines, Poland,
Saudi-Arabia, Syria, Turkey, Ukrainian S.S.R., U.S.S.R., Yemen, Yugoslavia.
Abstaining: Bolivia, Chile, Venezuela.
of the matter therefrom. However/ this apparent lack of consistency in the
votes in the second session is of interest because it herald3 further deveop-
ments in subsequent sessions. For, from the third session onwards, in this
case, States began to differentiate, openly, between different types of re¬
commendations on this matter and to support some while at the same time
opposing others, on the grounds of a lack of competence. Though they do
not state so explicity, countries adopting this attitude seem to imply that
the competence to adopt recommendations concerning matters which, in their
opinion, fall essentially within the domestic jurisdiction of another, is a
matter of degree and that whereas the General Assembly is competent to adopt
some recommendations, it is incompetent to adopt others on account of their
terms.
3. The Third Session.
(a) Resolutions Presented in the First Committee.
At this session of the General Assembly, resolutions were introduced in
the First Committee by South Africa, India, France and Mexico jointly, and
Australia, Denmark and Sweden jointly.
(i) The South African Draft Resolution.
At the 265th meeting of the First Committee, the South African delegation
introduced a draft resolution calling upon the General Assembly to decide that
this item was essentially within the domestic jurisdiction of South Africa and
that it did not fall within the competenoe of the United Nations.^" It was
not aooepted by the Committee, being defeated by 33 votes to 5> with 12
1. G.A.,(113/2), 1st Com., 265th mtg., p. 280.
68.
abstentions,1
(ii) The Indian Draft Resolution,
2
The draft resolution submitted by the Indian delegation, after certain
revisions, was adopted by the Committee by 21 votes to 17, with 12 abstentions.^
The text of this resolution was as follows:
The General Assembly.
Having considered the communication made by the Government
of India to the Secretary-General of the United Nations dated
12th July 1%8,
Mindful of the preamble of the Charter and of the pro¬
visions relating to the promotion of human rights and funda¬
mental freedoms contained in Article 1 (paragraph 3)* Article
13 (paragraph l), Article 55 (sub-paragraph o), Article 56 and
Article 62 of the Charter,
Having regard to its resolution 103(l) of 19 November
1946 against racial discrimination and resolution 217 (m) of
10 December 1948 proclaiming a Universal Declaration of Human
Bights which entitles everyone to all the rights and freedoms
set forth in that Declaration without distinction of any kind
such as race, colour, et cetera,
Recailing paragraphs 1 and 2 of its resolution 44(l) of
8 Deoember 1946,
1, Is of the opinion that the treatment of persons of
1. ibid, 268th mtg., p, 321, The details of voting were as follows:
In favour: Argentina, Brazil, Greeoe, the Netherlands, South Africa,
Against: Venezuela, Yemen, Yugoslavia, Afghanistan, Byelorussian
S.S.R., Chile, China, Colombia, Costa Rica, Cuba, Denmark,Ecuador,
Egypt, Haiti, Honduras, India, Iran, Iraq, Lebanon, Liberia, Mexico,
Norway, Pakistan, Panama, Philippines, Poland, Saudi-Arabia, Siam,
Syria, Ukrainian S.S.R., U.S.S.R., U.S.A., Uruguay.
Abstentions: Australia, Belgium, Burma, Canada, Dominican Republic,
Prance, New Zealand, Nicaragua, Peru, Sweden, Turkey, U.K.
2. G.A.,(in/2), Plen#, Annexes, a.i. 8(43)> P« 87, Doc. A/C.l/46l/Rev. 1.
3. ibid, 1st Com., 268th mtg., p. 321. The details of voting were as follows:
In favour: Egypt, Haiti, India, Iran, Iraq, Lebanon, Liberia, Mexico,
Pakistan, Philippines, Poland, Saudi-Arabia, Syria, Ukrainian S.S.R.,
U.S.S.R., Yemen, Yugoslavia, Afghanistan, Byelorussian S.S.R., Chile,
China.
Against: Denmark, Ecuador, Prance, Greece, Norway, Panama, Peru, Siam,
Sweden, Turkey, Union of South Africa, U.K., U.S.A., Argentina, Australia,
Belgium, Brazil.
Abstentions: Costa Rica, Cuba, Dominican Republic, Honduras, Netherlands,
New Zealand, Nicaragua, Uruguay, Venezuela, Burma, Canada, Colombia.
Indian and Pakistan origin in the Union of South Africa i3 not
in conformity with the relevant provisions of the Charter, the
resolutions of the Assembly and the international obligations
under the agreements concluded between the two Governments;
2. Recommends that a Commission, composed of representatives
of three Members of the United Nations, one nominated by India,
one by the Union of South Africa and one to be elected by the
two representatives so nominated, be appointed:
(a) To study the situation arisen out of the treatment of
persons of Indian and Pakistan origin in South Africa;
(b) To report to the fourth regular session of the General
Assembly the result of its study and submit recommendations for
the solution of the problem.
(iii) The Draft granoo-Mextcan Resolution.
This draft resolution, as amended by the proposals of Iran,"1" the
2 3 k
Byelorussian S.S.R., and Haiti was also adopted by the Committee. The
5
text was as follows:
i
The General Assembly,
Taking note of the application made by the Government of
India regarding the treatment of People of Indian origin in the
Union of South Africa as well as of considerations put forward by
the Government of the Union, and having re-examined the matter;
Invites the Governments of India, Pakistan and the Union
of South Africa to enter into discussions at a round table
1. G.A.,(lIl/2), ELen., Annexes, a.i.8(45), para. 11, p. 87, Doc. A/865.
2. ibid, para. 12.
5. ibid, para. 13.
4. G.A., (lH/2), 1st Com., 268th mtg., p. 524. The details of voting
were 39J2S9 as follows:
In favour: Denmark, Dominican Republic, Ecuador, Egypt, Erance, Greece,
Haiti, Honduras, Iran, Iraq, Lebanon, Liberia, Mexico, Netherlands, New
Zealand, Nicaragua, Norway, Pakistan, Panama, Peru, Philippines, Saudi-
Arabia, Siam, Sweden, Syria, Turkey, U.S.A., Uruguay, Venezuela, Yemen,
Afghanistan, Belgium, Brazil, Burma, Canada, Chile, Colombia, Costa Rica,
Cuba.
Against: South Africa, Australia.
Abstentions: India, Poland, Ukrainian S.S.R., U.S.S.R., U.K., Yugoslavia,
Argentina, Byelorussian S.S.R., China.
5. G.A.,(lIl/2), ELen., Annexes, a.i.8(45), p. 88, D00- (A/865)
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conference, taking into consideration the purposes and principles
of the Charter of the United Nations and the Declaration of Hveoan
Rights.
(iv) The Joint Draft Resolution of Australia, Denmark and Sweden.
This joint draft resolution, after certain revisions, provided, inter alia,
that the General Assembly should call upon the Governments of India and the
Union of South Africa to renew their efforts to reach an agreement settling
their dispute through a round table conference or by other means, such as
mediation and conciliation! invited the two Governments to associate the Govern¬
ment of Pakistan in their efforts; and requested the President of the General
Assembly and the Secretary-General to render all assistance in bringing the
parties together and, if the parties agreed, to designate a Mediator*
After discussion, the representatives of these three States agreed to with¬
draw their resolution, reserving the right to present further proposals in the
General Assembly.'*"
With the details of these resolutions and the voting thereon in mind, and
remembering the stands taken in previous sessions on the same topic by the
various States, attention must now be focused on the actual statements made in
the debates leading up to the votes in the First Committee of this session*
o
(b) The Attitude of States - First Committee*
(i) New Zealand.
New Zealand again noted that there was considerable doubt as to the correct
interpretation of Article 2(7) and that correct procedure would have been to
request the International Court of Justice far an advisory opinion on the
subject. Because of these doubts on competence, New Zealand abstained in the
1. G.A.,(lIl/2), ELen. Annexes, a.i. 8(45), para. 3, p. 86, Doc. A/865.
2. The material is presented in the order in which States spoke in the First
Committee debate. Only statements on intervention pertinent to the
present line of inquiry are presented.
votes on the South African and Indian resolutions* However, these doubts did
not compel her to abstain on all proposals, far as noted above, she voted for
the Eranco-Mexican draft* Elaborating New Zealand's views, Sir Carl
Berendsen said that
In view, however, of the grave doubts that existed re¬
garding the scope of the paragraph in question, it seemed
that the Committee's best course would be not to take any
steps on the substance of the question, but to try to work
out sows proposal for mediation.
The delegation of New Zealand was ready to support any
proposal of that kind. On the other hand, it could not
support axsy resolution containing any suggestion of con¬
demnation or even tqXleration, or any decision dealing
with the substance of the question.
New Zealand did not give any explanation of why, if she doubted the com¬
petence of the United Nations to deal with this item, she was able to vote
for the Pranco-Mexican draft, while at the same time opposing the Indian*
It is suggested that the answer must lie in the terms of the iVenco-Mexican
resolution, and that whereas because of her doubts on competence, the terms
of the Indian resolution would have amounted, in New Zealand's opinion, to
intervention, those of the Ptanco-Mexican one did not.
(ii) Belgium*
By the general tenor of his speech, the Belgian delegate, Mr. Ryckmans,
indicated that, in the opinion of his delegation, the matter fell essentially
within the domestic Jurisdiction of South Africa* In such circumstances, it
might have been expected that the Belgian delegation would have voted against
all resolutions put before the Committee or at least abstained, far it has
already been seen that in agenda debates Belgium assumed a particularly ex¬
treme view of the meaning of intervention. However, such was not the case in
1. Q-.A.,(Hl/2), 1st Corn., 265th mtg», p. 281.
this instance. ilrora the statements made it appears that even in such circum¬
stances Belgium is prepared to accept some discussion of and recommendation on
a domestic matter.
Recalling the case of the observance of human rights in Bulgaria and
Hungary and the treatment of various church dignitaries there, and pointing out
that the General Assembly had had a certain competence in that case only because
of the peace treaties with those countries, the Belgian delegate said that
However, in the present case, and in his draft resolu¬
tion and in his statement, the Indian representative had
not specifically referred to any treaty. Moreover, in his
letter to the Secretary-General (A/577) specifically mentioned
in his draft resolution, the Indian representative had not
merely dealt with the question of racial discrimination
against Indians in South Africa but with discrimination
against non-whites in general. There was no treaty re¬
garding the manner in which the Union of South Africa
should treat its nationals other than Indians who were not
of Suropean race. The conclusion to be drawn from those
considerations was that the discussion of that question
could not result in a recommendation. Therefore the ques¬
tion arose as to whether the discussion of the matter fell
within the competence of the General Assembly, and, if it
was permissible, whether it was opportune.
Recalling the conditions under which Article 2, para¬
graph 7, had been drafted at San Jhrancisco, Mr. Ryekxaana
thought that if the words 'deal with* had been suggested
to replace the word 'intervene', they would have met the
intention of most delegations, at that time, to forbid the
General Assembly to deal in any fashion whatsoever - not only
in the form of reconsaendations but even in the farm of discus¬
sion - with questions essentially within the domestic juris¬
diction of States. However, some doubt remained and was
aggravated by the fact that, according to rule 110 of the
rules of procedure, the General Assembly had to defer the
vote on the question of competence until the end of the
discussion, namely until just before the vote on the sub¬
stance was taken. That, at least, enabled the General
Assembly to discuss a question, if not to make a recommenda¬
tion and that was the point of view upheld by the Belgian
delegation during the discussion of the case of Cardinal
Mindszenty.
1. G.iU,(lIl/2), 1st Com., 266th ratg., pp. 288.
This statement at least accepts that some discussion of a matter is within
the competence of the General Assembly, if only on procedural grounds* Still,
it indicated Belgium* s continued hostility to any recommendation on the sub¬
ject*
Later on in the debate Mr. Byckmano eplained why he intended to vote
against the South African resolution denying competence and against the Indian
draft resolution and why he was opposed to the terms of the proposals sub¬
mitted jointly by the delegations of Australia, Denmark and Sweden. Speaking
of the South African draft he said that hei^
• ••••could not vote in favour of the draft resolution...
because it denied the competence of the General Assembly
on that question. He agreed that the General Assembly
could not make recommendations on that subject* However,
since it was doubtful whether the General Assembly could
discuss the question at all, the Belgian representative
felt that the General Assembly should not take a deci¬
sion on its own competence, but should refer the matter
to the international Court of Justice*
This statement would appear to back-pedal somewhat, aa it placed in doubt
the right to discuss which in his previous statement the Belgian delegate
appeared to have countenanced.
The Belgian delegate then explained his opposition to the Indian draft
resolution* It implied, he said, that the General Assembly had competence to
consider the issue* He was convinced that it would not bring a solution any
closer and in addition, it included an a priori conclusion which the commission
to be set up was ejqpected to reach.
Belgium opposed the joint draft resolution of Australia, Denmark, and
Sweden because it called for the intervention of the President of the General
Assembly and the Secretary-General without any invitation to these two 1laving
1* ibid, 268th infcg., pp. 320-321.
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been issued by the parties concerned.
However, no sooner had Mr# Syckraana said this than he announced Belgium's
intention of voting in favour of the Stance-Mexican draft resolution. Un¬
fortunately, he did not explain how he was able to do so when he had just
said that the Assembly could not make recommendations on this-subject#
It is difficult to see in what legal way the Stanco-Mexican draft dif¬
fered from the Indian. The Stanco-lfexican draft took note of the applica¬
tion of the Government of India concerning the treatment of people of Indian
origin in South Africa and this would normally be construed as an assertion
of competence to entertain such a matter.
The main difference between the two drafts is in the extent of their
operative provisions and it must be presumed, in the absence of any ex¬
planation to the contrary, that whereas Belgium considered the establishment
of a commission to study the problem as intervention in the domestic affairs
of South Afrioa, she did not ffeel that a call, on her to negotiate with India
and Pakistan suffered from the same defect. It appears that even in these
dubious legal circumstances, Belgium considered some kind of recommendation
to be within the competence of the General Assembly.
(iii) -Rraa.ee.
The position adopted by the Erench delegation at the third session on
this topic is of particular interest. It will be recalled that Eran.ce, to¬
gether with Mexico, had sponsered the first resolution to be adopted an this
subject at the first session of the General Assembly and that at the present
session was again, with Mexico, the co-sponsor of a draft resolution wich
was ultimately adopted.
On behalf of Erance (Mr. Garreau first of all indicated that in his view
the matter did not fall within the domestic jurisdiction of South Africa.
Ilowsver, lie tiien drew back and made statements which render the trench posi¬
tion somewhat equivocal. lie said that
• •• wiien the Indian complaint had first been submitted to the
General Assembly in 1946, his delegation had been in serious
doubt as to the Assembly's competence to take any action in
the matter. This doubt was, however, dispelled by the fact
that the problem presented two aspects: in the first case,
there was the question of the relationship between different
racial groups in South Africa which clearly fell within the
domestic jurisdiction of the Union; on the other hand, there
was tile question involving the latter*s obligations under its
existing agreements with India which presented an international
character.
I
ibr these reasons, the Erench and Mexican delegations had
joined in 1946 in submitting a draft resolution, which the
Assembly had later adopted, aimed at promoting a settlement
by mutual agreement between the two disputants. The natter
had again been discussed at the second regular session in
1947 but, since the Assembly had been unable to obtain the
necessary majority to take any further action, the resolu¬
tion of 1946 remained in foroe. The present position
of the Trench delegation was that the Assembly could not
take any further action in the matter without violating
iu-ticle 2, paragraph 7 of the Charter.
Mr. (Jarreau thought that the question of doiaestio
jurisdiction had been very clearly stated by the representa¬
tive of the Union of South Africa. lie noted that the Indian
draft resolution (A/C.l/461/Rev.l) at present before the Com¬
mittee dealt with discrimination not only against the Indian
community but also against other minority groups of Asiatic
origin in South nfrica. Clearly, it was a question of re¬
lations between a sovereign Government and its citizens in
which the United Nations had no competence to interfere,
lis the representative of India had himself admitted, the
Indian community concerned was composed of South African
citizens of Indian origin and not of foreign nationals
residing in the Union of South Africa.
Mr. (Jarre&u shared the view of the representative of
Argentina that the fact of their racial origin was no justifi¬
cation for intervention on their behalf by the Indian Govern¬
ment. lie also upheld the interpretation of the words 'to
intervene' given by the Belgian representative to the effect ^hat
it really meant 'to deal with', thus giving it a broad sense.
1. ibid, 266tii mtg., pp. 290-291. Bmphasis added.
2. See supra, p.72.
It remained true, however, tout the two Governments concerned
had concluded certain agreements. It was then up to those
two Governments to settle between themselves any misunderstanding
that might have arisen concerning the text of those agreements.
If the parties could not agree on the meaning or on the imple¬
mentation of their agreements they could always have recourse
to the International Court of Justice. The question did not
seem to the Ererich delegation to be a matter for the General
Assembly.
In conformity with the foregoing position, the Erench dele¬
gation was once again joining with the delegation of Mexico in
submitting & draft resolution to the Committee..........
finally, Mr. Garreau stated that his delegation would
abstain from voting in respect of the draft resolution sub¬
mitted by the Union of South Africa (a/C.1/460). Its reason
far so doing was to avoid any decision as to the Assembly's
competence. Mr. Garreau hoped that the adoption of the
Erench-Mexican draft resolution would make possible a solu¬
tion based upon mutual understanding between the parties.
ftom this, it is not too clear what the Erench position, to which Mr.
Garreau refers, is. He says, on the one hand, that the question has an
international character, but then goes on to stress its domestic qualities.
On the basis of this latter assertion, he claims that the United Nations has
no competence to intervene, a word which, in his opinion, means 'deal with'.
But if the United Nations has no competence to deal with this item, how can
it have the competence to adopt the resolution submitted by the Erench dele¬
gation itself? The theory expounded by Mr. Garreau and his actions do not
tally.
In the light of the Krench actions on this occasion, it appears that what¬
ever measures the United Nations is prohibited from taking by the adoption of
this broad interpretation of the term 'intervene •, it is not prevented from
calling on a State within whose domestic jurisdiction the matter falls, to
settle its differences with respect thereto with another State, by negotiation.
Once again the conclusion is readied that contrary to dogmatic assertion, Erance
does not consider all recommendations addressed to a State as intervention.
(iv) Australia.
On numerous occasions Australia had taken a strong line against any form
of United Nations action where the matter fell within the domestic jurisdic¬
tion of any State. In this case, however, she showed herself undecided not
only as to the question of domestic jurisdiction, hut also as to how far the
United Nations can act in such circumstances. In the first session, she
abstained from the vote on the Franco-Mexican draft resolution, although this
merely asked the two Governments concerned to report to the Assembly what mea¬
sures they had taken to accord to the people concerned, treatment in accordance
with the provisions of the Charter and the agreements concluded between them.
In the second session she voted against the resolution calling on the parties
to enter into discussions on the subjeot, and which reaffirmed the previous
year's resolution. In this, the third session, she abstained in the vote on
the South African draft resolution; voted against the Indian draft; and also
against the Franco-Mexioan draft, even though this latter also only called on
the parties to negotiate in order to reach a solution to the problem. Yet the
draft resolution which Australia, along with Denmark and Sweden, proposed to
the Committee, involved the United Nations in a more extreme form of inter¬
vention than that foreseen by the resolutions of the first two sessions which
she hod voted against. This Australian draft, as well as calling on the States
to negotiate to find a settlement, called far tiie uninvited assistance of the
President of the General Assembly and the Secretary-General in these negotiations.
No explanation of this attitude is to be found in the statement of the Australian
delegation in the First Committee. Hie Australian delegate, Mr. HLimsoll, said
that he:**"
1. ibid, 266th mtg., p. 295.
.» agreed with the previous speaker that the question was
extremely complex and much time would he required to reach a
solution. He considered that the Assembly would he unwise
to issue a condemnation of any of the parties to the dispute
for the only hope of reaching a practical and a just solu¬
tion was to bring the parties together in order to settle
their differences by mutual agreement in accordance with the
principles of the Charter. In that spirit the Australian
delegation had joined with the delegations of Denmark and
Sweden in submitting a draft resolution (A/c.l/465) calling
upon the parties to renew their efforts to reach an agreement
by the best means possible. The chief difference between
that proposal and the Erench-Jfexicaix draft resolution con¬
sisted in the fact that the former laid down no prerequisites
or conditions for the negotiations whereas the latter required
the discussion to be based upon General Assembly resolution
44(l) of December 1946. Mr. ELirasoll believed that that con¬
dition was unwise since the Government of the Union of South
Africa had already in the past refused to participate in talks
on the basis of the 1946 resolution.
However, these remarks do not accord with the final terms of the Franco-
Mexican resolution which made no reference to the 1946 resolution.^" Yet
despite this, the Australian delegation still voted against it. Australia's
position in this instance is to say the least, unclear, and when it is com¬
pared with her statements made in subsequent sessions on domestic jurisdiction
and intervention, is plainly illogical unless she adhered here to a modified
2
definition of intervention which does not condemn all recommendations,
(v) Greece.
Greece voted in favour of the South African motion denying the competence
of the United Nations to entertain the question and, naturally enough, in view
of this vote, against the Indian draft resolution. However, she also found it
possible to vote in favour of the Franco-Mexican proposal. In thus voting,
the Greek delegation seemed to rely more on political considerations than on
1. The Erench delegate, ibid, 267th rutg., p. 297, amended the Franco-Mexican
proposal to exclude the reference to resolution 44(1).
2. At the Plenary Session, the Australian delegation voted for the Franco-
Mexican draft.
legal, Explaining Greece's position^this question,Mr. Kyrou said that i"1"
.... The General Assembly, however, was a political body
composed of different nations} its chief purpose was the
settlement of political disputes. It was neither a court
of law nor an organization for moral improvement. The aim of
the Committee's discussions should therefore be to seek suit¬
able means for a final settlement of the dispute. Bearing
those considerations in mind, it would appear that the only
method which might lead to an effective solution of the pro¬
blem was that of direct contact between the two States con¬
cerned. The General Assembly could hardly take up the
substance of the problem, whereas, if the Committee were to
recommend direct negotiations between the parties, the chances
of reaching concrete results would certainly be much greater.
Such a method would be preferable to that of mediation or con¬
ciliation, which always contained a certain element of pressure.
If good results were to be achieved, a draft resolution should
not be based on resolution 44(l) of 1946.
Although Greece does not here stress the legal aspect of the problem,
other than to say that the General Assembly could hardly take up the sub¬
stance of the problem, the exact significance of which is not clear, her
actions on tills, and subsequent occasions,are somewhat contr&dictatory.
By voting for the South African motion, she accepted the hypothesis
2
that the General Assembly was incompetent to deal with the item. But if
trie subject fell essentially within the domestic Jurisdiction of South Africa,
how could the General Assembly adopt a resolution which dealt with it in any
way, even if that recommendation only called on the parties to negotiate?
The answer must be that Greece did not consider a recommendation of the type
proposed by STance and Mexico to be intervention in the affairs of a State.
Once again, there is a discrepancy between words and actions, leading to the
conclusion that not all recommendations constitute intervention, even if the
subject matter thereof does fall within the domestic Jurisdiction of a State.
1. ibid, 267th mtg., p. 298,
2. ibid,p.300
(vi) Canada.
While at tile second session of the General Assembly, Canada had. had
some doubts on the legal aspects of the matter, at this session she seemed
to accept the hypothesis that the competence of the General Assembly to
adopt a recommendation is a question of degree* Her approach to the problem
of the relationship between the prohibition of intervention and the power of
recommendation is overtly liberal, as it was in the case of discussions. In
Canada's opinion, the question of competence can only be decided once there is
a specific proposal before the General Assembly, and it seems to be inferred
that whereas some reconuendations will be outwith the competence of the General
Assembly, not all recommendations necessarily are so. Explaining Canada's
position, General MoHaughton said that j"*"
....while agreeing that the Union of South Africa was within
its rights in contesting the competence of the General Assembly
in the question, he felt that a distinction must be made be¬
tween the right of the Assembly to discuss the problem under
the terras of the Charter and its competence to intervene,
He recalled that, when the same question had been dis¬
cussed in 1946, the Canadian representative had stressed that
the rights of the Assembly to discuss questions under Articles
10 and 14 of the Charter would be seriously impaired if too
great force vrere given to the domestic jurisdiction clause
in Article 2, paragraph 7, of the Charter. A happy balance
must be maintained between those two concepts. Such a happy
balance could not be expressed in a general principle, but
roust be determined by the facts of each particular case. Tire
question of competence in the case under consideration could
not be decided until the Committee had a specific proposal
before it, prescribing toe kind of action the Assembly might
be invited to take.
It was for that reason that rule 110, which laid down that
any motion calling for a decision on the competence of the
General Assembly must be put to the vote immediately before a
vote was taken on the proposals concerning the substance of
the question, had been included in the rules of procedure.
1. Ibid, p. 300.
(vii) The United Kingdom,
Although the United Kingdom has he en one of the foremost exponents of the
broad view of the meaning of the word * intervene* f in this case her attitude
was somewhat different. In the first two sessions she expressed grave doubts
on the competence of the United Nations to deal with the question, but in the
third session abstained on the South African motion denying that competence.
She subsequently voted against the Indian draft resolution and abstained cm
the franco-Mexican one. In explaining the United Kingdom view, Mr. Walker
said that
• The United Kingdom would abstain from the vote an the
competence of the General Assembly in view of the importance
of that question and the grave doubts raised by some clauses
in the Charter. His delegation's position had always been
that the proper course in suoh matters was to refer them to
the International Court of Justice for decision, as the
General Assembly could not decide its own competence in so
grave a matter. Strictly speaking, he should continue to
abstain on the other proposals, but such a course might be
open to misunderstanding. He would therefore have to vote
against the Indian draft resolution (A/C.l /4*dl/Rev.l) as it
recommended the establishment of a corardssian, a step which
he felt would be a grave precedent and which would not be
in conformity with the terms and intentions of the Charter.
Even if all the arguments used by the representative of
India were correct, it would still not be right to impose
a commission on an unwilling country. His delegation
would vote for the Australian, Danish and Swedish draft
resolution (A/C.l/465/Sev.1) which offered the best
possible way to a solution.
As Mr. Walker himself said, Great Britain ought at least to have ab¬
stained in all votes in view of the uncertainty which she felt about the
question of competence. However, that doubt seems to have turned into
certainty in so far as the Indian draft resolution was concerned, for in his
opinion, such a recommendation would be contrary to the terms and intentions
1. ibid, 268th mtg. p. 520.
of the Charter. Again, given the fact that she was uncertain about the
competence of the General Assembly, Great Britain ought to have indicated
her intention to abstain on the Australian, Danish and Swedish draft, or at
the very most to vote against it, pending the resolution by the International
Court of the question of competence. But instead, she indicated her inten¬
tion to vote for it. Such an action would surely only be possible if she
considered such a recommendation not to constitute intervention, whatever the
status of the item in question.
(c) The ELenary Session.
At the plenary session no statements were made which are of interest for
the present purpose. Of the two resolutions recommended by the First Com¬
mittee, only the Franco-Mexican one was adopted, the Indian one not being
pressed to a vote.
4. The Fifth Session.
At the fifth session, the item was referred to the Ad Hoc Political
Committee, in which two resolutions were proposed. Tite resolution proposed
2
jointly by the delegations of Burma, India, Indonesia and Iraq expressed the
opinion that the Group Areas Act, an act of the South African Parliament
1. Cr.A. ,(lIl/2), Hen., 212th mtg., p. 455; Res. 265(111). The voting -
47:1:10 - was as follows:
In Favour: Egypt, SI Salvador, France, Guatemala, Haiti, Honduras, Ice¬
land, India, Iran, Iraq, Israel, Lebanon, Liberia, Luxembourg, Mexico,
Netherlands, Hew Zealand, Nicaragua, Norway, Pakistan, PAnama, Peru,
Philippines, Saudi-Arabia, Siam, Sweden, Syria, Turkey, U.S.A., Uruguay,
Venezuela, Yemen, Afghanistan, Australia, Belgium, Bolivia, Brazil, Burma,
Canada, Chile, China, Colombia, Costa Rica, Cuba, Denmark, Dominican,
Republic, Ecuadorj
Against: Union of South Africa.
Abstaining: Greece, Paraguay, Poland, Ukrainian S.3.R., U.S.3.R., U.K.,
Yugoslavia, Argentina, Byelorussian S.S.R., Czechoslovakia.
2. G.A.,(V), Annexes, Vol. II, a.i, 57, p. 2, Doc. A/AC.38/L53. This resolution
was subsequently withdrawn by India on behalf of the co-sponsors at the
48th mtg. of the Committee.
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regulating the residence of the various racial groups in the Union of South
Africa* entailed a controversion of the purposes and principles of the Charter
and of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights. It also noted that because
of this act, resolution 265(111), inviting the Governments of India, Rakistan
and the Union of South Afrioa to negotiate had proved vise less. The draft
resolution recommended that South Africa take all steps necessary speedily to
bring its treatment of people of Indian origin into conformity with the purposes
and principles of the Charter and the Universal Declaration of Human Rights.
The other resolution which, as amended, was ultimately adopted by the
Committee, was introduced jointly be the delegations of Bolivia, Brazil, Denmark,
Norway and Sweden.^ The text of this resolution was as follows i
The General Assembly,
Recalling its resolutions 44(l) and 265(111) relating to
the treatment of people of Indian origin in the Union of South
Afrioa,
Having considered the communication by the permanent
representative of India to the Secretary-General dated 10
July 1950,
1. Recommends that the Governments of India, Pakistan and
the Union of South Africa proceed, in accordance with the
resolution 265(111), with the holding of a round table con¬
ference on the basis of their agreed agenda;
2. Recommends that in the event of failure of the
Governments concerned to reach an agreement in the afore¬
said manner within a reasonable time, they should desig¬
nate by agreement between them an individual to assist
the parties in carrying through appropriate negotiations;
5. Calls upon the Governments concerned to refrain from
taking any steps which would prejudice the success of their
negotiations.
To this text various amendments were proposed.
2
Cuba proposed to insert in the preamble a clause to the effect that the
policy of racial segregation (Apartheid) was necessarily based on the doctrines
of racial discrimination.
1. ibid, p. 5, Doc. A/AC.3^^.35.
2. ibid, Report of the Ad Hoc Political Committee, Doc.a/L548, p. 5, at p. 4,
para. 8.
At the 46 meeting of the Committee, an amendment was introduced on behalf
of Ecuador, Mexico, the Philippines and Uruguay, which provided fori"1*
(a) The insertion after the second paragraph of the preamble of an
additional paragraph reading:
Having in mind its resolution 105(1) of 19 November 1946
against racial persecution and discrimination, and its resolu¬
tion 217(111) dated 10 December 1948 relating to the Universal
Declaration of Human Rights.
(b) The addition at the end of paragraph 1 of the words "and bearing In
mind the provisions of the Charter of the United Nations and the Universal
Declaration of Human Rights";
(o) The insertion in paragraph 2, after the words "of the Governments con¬
cerned to" of the words"hold a round table conference within a reasonable time
or to reach agreement in the r-ound table conference"} and, at the end of the
paragraph, the addition of a clause reading "should the parties fall to agree
on this designation, he should be appointed, at the request of any of the
parties, by the Secretary-General of the United Nations";
(d) The addition, at the end of paragraph 5, of the words "in particular,
the implementation or enforcement of the provisions of 'The Group Areas Act*
pending the conclusion of such negotiations"}
(e) The addition of a new paragraph reading:
Decides to include this item in the agenda for the
next regular session of the General Assembly.
The above amendments were accepted by the co-sponsors of the resolution,
2
with the exception of the amendment to paragraph S.
At the 47 meeting of the Committee the representative of Iraq proposed that
1. ibid, p. 4, para. 10.
2. ibid, p. 4, para. 12; See also G.A.(V), M Hoc Bol.Com., 47th ratg., para. 11.
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in paragraph 2, after the words "within a reasonable time" the following should
be inserted:''"
.... there shall be established far the purpose of assisting
the parties in carrying through appropriate negotiations a
commission of three members, one to be nominated by the Govern¬
ment of the Union of South Africa, another to be nominated by
the Governments of India, and Pakistan and the third to be
nominated by the other two, or in default of agreement between
these two in a reasonable time, by the Secretary-General of
the United Nations"* x
2
The resolution as ultimately adopted by the Committee read as follows:
The General Assembly
Remlling its resolutions 4A(l) and 265(111) relating to
the treatment of people of Indian origin in the Union of South
Africa,
Having considered the consounioation of the permanent
representative of India to the Secretary-General of the
United Nations dated 10 July 1950,
Having in mind its resolution 105(1) of 19 November 1946
against racial persecution and discrimination, and its resolu¬
tions 217(ill) dated 10 December 1948 relating to the Universal
Declaration of Human Rights*
Considering that the policy of *raoial segregation* (Apartheid)
is necessarily baaed on doctrines of racial discrimination,
1* Recommends that the Governments of India, Pakistan and
the Union of South Africa proceed in accordance with resolution
265(111), with the holding of a round table conference on the
basis of their agreed agenda and bearing in mind the provisions
of the Charter of the United Nations and the Universal Declaration
of Human Rights#
2* Recommends that, in the event of failure of the Govern¬
ment concerned to hold a Round Table Conference before 1 April
1951 or to reach agreement in the round table conference within
a reasonable time there shall be established for the purpose
of assisting the parties in carrying through appropriate
negotiations a commission of three members, one member to be
nominated by the Government of the Union of South Africa,
another to be nominated by the Governments of India and
Pakistan and the third to be nominated by the other two
members or, in default of agreement between these two in
a reasonable time, by the Secretary-General;
3* Calls upon the Governments concerned to refrain from
taking any steps which would prejudice the success of their
1. G«A*,(V), Annexes, Vol# II, a.l. 57, Report of iid Hoc Pal.Com., Doc,
A/1548, p. 4, para. 12.
2. ibid, p. 6.
negotiations, in particular, the implementation or enforcement
of the provisionsof "The Group ireas Act' pending the con¬
clusion of such negotiations}
4. Decides to include this item in the agenda of the
next regular session cf the General Assembly.
The resolution as amended was adopted fcy the Ad Hoc Ralitical Committee
by 26 votes to 6, with 24 abstentions."''
(a) The Attitude of States
(l) The Ad Hoc Political Committee
Of the States which voted against or abstained in the vote on the final
2 5 4
form of the five power draft resolution, the Netherlands, France, Belgitsa,
5 6
Turkey and the United Kingdom expressed their doubts on the competence of
7 8
the General Assembly to deal with the issue. Belgium and the United Kingdom
expressed regret that the question of competence had not been submitted to the
_ 9 10
International Court, and Denmark and Sweden were also in favour of an
1. G.A«,(V), Ad hoc Fol.Conn, 47th ratg., para. 64. The details of voting were
as follows I
In favour: Burma, Chile, China, Cuba, Dominican Republic, Ecuador, Egypt,
El Salvador, Guatemala, Haiti, Honduras, India, Indonesia, Iran, Iraq,
Israel, Lebanon, Liberia, Mexico, Pakistan, Philippines, Saudi-Arabia,
Syria, Uruguay, Yemen, Yugoslavia.
Against: Australia, Belgium, Greece, Luxembourg, Netherlands, South Africa.
Abstaining: Afghanistan, Argentina, Bolivia, Brazil, Byelorussian S.S.R.,
Canada, Colombia, Czechoslovakia, Denmark, France, New Zealand, Nicaragua,
Norway, Paraguay, Peru, Poland, Sweden, Thailand, Turkey, Ukrainian S.S .R.,
U.S.S.R., U.K., U«S*A., Venezuela.
2. G.A.,(V), Ad Hoc BiL.Com., 43rd mtg., para. 2.
3. ibid, para. 46.
4. ibid, paras. 51-52.
5. ibid, 45th nrtg., paras. 54-37.
6. ibid, 47th mtg., paras. 15-14.
7. Loc.cit.
8. Loc.Cit.
9. ibid, 44th mtg., paras. 19-25.
10. ibid, 45th mtg., para. 1.
advisory opinion on the legal aspects of the matter*
As in the third session, so in this, some states, in particular the
Netherlands, iirance and Australia, made statements regarding the proposals
and their legality which are somewhat contradictory of the attitude of
hostility to any action by the United Nations concerning the domestic affairs
of States, which they assisaed in other situations.
The Netherlands, having expressed its doubts on the competence of the
United Nations, announced the intention of voting against the draft resolution
sponsored by the delegations of India, Burma, Indonesia, and Iraq, because its
legality was doubtful, and also because it was considered politically un¬
satisfactory.
By doubting the legality of the four-power draft resolution, the Nether¬
lands must have intended to indicate that, in her opinion, it perilously ap¬
proached intervention* Yet, no sooner had the Netherlands indicated her
objections to the four-power draft resolution than she announced her intention
of voting in flavour of the original terras of the five-power draft* Thus,
plainly, the Netherlands was here drawing some distinction between various
forms of recommendations* She did not maintain that as there was some doubt
as to the competence of the Assembly, all recommendations were illegal pending
a resolution of the competency question, but was prepared to accept some kind
of recommendation*
This is made abundantly clear by the attitude which the Netherlands adopted
towards the various amendments which were proposed to the five-power draft* The
Netherlands announced that if the amendments proposed by the delegations of
Ecuador, Mexico, the Philippines and Uruguay were adopted, she would oppose
the resultant resolution, because in her opinion, the amendments to paragraphs
2 and 5 were clear cases of intervention.
The actions of the Netherlands in the fifth session, in differentiating
between types of recommendations, are similar to those of that State at the
third session. At the third session, she not only expressed her doubts on
the competence of the General Assembly to deal with the question, but voted
in favour of the South African resolution denying competence. But having
voted in favour of the South African draft, she then proceeded to vote in
favour of the Franco-Mexican resolution.
Clearly, the practice of this State at these two sessions indicates
acceptance in practice of some modified definition of intervention.
The position adopted by the French delegation was similar. I-r&nce also
doubted the competence of the General Assembly and, as the Netherlands had
done, declared her intention of voting against the proposed amendments to
paragraph 5 of the five-power draft resolution. The French delegate said
that he considered that the General Assembly could not call on the Govern¬
ment of the Union of South Africa to refrain from implementing a specific
law, since in doing so it would be intervening in a matter which was not with-
1
in its competence.
Turkey, likewise objected to the proposed amendment to paragraph 5 of
2
the five-power draft resolution, a fact which acquires a significance when
compared with her vote in favour of the TTanco-Mexican draft at the third
session.
(ii) The Plenary Session.
In the AA Hoc Political Committee, the Australian representative said that,
in the opinion of his delegation, the Committee would be acting contrary to
1. ibid, 47th mtg., para. 10.
2. ibid, para. 20.
Article 2, paragraph 7 if it discussed this matter* '.There might he, he said,
cases where the United Nations was entitled to discuss and adopt resolutions
with a view to the conciliation of a dispute. But, in this oase, as the
Government of the Union of South Africa had indicated its readiness to re¬
sume negotiations with India, the United Nations could not, under Article 2,
paragraph 7, deal with the matter without being invited to do so by the
parties.^* However, in the plenary session, Mr. Tange, the Australian re-
2
presentative said:
The Australian delegation expressed the view from the
outset that action on this matter by the Assembly would
represent an infringement of Article 2, paragraph 7, of
the Charter, and was therefore outside the competence of
the General Assembly.
«•»«, It had based its attitude on the opinion that the
Assembly had been called upon to make recommendations which
constituted interference with matters essentially within the
domestic jurisdiction of the Government of the Union of
South Africa.
I should like at this time, to state that had the
draft resolution submitted to the Ad Hoc Political Com¬
mittee by the delegations of Bolivia, Brazil, Denmark,
Norway and Sweden come to the vote in the Committee
in its original form, the Australian delegation - while
maintaining its attitude on the question of competence -
would not have opposed the adoption of that draft reso¬
lution by the General Assembly. In the view of the
Australian delegation, that joint draft resolution re¬
presented a reasoned and constructive attempt to settle
the question with the least friction possible.
Australia was plainly trying here to have the best of both worlds. On
the one hand she claimed that the Assembly was incompetent even to discuss the
matter, and on the other, indicated her intention to tacitly accept a certain
type of recommendation. Of course, she took care to expressly reserve her
1. ibid, 42nd mtg., para. 41.
2. ibid, Hen., 315th mtg., paras. 24-26.
own stand on the question of competence. But what value can be attached to
actions of this kind? All they amount to is a. formal acceptance of one approach
while in practice doing soras thing entirely different. The Australian delegate
iaay as well have said that while he thought that a certain course of action
wsls illegal he would do it anyway.
Such statements and aotions are plainly contradictory unless Australia in
practioe accepted that irrespective of the nature of a matter, same kind of
United Nations action was competent.
The amended five-power draft resolution was adopted by the plenary session
by 53 votes to 6, with 21 abstentions.^
1. ibid, para. 51; Res. 595(V). The details of voting were as follows:
In favour: Bolivia, Burma, Chile, China, Cuba, Ecuador, Egypt, El
Salvador, Ethiopia, Guatemala, Haiti, Honduras, Iceland, India,
Indonesia, Iran, Iraq., Israel, Lebanon, Liberia, Mexico, Nicaragua,
Pakistan, Banana, Ihilippines, Saudi-Arabia, Syria, Thailand, U.S.A.
Uruguay, Yemen, Yugoslavia, Afghanistan.
Against: Australia, Belgium, Greece, Luxembourg, Netherlands,Union of
South Africa.
Abstaining: Brazil, Byelorussian 3.S.R., Canada, Colombia, Costa Rica,
Czechoslovakia, Denmark, Dominican Republic, Prance, New Zealand,
Norway, Paraguay, Peru, Poland, Sweden, Turkey, Ukrainian S.3.R.,
U.S.3.R., U.K., Venezuela, Argentina.
It should be noted also that of the five sponsors of the
original resolution, Brazil, Denmark, Norway and Sweden all abstained
in this vote. It does not appear, however, that any of them stressed
the domestic nature of this item and so no definite conclusions can be
drawn from their abstention. It may be, however, that their objections,
particularly to paragraph 5 of the amended draft, were political; see
for example, the statement of Brazil - loc.cit., 47th ratg., para. 65.
(Although Brazil had voted in favour of the South African motion denying
the competence of the General Assembly at the third session, at the fifth
session 3he was of the opinion that trie question of competence had
lost its importance; see ibid, 44th mtg., para. 16),
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5. The Sixth Session.
At the sixth session, several States continued to express their doubts
on the Assembly's competence. Brazil reserved her position on those parts
of the proposed resolution which referred to the domestic legislation of the
12 5 4
Union of South Africa, while Sweden, the United Kingdom, the Netherlands,
5
and New Zealand again expressed support for an advisory opinion from the
International Court of Justice on the question of the competence of the United
Nations.
The delegations of Burma, India, Indonesia, Iran and Iraq jointly Intro-
f*
duced a resolution which, as amended, was ultimately adopted by the Ad Hoc
7 8
Political Committee and the plenary session. The final text of the
1. G.A., (VI), Ad Hoc R>l.Com», 28th mtg., para. 38; and cf. her statements on
competence at the 5th session; see supra, p. 90 tn, 1.
2. ibid, 50th mtg., paras. 1*2.
5. ibid, 52nd ratg,, para. 26.
4• ibid, para. 27.
5. ibid, para. 55.
6. &.A.,(VI), Ad Hoc Bol.Com., 27th ratg., para. 55.
7. ibid, 52nd mtg,, para. 50; 41 votes in favour, 2 against, 15 abstentions.
8. ibid, HLen., 580th mtg., para. 55; 44 votes in favour, none against,
14 abstentions, the details of which are as follows:
In favour: Syria, Thailand, Ukrainian S.S.R., U.S.S.R., U.S.A.,
Uruguay, Yemen, Yugoslavia, Afghanistan, Bolivia, Brazil, Burma,
Byelorussian S.S.R., Chile, China, Costa Rica, Cuba, Czechoslovakia,
Dominican Republic, Ecuador, Egypt, El Salvador, Ethiopia, Guatemala,
Haiti, Honduras, Iceland, India, Indonesia, Iran, Iraq, Israel,
Lebanon, Liberia, Mexico, Nicaragua, Norway, Pakistan, Panama,
Paraguay, Bsru, Philippines, Poland, Saudi-Arabia.
Against: None.
Abstaining: Sweden, Turkey, U.K., Venezuela, Argentine, Australia,
Belgium, Canada, Denmark, Prance, Greece, Luxembourg, Netherlands,
New Zealand.
resolution read as follows
The General Assembly,
Recalling its resolutions 44(1), 265(111), and 595("/) relatirg
to the treatisent of people of Indian origin in the Union of South
Africa*
considered that the Government of the Union of South
Africa has been unable up to the present time to accept General
Assembly resolution 595(7) as a basis for a round-table confer¬
ence,
Noting that the promulgation on 50 l&reh 1951 of five pro¬
clamations under the Group Areas Act renders operative the pro¬
visions of that Act in direct contravention of paragraph 5 of
resolution 595(7)*
Hearing in raind its resolution 105(1) of 19 November 1946
against racial persecution and discrimination, and its res¬
olution 217(111) of 10 December 1948 relating to the Universal
Declaration of Human Eights*
Considering that a policy of *raoial segregation* (apartheid)
is necessarily based on doctrines of racial discrimination,
1. Becooaanda that a commission of three members be es¬
tablished far the purpose of assisting the parties* namely the
Governments of India, Bakistan and the Union of South Africa,
in carrying through approp&wte negotiations, the said coonis-
sion to be composed of one member to be nominated by the Govern¬
ment of the Union of South Africa, another to be nominated by
the Governments of India and B&istan end the third to be nomi¬
nated by the other two members or, in default of agreement be¬
tween these tso within a reasonable time, by the Gecrotury-General;
2* Calls upon the Governments of the Union of South africa,
India and Xhuciston to nominate members within sixty days from
the date of adoption of the present resolution)
5* Bequests the Secretary-General, in the event that the
members of the Commission are not nominated in accordance with
paragraphs 1 and 2 above, to lend his assistance to the Govern¬
ments of India, B&iston and the Union of South Africa, provided
much assistance is deemed necessary and helpful by him, with a
view to facilitating appropriate negotiations between them; and
further, in his discretion and after consulting the Governments
concerned, to appoint an individual who would render such
assistance for the purpose of facilitating the conduct of the
said negotiations;
4* Calls upon the Government of the Union of South Africa
to suspend the implementation or enforcement of the Group Areas
Act pending the conclusion of the negotiations;
5. Decides to include this item In the agenda of the neat
regular session of the General Assembly,
1, G*A,,(VI)» Supplement No, 20, liesolutions -adopted by the General .assembly,
during its Sixth Session, p. 11; lies. 511(VI).
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(a) The Attitude of States.
Statements of Ambers of the United Nations concerning these delicate
questions of law are frequently not too explicit, and it isf as a result, not
too easy to state with certainty what opinions they do in fact hold.
Throughout the treatment of this subject, it has become noticeable that
while many States opposed intervention in the domestic affairs of another,
they did not necessarily oppose all recommendations on those subjects. This
has been seen to be the case with even the most ardent opponents of inter¬
vention, for even they have been prepared to vote for a recommendation which
calls on the States concerned to negotiate on their differences. However,
apart from indicating their general support far such resolutions, it was
not till the fifth and sixth sessions that a clearer explanation was given
of this differentiation between various "types of recommendations. from
these sessions, it emerges that States opposing intervention object to
recommendations which made specific 'requests* on a State regarding its
domestic policy, administration or legislation.
In the fifth session, it has already been seen that the Netherlands,
franco and Turkey objected to the specific request to South Africa to suspend
the implementation of the Group Areas Act. At the sixth session, similar
objections were heard, but at the same time states making such objections
declared themselves prepared to accept a more general recommendation.
The Netherlands remarked that there was no certainty as to the competence
of the General Assembly to request the Union of South Africa to suspend the
implementation of a particular law.^"
The australian delegation took similar exception to paragraph 4 of the
resolution, but did not rule out all recommendations. The Australian
1. G.A. ,(VT), Ad hoc RdI.Cooa , 52nd mtg., para. 28.
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delegate, Mr. Tange, said that:
.....adhering to the position taken by his delegation at the
previous session on the question of competence, he would vote
against the draft resolution before the Committee. Vfere it
put to the vote paragraph by paragraph, he would not vote
against the whole of it, sinoe his main objection was to the
general tendency it reflected of making the United Nations
intervene in matters that were essentially within the domestic
jurisdiction of States; in the case in point, that tendency
was expressed by a recommendation calling upon a State to sus¬
pend enforcement of its national legislation. ••••
In the opinion of the Australian Government, however,
existing international instruments did not authorize the
United Nations to impose upon the parties the conditions
in which negotiations should be held. Moreover, there were
other avenues of negotiations. •••• it was precisely beoause
his Government was anxious for negotiations to be resumed
that it would prefer the adoption of a resolution encouraging
the parties to negotiate rather than a text condemning one of
them.
In the plenary session the Australian delegate, Sir Keith Officer, re¬
peated the objections of his government to the proposed resolution and added
that Australia would not object to a resolution devoted to the "encouragement
of the parties instead of implicitly condemning one party and also, in our
2
view, intervening in it3 domestic affairs."
France opposed part of this resolution for similar reasons. The French
delegate said that Fronoe opposed paragraph 4 of the operative part because the
specific reference to a national law in that paragraph appeared to encroach too
obviously upon the sphere of domestic jurisdiction.** The French delegation did
not oppose the rest of the resolution, so presumably, though again this is not
stated so explicitly, she must have considered it to be in conformity with the
1. ibid, paras. 22-23•
2. ibid, Flen., 360th mtg., paras. 18-20.
3. ibid, Ad Hoc Pol.Com., 32nd mtg., para. 51.
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provisions of the Charter and, in particular, with Article 2, paragraph 7»
6. The Seventh Se33ion.
The objections voiced at earlier sessions to the adoption of recommendations
which issued specific directives to South Africa concerning its national legis¬
lation, were very noticeable at the seventh session.
The Seoretary-General reported to the seventh se33ion of the General Assembly
on the developments 3ince the adoption of resolution 5H(VT). He declared that
after the failure of the parties concerned to nominate the members of the pro¬
posed commission in accordance with paragraph 2 of that resolution, consultations
with the representatives of all three Governments concerned and with those of
other Governments had forced him to the conclusion that there was at that time
no possible solution to the problem and that, consequently, the appointment of
the individual under the terms of its third paragraph was not opportune."1"
In a further attempt to arrive at some solution of the problem, yet another
resolution was introduced jointly by the delegations of Afghanistan, Burma, Egypt,
India, Indonesia, Iran, Iraq, Lebanon, Liberia, Pakistan, Philippines, Saudi-
2
Arabia, Syria, Thailand and the Yemen. The text of the resolution wa3 as follows:
The General Assembly,
Recalling it3 resolutions i), 265(Hl) and 51l(Vl) re¬
lating to the treatment of people of Indian origin in the Union
of South Africa,
Noting that the Government of the Union of South Africa
ha3 expressed its inability to accept General Assembly re¬
solution 511(VT) in respeot of the resumption of negotiations
with the Governments of India and Pakistan,
Noting further that the Government of the Union of South
Africa has continued to enforce the Group Area3 Act in con¬
travention of the terms of General Assembly resolution 5H(Vl)
and 395(V),
1. Establishes a United Nations Good Offices Commission
consisting of .....members to be nominated by the President
1. G.A.,(vn), Annexes, Vol.1, a.i. 22, p. 4, Hoc. a/2257, Report of the
Ad Hoc Political Committee, paragraph 2.
2. ibid, p. k, para. 6.
of the General Assembly, with a view to arranging and assisting
in negotiations between the Governments of the Union of South
Africa and the Governments of India and Pakistan in order that
a satisfactory solution of the question in accordance with the
Principles and Purposes of the Charter and the Universal
Declaration of Human Rights may be achieved;
2. Requests the Good Offices Commission to report to the
General Assembly at its eighth regular session;
3. Requests the Secretary-General to provide the members
of the Commission with the necessary staff and facilities;
4* Calls upon the Government of the Union of South Africa
to suspend the implementation or enforcement of the provisions
of the Group Areas Act pending the conclusion of the negotiations
referred to in paragraph 1 above;
5. Decides to include the item in the agenda of the next
regular session of the General Assembly.
In the debates on this proposed resolution several delegates objected to
paragraph 3 of the preamble and to paragraph 4 of the operative part. As
before, States differentiated between the terms of the resolution, accepting
some and objecting to others on the grounds they would constitute an inter¬
vention in the domestic affairs of the State ooncerned.
Australia declared that the United Nations was completely incompetent in
this matter, an attitude not in harmony with her previous action.^" Brazil
indicated her intention to abstain from voting on paragraph 3 of the preamble
2
and paragraph 4 of the operative part. New Zealand expressed doubts on the
competence of the United Nations and again supported the idea of an advisory
opihion from the International Court. The New Zealand delegate went on to
state that in his opinion, to call upon the South African Government to suspend
its internal legislation was an intrusion into the domestic affairs of South
Africa.^ Likewise France deolared her intention of voting against paragraph
1. G.A.,(VIl), Ad Hoc Pol.Com., 10th mtg., paras. 13-16.
2. ibid, para. 29•
3» ibid, paraa 52-53*
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4 of the operative part as it constituted an interference in South Africa's
domestic affairsBelgium, like New Zealand, also supported the idea of an
advisory opinion from the International Court on the question of competence,
and in the meantime declared her intention of voting against paragraph A of the
2
operative part for the same reasons as the other states. The United Kingdom
took a similar position.1^ Argentina stated that while she would support any
measure "calculated to achieve settlement of the question" she would oppose the
two paragraphs in point, because they concerned matters within South Africa's
4 5 6 7
domestic jurisidiction, Colombia. Ecuador said Turkey all adopted similar
positions.
Despite these objections to the two specified paragraphs however, the whole
resolution was adopted by the plenary session by 41 votes to 1, with 15 ab¬
stentions.^
7. The Eighth Session.




1. Recalls that at its first, second, third, fifth, sixth and
1. ibid, paras. 60-61.
2. ibid, 11th mtg., paras. 5-9.
3* ibid, paras. 20-21.
\
4. ibid, 37-40.
5. ibid, 12th mtg., para. 18.
6. ibid, para. 24.
7. ibid, para. 27.
8. ibid, Plen., ijOlst mtg., para. 69.
9. G.A.,(VIIl), Annexes, a.i. 20, p. 6, Report of the Ad Hoc Pol.Com., Doc.
A/2532, para. 6, and 9; Res. 719(VIIl).
seventh sessions, it had giv«p consideration to the question
of the treatment of people oh Indian origin in the Union of
South Africa;
2. Further recalls
(a) That resolution 44(l) of 8 December 1946 expressed the
opinion that the treatment of Indians in the Union of South
Africa should be in conformity with the international obliga¬
tions under the agreements concluded between the Governments
of India and the Union of South Africa and the relevant pro¬
visions of the Charter and requested the two Governments to
report to the General Assembly on the measures adopted to
this effect;
(b) That resolution 265(111) of 14 May 1949 invited the
Governments of India, Pakistan and the Union of South Africa
to enter into discussions at a round table conference taking
into consideration the Purposes and Principles of the Charter
and the Universal Declaration of liuraan Rights;
(o) That resolution 595(V) of 2 December 1950 held that
a policy of 'racial segregation' (apartheid) was necessarily
based on doctrines of racial discrimination; repeated the
recommendation that a round table conference be held; end
further recommended that in the event of failure to hold a
conference or reach agreement thereat, a commission of three
members be set up to assist the parties in carrying through
appropriate negotiations;
(d) That resolution 51l(Vl) of 12 January 1952 reaffirmed
the recommendation of resolution 595(V) that & three member
commission be established and further requested the Secretary-
General, in the event of failure to establish such a commission
to lend his assistance to the governments concerned and if nec¬
essary to appoint an individual who would render any additional
assistance deemed advisable;
(e) That resolution 615(VH) of 5 December 1952 established
a three member United nations Good Offices Commission to arrange
and assist in negotiations between the Governments concerned in
order that a satisfactory solution in accordance with the
Purposes and Principles of the Charter and the Universal Declar¬
ation of Human Rights might be achieved;
5* Also recalls that resolutions 595(V), 51l(Vl) and 615(VTl)
successively called upon the Government of the Union of South
Africa to refrain from implementing or enforcing the Group Areas
Act;
4. Takes note of the report of the Good Offices Commission
(A/2475), and in particular its conclusion that 'in view of the
response of the Government of the Union of South Africa , it has
been unable to oarry out its task to arrange and assist in neg¬
otiations between the Governments concerned*;
5* Expresses its regret that the Government of the Union
of South Africa t
(a) Has refused to make use of the Commission's good offices
or to utilize any of the alternative procedures for the settle¬
ment of the problem recommended by the four previous resolutions
of the General Assembly;
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("b) lias continued to implement the provisions of the Group
Areas Act in spite of the three previous resolutions, and
(c) Is proceeding with further legislation contrary to
the Charter and the Universal Declaration of Human Sights in¬
cluding the Infidgranta Regulation Amendment Bill which seeks
to prohibit the entry into South Africa of wives end children
of South African nationals of Indian origin;
6. Considers that these actions of the Government of the
Union of South .ifrica are not in keeping with its obligations
and responsibilities under the Charter of the United Nations;
7. Decides to continue the Good Offices Commission and
urges the Government of the Union of South Africa to co-operate
with that Commission;
8. Requests the Commission to report to the General
Assembly at its next regular session the extent of progress
achieved, together with its own views on the problem and
any proposals which, in its opinion, may lead to a peace¬
ful settlement of it;
9. Again calls upon the Government of the Union of South
Africa to refrain from implementing the provisions of the
Group Areas Act;
10* Decides to include this item in the provisional
agenda for the ninth session of the General Assembly.
This resolution was adopted by the Ad Hoc Political Coraaittee by 38 votes
to 2, with 19 abstentions,"*" and by the plenary session by 42 votes to 1, with
o
17 abstentions.
1. G.A.,(VIII), Ad Hoc Pel.Com., 21st mtg., para. 46. The details of voting
were as follows x
In favour I Lebanon, Liberia, Mexico, Nioaragua, Pakistan, Paraguay, Philippines,
Poland, oaudi-Arabia, Syria, Thailand, Ukrainian 3.S.R., U.S.S.R., U.3.A., Uruguay,
Yemen, Yugoslavia, Afghanistan, Bolivia, Brazil, Burma, Byelorussian S.3.R., Chile
China, Costa Rica, Cuba, Czechoslovakia, Ecuador, Egypt, El Salvador, Ethiopia,
Guatemala, Haiti, Honduras, India, Indonesia, Iran, Iraq*
Against i Union of South Africa, Greece.
Abstaining x Israel, Luxembourg, Netherlands, New Bealand, Norway, Peru, Sweden,
Turkey, U.K., Venezuela, Argentine, Australia, Belgium, Canada, Dominican
Republic, Denmark, Colombia, Prance, Ireland.
2. ibid, Hen., 457th mtg., paras. 92-93. The details of voting were as follows:
In favour t Nicaragua, Pakistan, Fanaiaa, Paraguay, Peru, Philippines, Poland,
Saudi-Arabia, Syria, Thailand, Ukrainian S.S.R., U.3.3.R., U.S.A., Uruguay,
Yemen, Yugoslavia, Afghanistan, Bolivia, Brazil, Burma, Byelorussian 3.S J?.,
Chile, China, Costa Rica, Cuba, Czechoslovakia, Ecuador, Egypt, El Salvador,
Ethiopia, Guatemala, Haiti, Honduras, Iceland, India, Indonesia, Iran, Iraq,
Israel, Lebanon, Liberia, Mexico.
Against: South Africa.
Abstainingx Norway, Sweden, Turkey, U.K., Venezuela, Argentina, Australia,
Belgium, Canada, Colombia, Denmark, Dominican Republic, Prance, breece,
Luxembourg, Netherlands, New Zealand.
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In the debate in the Ad Hoc Political Committee^the tendency of several
States to distinguish between the clauses of a recatmnendation, supporting sons
and objecting to others on the ground that they constituted intervention, is
again evident. -Again, States which, in other circumstances, have taken a
rigid attitude towards the question of recommendations and intervention, here
appeared to be willing to accept recommendations addressed directly to South
Africa or concerning her domestic affairs which were of a more general nature
but vigorously objected to recommendations of a specific nature, which they
considered to constitute intervention in that State*s domestic affairs.
Explaining the position of France on this draft resolution, the French dele-
2
gate, Mr. Lucet said that:
The French delegation believed that the method best
suited to achieve a speedy and effective solution was that
of direct negotiations between the parties, which would be
fTee to proceed and act as they wished. It continued to
believe that the General Assembly, so far as it was authorized
to act, should do nothing more than adopt a very simple re¬
solution inviting the Governments of India and South Africa
to seek an amicable solution.
Instead of a proposal of that kind, India and sixteen
other States had submitted a draft resolution which was a veri¬
table patchwork of cconsiderations, judgements, invitations and
even demands. The entire first part, instead of seeking a
fTesh approach for the future, merely bogged the question down
in the old morass. The draft resolution passed censure on the
reasons underlying the South African Government *s domestic
legislation and on the enforcement of that legislation. It com¬
plained that the Government had not resorted to the Good Offices
Commission even though the Commission was necessarily only an
advisory body and to have recourse to it was optional. Those
demands and censures constituted blatant interference in South
Africa's domestic affairs and his delegation, as in the previous
year, could not support them.
Later in the same debate, Mr. Lucet gave details of his delegation's
5
opinion of specific clauses in the draft resolution. He said that:
1. The ELenary Session decided not to discuss the report of the Committee on this
subject, ibid*
2. G.A. ,(VIII), Ad Hoc Pol.Com., 14th mtg., paras. 31-52 j emphasis added.
5. ibid, 20th mtg., para. 14.
Ha mould be able to support only paragraph 1 aaid paragraph
2, sub-paragraph (a) and (b) which referred to General Assembly
resolutions 44(l) and 265(111) of 1946 and 1949, the only two
in which the Assembly had confined itself to recommending direct
consultations between the parties* He would abstain on the
other sub-paragraphs of paragraph 2 which referred to resolu¬
tion 595(V), 511(VI) and 615(VIl) as well as on paragraphs 4
and 7* He would vote against all other paragraphs because
they represented intervention in South Africa's domestic
affairs and would abstain in the vote on the draft resolu¬
tion as a whole*
The stands taken by the Netiterlands, Australia, Brazil, Argentina and
Greece were similar.1 Likewise while Sweden accepted the constitutionality
1* The representative of the Netherlands stated that: (ibid, 16th mtg., para.
"...Being traditionally & 'country of asylum and abhorring any
form of discrimination, it sometimes had difficulty in under¬
standing the racial polioy that was the origin of the problem
under discussion. Nevertheless, even though the Netherlands
delegation considered that the Assembly should not refuse to
discuss an Issue connected with one of the basic principles
of the Charter, it could not support the joint draft resolu¬
tion (A/ftC.72/ti.lO) because it very much doubted whether the
United Nations had the right to demand that a Member State
alter its legislation."
The Australian delegate said that j (ibid, 18th mtg., para. 24) •
" Under the Charter the United Nations was excluded from
intervening in matters which were essentially within the
domestic jurisdiction of States. It could not issue direc¬
tives to States concerning the conduct of their domestic
legislation."
The Brastlinn delegate said that (ibid, 19th mtg., paras. 24-52)
he doubted the validity of the South African objections on competence,
but added that this matter could still be settled by an advisory opin¬
ion from the International Court. However, later on he said that (ibid,
22nd mtg*, para. 6) while he had voted for the resolution as a whole, to
show his country's disapproval of South African policy, he had voted
against references to South African legislation because he continued to
doubt their propriety under the Charter. In particular, he had voted
against paragraph 5(c) because questions of immigration were, in his
opinion, essentially within domestic jurisdiction, and his affirmative
vote far the whole draft had been cast without prejudice to that view.
The Argentinian representative said that: (ibid, 22nd mtg,, para. 5).
w
... consistent with its position in the past and without de¬
parting from its stand on the question of non-intervention in
domestic affairs, his Government had been prepared to vote in
favour of the continuation of the Good Offices Commission. He
voted against paragraphs 5 and 6 because they were not likely to
facilitate the task of the Commission and because paragraph 5,
sub-paragraph (c), infringed the limitation laid down in Article
2, paragraph 7, of the Charter."
In the same vein, the representative of Greece said: (ibid, 20th mtg., para,
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of general recommendations addressed to South Africa, she could not accept
the legality of any specific references to particular South African laws."*"
2
Turkey expressed her doubts on competence and. while Ecuador in general
regarded this as a non-domestic matter, she nevertheless placed on record her
5
reservations regarding paragraphs 5, 5 (b) and (o), and 9.
8. The Ninth Session.
At the ninth session, the General Assembly decided not to continue the
Good Offices Commission arid adopted a recommendation which simply called upon
the parties to enter into direct negotiations. This resolution, sponsored
by the delegations of Argentina, Brazil, Cuba, Ecuador, El Salvador, Haiti,
Honduras, and eventually also fay Costa Rica, after an amendment by India,
En.l contd. from p.jQi.
he would vote in favour of paragraphs 1, 2 and 5 of the
joint draft resolution. He would abstain on paragraphs 4, 5
and 6. ....Greece shared the doubts expressed as to whether the
resolutions of the Assembly on the subject were constitutional.
For that reason, and because continued application of a method
which had already failed, namely, the Good Offices Commission,
was not likely to succeed in bringing about a solution, Greece
would vote against paragraphs 7 to 10. Finally, it could not
endorse the text as a whole. Its adoption would be based on
an erroneous interpretation of a fundamental provision of
the Charter j Article 2, paragraph 7."
1. ibid, 22nd nrtg., para. 8, where the Swedish delegate said that he had ab¬
stained from voting on:
"those passages of the draft resolution which specifically
referred to South African legislation because, while general
recommendations were acceptable, his delegation thought it
unwise to express judgement on such specific legislation in
a matter where the extent of the United Nations corapetenoe
was still open to question."
2. ibid, 20th mtg., para. 20.
5. ibid, 14th mtg., parao. 19-26; ibid, 22nd mtg., paras. 4-5. The United
Kingdom, at this session, even doubted the competence of the General
Assembly to discuss the matter, ibid, 17th mtg., para. 50; cf her atti¬
tude in the third session.
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accepted by the co-sponsors, read as follows:*
The General Assembly,
Recalling that at several sessions it has considered
the question of the treatment of people of Indian origin
in the Union of South .Africa and has adopted resolutions
on that subject,
Having noted the report of the United Nations Good
Offices Commission (a/2725),
1. Expresses appreciation of the work and efforts of
the Good. Offices Commission:
2. Suggests to the Governments of India, Pakistan and
the Union of South Africa that they should seek a solution
of the question Toy direct negotiations;
5. Suggests, moreover, that the parties should desig¬
nate a Government, agency or person to facilitate contacts
between them and assist them in settling the dispute;
4. Decides that, if within the next six months follow¬
ing the date of the present resolution the parties have not
reached agreement on the suggestions made in the foregoing
paragraphs, the Secretary-General shall designate a person for
the purposes specified above;
5. Bequests the Secretary-General to report to the General
Assembly at Its next regular session on the results obtained.
In the Ad Hoc Political Consulttee, this resolution was adopted by 47
2
votes to 1, with 10 abstentions, and in the plenary session by 45 votes to 1,
5
with 11 abstentions.
1. G.A, ,(lX), Annexes, a.1.22, Res. 816(IX), p. 5.
2. G.A., (IX), Ad Hoc Rol.Com., 16th mtg. , para. 50. The details of voting were
as follows:
In flavour: China, Costa Rica, Cuba, Czechoslovakia, Denmark, Ecuador, Egypt,
El Salvador, Ethiopia, Greece, Guatemala, Haiti, Honduras, Iceland, India,
Indonesia, Iran, Iraq, Israel, Lebanon, Liberia, Mexico, Nicaragua, Norway,
Pakistan, Panama, Paraguay, Peru, Philippines, Poland, Saudi-Arabia, Sweden,
Syria, Ukrainian S.S.R., U.S.S.R., U.S.A., Uruguay, Venezuela, Yemen,
Yugoslavia, Afghanistan, Argentina, Bolivia, Brazil, Burma, Byelorussian
S.S«R., Chile.
Against: Union of South Africa
Abstaining: Colombia, Dominican Republic, Prance, Netherlands, New Zealand,
Turkey, O.K., Australia, Belgium, Canada.
5. ibid, HLen., 497th mtg., para. 198. The Assembly decided not to discuss the
report of the Ad Hoc Political Committee; ibid. There was no roll-call
vote.
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Although this resolution in many ways resembles those of the first
three sessions, in that it only called for direct negotiations between the
parties, several States still objected to it and as a result abstained in
the final vote.
Despite the seeming innocuouaness of this draft resolution, several
States still held that same parts of it constituted intervention in the
domestic affairs of South Africa, or at least were of doubtful legal vali¬
dity. Here, as in other sessions, there is found the same tendency to sepa¬
rate the clauses which were felt to be illegal, from those which were accepted*
Even States which accepted the whole resolution were at pains to explain why
they did so and why they felt that none of the clauses thereof amounted to
intervention in the domestic affairs of the Union of South Africa.
The delegation of Ecuador, although it believed that Article 2(7) was not
relevant to this discussion, nevertheless maintained that in any case the draft
resolution did not in any way impair the sovereignty of States. It merely ad*
vocated direct negotiations between the parties and only contemplated activity
by the Secretary-General as a secondary possibility.^
On behalf of Mr. de Souza Gomes said that it was difficult, if not
impossible ,to determine a priori whether the United nations was competent to
deal with a question which,prima facie, was of an international character.
Member States, he maintained, could not pass an opinion on the subject until
they had before them a specific proposal. In the present case he felt that
the General assembly could discuss the item without violating any provisions
of the Charter and could adopt any resolution which did not infringe the
2
domestic jurisdiction of a Member State. Mr. de Souza Gomes went on to
1. G.A.,(lX), Ad Hoc Ral.Com., 10th mtg., para. IS.
2. ibid, paras. 15-18.
indicate his support for the proposed draft, and it is inherent in his treat¬
ment that, in his opinion, none of the ter.s of this resolution did Infringe
that domestic jurisdiction*
Other delegations, however, did not share the opinions of the sponsors
on this question of intervention.
Belgium continued to doubt the competence of the United nations to act
on this subject and still bemoaned the lack of an advisory opinion on the
subject of competence from the International Court of Justice* Being doubtful
on the question of competence, but without specifying any particular clause to
which she objeoted, Belgium declared her intention to abstain.^
While Belgium seemed to object to the whole resolution, Colombia, on the cfcfra*
hand,accepted it in part, although she had reservations about the competence
to adopt paragraph 5 of the operative part* The Colombian delegate, Mr.
2
Canal Rivaa,said that:
• •• his delegation had not often taken part in a question
which might be construed as involving the domestic jurisdic¬
tion of a Member State and on that ground had always abstained,
lb felt, however, that the dispute had taken a fresh turn,
thanks to the spirit of the joint draft resolution, which ap¬
pealed to the parties to reach a peaceful solution by direct
negotiations and reminded them of their duty to find a solution
which, without invading their sovereignly, would respect the
rights of others.
His delegation therefore agreed in principle with the
purpose of the draft resolution, and would support operative
paragraphs 1 and 2. It would support paragraph 5, which
might involve a question of domestic jurisdiction, only if
all the parties concerned in the dispute agreed to its in¬
clusion because there would -chen be no question of violating
domestic jurisdiction.
France also abstained in the final vote in Committee on this draft.
Although she herself had been the co-sponsor of similar resolutions at
1. ibid, 12th mtg., paras. 6-8.
2. ibid, 15th mtg., paras. 46-47.
other sessions, she objected to operative paragraph 5 of the present draft.
The French delegate, Mr. Lucet, said that:"*"
The joint draft resolution was an improvement on previous
attempts, and he was glad to note that it contained no cock
damnatory language. However, it still maintained the princi¬
ple that the United Nations was competent to si&gest a means
of settlement, and he took exception to paragraph 5, in
which all caution had been abandoned by formally instructing
the Secretary-General to appoint an intermediary to speed
a solution of the problem if negotiations proved unsuccessful
His delegation had always felt doubt as to the competence
of the United Nations in the matter and he could not agree with
the idea that the direct negotiations suggested in the draft
resolution should be undertaken within the framework of the
United Nations, particularly in view of the South African
Government's refusal to accept that procedure. ...»
In the view of the Sirench delegation, well meaning resolu¬
tions continued to be superfluous when United Nations competence
was not established. ....
However, though Mr. Lucet objected to this particular resolution because
it seemed to impose conditions on South Africa, it is clear that he would not
have objected to a recommendation which limited itself to calling for such
direct negotiations, but which refrained from imposing conditions cm any of
the parties,and which did not intrude the personality of the United Nations
into the affair, any more, that is, than was necessary in the first place to
make the request far a resumption of negotiations.
The Netherlands, on this occasion, again maintained that the issue of
3
competence was in doubt, and declared her intention to abstain.
New Zealand voiced objections similar to those of France. On behalf of
1. ibid, 14th mtg., paras. 55-39.
2. Paragraph 5 of the draft resolution referred to here became paragraph 4 in
the final form.
5. ibid, paras. 40-43.
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that country Mr. Shanahan said thatt
. • ••. the absence of a solution was not due to the lack of
diligence on the part of the Good Offices Commission. He
restated the serious doubts of his delegation on competence
and its regret that the Assembly did not at the outset seek
the assistance of the International Court of Justice. Be¬
cause of its doubts his delegation could not support any resolu¬
tion which judged the substance of the question. He could
not subscribe# to the argument that the actions of the previous
sessions had resolved the issue of competence.
He would accordingly vote for paragraph 1 of the operative
part but abstain on paragraph 2 because his delegation thought
that it would be preferable to leave the question of outside
assistance to the parties. lie vould vote against paragraphs
5 and 4 which went beyond the proper scope of Assembly action 2
and were likely to hinder the effecive solution of the problem.
Austalia, for the same reasons, indicated that while she would vote for
g
paragraph 2 of the operative part,she would oppose paragraphs 4 and 5.
The United Kingdom delegate, Lord Fairfax, said that his delegation
welcomed the spirit of conciliation shown in the joint draft resolution but
maintained, nevertheless, that the question was within the domestic juris¬
diction of South Africa. However, he endorsed the principle of direct
negotiations but oould not vote for any resolution which asserted the corape-
4
tence of the United Nations or reconmended United Nations action.
Canada stated her intention to vote in favour of paragraph 2 of the reso¬
lution but intended, Mr. Weaver, the Canadian delegate, said to abstain on the
other clauses of the draft, because of doubts which his country entertained on
1. ibid, paras. 46-48.
2. Paragraph 1, referred to, is numbered paragraph 2 in the final form of
the resolution; paragraph 2 became paragraph 5; paragraph 5 became
paragraph 4; and paragraph 4 became paragraph 5.
3. ibid, paras. 49-51.
4. ibid, para. 53.
the competence of the Organization.
9« The Tenth Session#
At the tenth session the General Assembly adopted the following resolva¬
tions, sponsored by the delegations of Argentina, Bolivia, Chile, Costa Rica,
2
Ecuador, El Salvador, Haiti, Honduras, and Yugoslavia*
The General Aaaembly,
Having considered the report of the Secretary-General
relating to the question of the treatment of people of Indian
origin in the Union of South Africa, submitted pursuant to
General Assembly resolution 816(IX) of 4 November 1954,
1* Notes that the negotiations envisaged in resolution
816(H) have not been pursued]
2. Urges the perties concerned to pursue negotiations
with a view to bringing about a settlement of the question of
the treatment of people of Indian origin in the Union of
South Africa]
5, Invites the parties to report as appropriate jointly
or separately, to the General Assembly at its next session.
In Committee this resolution was adopted by 45 votes to 0, with 8
abstentions,5 South Africa did not take part in the voting,4 The
plenary session adopted the recommendation/
1, ibid, 15th mtg,, paras. 1-5,
2, G»A* ,(x), Annexes, a,i, 20, p, 7, Doc, A/360] Res. 919(X).
5, G.A.,(X), Ad Hoc Pol.Com., 54th mtg., para. 44. The details of voting
were as followst
In favour: U.S.A., Yemen, Yugoslavia, Afghanistan, Argentina, Bolivia,
Brazil, Burma, Canada, Chile, China, Costa Rica, Cuba, Czechoslovakia,
Denmark, Egypt, El Salvador, Ethiopia, Greece, Guatemala, Haiti, Iceland,
India, Indonesia, Iran, Iraq, Israel, Lebanon, Liberia, Mexico, Nicaragua,
Norway, Pakistan, Panama, Paraguay, Philippinea, Poland, Saudi-Arabia,
Sweden, Syria, Thailand, Turkey, U.S.S.R.
Against] None
Abstaining] U.K., Australia, Belgium, Colombia, Prance, Luxembourg,
Netherlands, New Zealand.
4. ibid, Ad Hoc Bol.Com., 54th ratg*, para. 44.
by 46 votes to 0 , with 8 abstentions."*"
10* Eleventh, Twelfth and Thirteenth Sessions.
As the debates on this subject dragged on year after year, it became
apparent that interest in the question of eorapetence diminished. The great
majority of States which took part in these debates stated that,in their op¬
inion, the matter was not within the domestic jurisdiction of South Africa
or implied that they held this view. As a result the need to explain why a
certain delegation supported some part of a resolution ceased to exist.
Compared to the earlier debates on this subject, there was in these three
sessions a conspicuous lack of concern with the question of intervention.
There were, however, one or two noteable exceptions to this which renders
these debates of importance far the present purpose.
(a) The Eleventh Session.
On the recommendation of the Special Political Committee, the General
2
Assembly, without debate, adopted the following resolution on the subject*
The General Assembly,
Recalling its resolution 919(X) of 14 December 1955,
Ilaving considered the reports of the Governments of
India (A/5186) and Pakistan (A/5188),
1.Motes that the Governments of both India and Rtkistan
have reiterated their readiness to pursue negotiations with
the Government of the Union of South Africa, in accordance
with the expressed desires of the United Nations}
2. Notes with regret that the Government of the Union
of South Africa has not yet agreed to such negotiations;
5. Urges the parties concerned to enter into negotiations
to facilitate a settlement of the problem of the treatmsnt of
people of Indian origin in the Union of South Africa, and,
more particularly, appeals to the Government of the Union
of South Africa to co-operate to this end;
4. Recalls also its resolution 926 (X) of 14 December 1955,
which provides a unified programme under the name of 'advisory
services in the field of human rights';
1. ibid, ELen., 554th mtg., para. 7. No roll-call was taken.
2. G.A.,(XI), ELen., Vol. II, 64Qth mtg., para. 1; Res. 1QL5(XI); for the text,
see ibid, Annexes, a.i. 24, p. 5, Doc. A/Res./458.
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5* Invites the parties to report as appropriate, jointly
or separately, to the General Assembly.
Despite the mild tone of this resolution, Australia. Belgium and Erance
all indicated their opposition to it on the grounds of Article 2(7). However,
in this case they did not, as they had done at previous sessions, seek to ex¬
plain their opposition by reference to certain clauses of the resolution. On
the contrary they indicated that their opposition was of a general and not spe¬
cific nature, which constitutes a return to the more rigid view of intervention.
Australia, for example, maintained that the United Nations was not even compe¬
tent to discuss the matter. Erancc simply maintained that the limitations of
Article 2(7) had to be observed.*
The only other statements which are relevant to the present purpose are
those of Peru, Argentina and the Ehilippines. These three nations appeared to
be voider the impression that the question of competence could be circumvented
by not mentioning the Charter in the resolution and they hoped thereby to
satisfy the objections of South Afrloa.
2
Eteruvian delegate said that :
• ••••The Union has also refused to agree to any reference to
the provisions of the Charter in resolutions on the topic under
discussion.
The United Nations Committee of Good Offices had, after a
certain stage, simply ceased to exist. Now that the old
obstacles had been removed, the time would seem to be ripe to
set a new course♦ Unfortunately, the representative of India
had said that his delegation could not agree to the elimination
of any reference to the Charter as a condition* In practice,
however, it would be possible to adopt a resolution whioh would
leave all doors open and omit any specific reference to the
Charter. Since the Members of the United Nations drew their
1. Australiat G.A«,(Xl), Sp.Bol.Com., 7th mtg., para. 52; ibid, 10th mtg.,
paras. 42-45.
Belgium: ibid, 9th mtg., paras. 10-11.
Eranoc: ibid, 10th mtg., para. 41.
2. ibid, 3th mtg., par&s. 19-20.
mandate for any joint action from the Charter there was no
need to make an explicit reference to it in a resolution*
Argentina and the ghlltppjnes expressed similar views. Argentina,1 one
of the co-sponsors of the resolution, explained that her notion was prompted
"by the desire to find a solution to the problem and to that end had omitted
any reference to the question of competence and the juridical position of the
United Nations. The Hhtltppinc delegate simply stated that he too wished
2
for a resolution which did not refer to the question of domestic jurisdiction*
It is not too clear what these three States hoped to achieve by the om¬
ission of any reference to the question of competence. It is evident that
they were under the impression that the omission of any reference to this pro¬
blem would circumvent it and that the resultant resolution would thus he
acceptable* However, as the Peruvian delegate noted, competence flows from
the Charter and it is not necessary to recite a particular provision in a
resolution to prove that you are competent. Therefore, the omission of any
reference to the Charter or to the question of competence in fact settled
nothing.
However, despite its obvious failings, this attempt to produce an
acceptable resolution has some importance for it demonstrates again the
lengths to which States will go in their efforts to circumvent the strictures
of Article 2(7)* If their former statements of opinion of this topic are
any guide, neither Bsru nor Argentina would have voted for this resolution
had they felt that it intervened in the domestic affairs of South Africa*
They must therefore have been under the impression that it did not*
1* ibid, 9th mtg*, para. 20*
2. ibid, paras. 35-36.
(b) Twelfth Sesalon*
The text of the resolution adopted by the twelfth session of the General
Assembly was as follows
The General Assembly.
Repalling its resolution 1015(H) of 50 January 1957,
Having considered the reports of the Governments of
India (A/5645) and of Rakistan (A/5645),
1* that the Governments of both India and Raidstan
have reiterated their readiness to pursue negotiations with
the Government of the Union of South Africa in accordance
the expressed desires of the United Rations}
2. Notes with regret that the Government of the Union
of South Africa has not agreed to carry forward the purpose
of General Assembly resolution 1015(H) of 50 January 1957}
5. Appeals to the Government of the Union of South
Africa to participate in negotiations with the Governments
of India and Xfekistan with a view to solving this problem in
accordance with the Purposes and Principles of the United
Nations Charter and the Universal Declaration of Human Rights;
4* Invites the parties concerned to report to the
General Assembly as appropriate, jointly or separately,
regarding the progress of the negotiations*
Like Resolution 1015(H), the resolution adopted at the twelfth session
of the General Assembly was little more than an appeal to the South African
Government to negotiate* As such it was similar to, for example, resolution
265(ill) which had been sponsored by the delegations of France and .Mexico and
1. G*A«,(Hl), Annexes, a#i«61, p* 4, Res. 1179(Hl)| adopted ibid, ELen.,
725rd mtg,, para. 113, by 64 votes to 0, with 15 abstentions, the details
of which were as follows:
In favouri Uruguay, Venezuela, Yemen, Yugoslavia, Afghanistan, Albania,
Austria,Bolivia, Brazil, Bulgaria, Burma, Byelorussian S.3.R,, Cambodia,
Ceylon, Chile, Colombia, Costa Rica, Cuba, Czechoslovakia, Denmark,
Ecuador, Egypt, £1 Salvador, Ethiopia, Ghana, Greece, Guatemala, Haiti,
Honduras, Hungary, Iceland, India, Indonesia, Iran, Iraq, Ireland, Israel,
Japan, Jordan, Laos, Liberia, Lybia, Malaya, Mexico, Nepal, Nicaragua,
Norway, Rakistan, Banama, Paraguay, Pteru, Philippines, Roland, Romania,
Saudi-Arabia, Sudan, Sweden, Syria, Thailand, Tunisia, Turkey,
Ukrainian S.S.R., U*S*S*R«, U.S.A*
against: 0*
Abstaining t Argentina, Australia, Belgium, Canada, China, Dominican
Republic, Finland, France, Italy, Luxembourg, Netherlands, New Zealand,
Portugal, Spain, U.K.
found vd.de support in the General Assembly. Despite this similarity, however,
States like Belgium which had supported resolution 265(111) abstained from
supporting this one. Belgium stated that she doubted the competence of the
United Nations in the matter and would abstain. Australia disputed the
competence of the General Assembly even to discuss the subject.*
Against those opinions must be set, however, those of the United States,
Peru, and Venezuela which supported this resolution as it did not in their
opinion contravene the limitations of Article 2(7).
At the third session of the General Assembly the United States had sup¬
ported the inclusion of an item dealing with the violation of human rights in
Bulgaria and Hungary. In doing so the American delegate claimed that dis¬
cussion of domestic affairs did not constitute intervention.At this session
the United States again made similar statements, but this time added important
qualifications. Hrom the statements it is clear that the United States does
not believe that no resolution can constitute intervention but that whether or
not a resolution amounts to intervention depends on its terms. She United
States therefore, like so many other nations, has come to regard the question
of competence as a specific one,related to the terms of the particular resolu¬
tion and not as something which can be decided on the basis of a priori theories.
2
Explaining the American point of view, Mr. 'fells said that:
1. jfeljjjjij• G»iu,(XIl), i>p. Bui.Com., cist mtg., paras. 54—SC.
Australia: ibid, para. 24.
The Dominican Bepublic also maintained that it wa3 a domestic matter and
indicated her intention to abstain, (ibid, 63rd mtg., para. 29) j the
United Kingdom doubted competence and abstained also, (ibid, paras. 54-35).
2. ibid, 61st mtg., paras. 6-7.
In the opinion of his delegation, the Assembly could,
through discussion and sometimes through the adoption of
an appropriate resolution, reawaken in the international
community an awareness of the principles of the Charter of
the United Nations and encourage the implementation of those
principles. It could also request countries which were par¬
ties to a dispute to try to settle their differences through
negotiation and the conclusion of mutually acceptable agree¬
ments.
It had been said, on the basis of Article 2, a»^33%
7, of the Charter, which safeguarded the domestic jurisdiction
of States, that the General Assembly wa3 not conqxstent to
discuss a dispute such as that in question. The United States
thought that, by discussing a problem, the Assembly did not
go beyond the limits set by Article 2, paragraph 7. Nor did
it violate the Article by making recommendations on the imple¬
mentation by member States of obligations imposed on them by
the Charter in the field of human rights. That might not be
the case where a resolution related to legislative or adminis¬
trative action taken by a country at the domestic level. In
a number of instances, in cases of that kind, the United States
delegation bad abstained or had made reservations.
Beru supported the proposed resolution because she felt it did not in¬
volve the question of competence. Explaining his country's position, the
Peruvian delegate said that:'*'
.....his delegation agreed with what appeared to be the
majority view, that the best method of settling the pro¬
blem under discussion was by direct negotiations. In
his statement at the previous meeting, therefore, he had
outlined a plan whereby the matter would go before a
neutral mediator who would not only supervise the negot¬
iations but would be in a position to suggest legal rem¬
edies for ahy difficulties that might arise. The aim of
that plan had been to eliminate misgivings which might have
resulted from the question of the interpretation of Article
2, paragraph 7 of the Charter. Unfortunately, the idea had
not found favour in the Committee, and no specific proposals
to that effect had been made. However the Peruvian dele¬
gation did not feel that the four-Bower draft resolution
was incompatible with its original position, and would
therefore vote in favour, although it had no great faith
in the prospect of success
1. ibid, 63rd mtg., para. 58; see also ibid, 62nd mtg., paras. 11-15
115.
Venezuela felt that the resolution under consideration by the Committee









Having considered the reports of the Govemaenta of
India (A/3S50) and Pakistan (A/3854),
1. Note3 that the Governments of both India and Pakistan
have reiterated their readiness to enter into negotiations with
the Government of the Union of South Africa in accordance with
the expressed desires of the United Nations, and with the express
declaration that such negotiations would not in any way prejudice
their own position or the position taken by the Government of the
Union of Sough Africa regarding their respective juridical stands
in the dispute;
2. Regrets that the Government of the Union of South Africa
has not replied to the communications sent by the Governments of
India and Pakistan on this subject and has not yet agreed to con¬
fer with those Governments with a view to arriving at a solution
of this problem in accordance with the purposes and principles of
the United Nations Charter and the Universal Declaration of Human
Rights;
5. Appeals to the Government of the Union of South Africa
to enter into negotiations to that end with the Governments of
India and Pakistan without prejudice to the position taken by the
Union of South Africa regarding its juridical stand on the issue;
1. ibid, 63rd mtg., para. 26.
2. G.A.,(XIIl), HLen., 783rd mtg., para. 59. The voting - 69:0:10 - ms as
follows:
In favour: Mexico, Morocco, Nepal, New Zealand, Norway, Pakistan, Panama*
Paraguay, Peru, Philippines, Poland, Romania, Saudi-Arabia, Sudan, Sweden,
Thailand, Tunisia, Turkey, Ukrainian S.SJ1., U.S.S.R., U.A.B.* U.S.A.,
Uruguay, Venezuela, Yemen, Yugoslavia, Afghanistan, Albania, Argentina,
Austria, Bolivia, Brazil, Bulgaria, Burma, Byelorussian 3.S.R,, Cambodia,
Canada, Ceylon, Chile, Colombia, Costa Rice, Cuba, Czechoslovakia, Denmark,
Dominican Republic, Ecuador, El Salvador, Ethiopia, Fed. of Malaya, Ghana,
Greece, Guatemala, Haiti, Honduras, Hungary, Iceland, India, Indonesia,
Iran, Iraq, Ireland, Israel, Italy, Japan, Jordan, Laos, Lebanon, Liberia,
Lybia.
Against: 0
Abstaining: Netherlands, Portugal, Spain, U.K., Australia, Belgium, China,
Finland, France, Luxembourg.
3. ibid, Annexes, a.i.62, p. 4; Res. 1502(XIIl).
4. Invites Member States to use their good offices, as
appropriate, to bring about negotiations in accordance with the
desires expressed by the General Assembly at previous sessions,
5* Invites the parties concerned to report to the General
Assembly as appropriate, jointly ctr separately, regarding any
progress which may be made*
Die debate on this topic at the thirteenth session was not protracted and
as at the eleventh and twelfth sessions most delegates who spoke confined the
main part of their remarks to expressing their regret that after so many years
the problem was no nearer solution. The vast majority, of course, considered
that the matter fell within the competence of the United Nations and therefore
few statements on competence were cade* However, as at previous sessions, a
few States were at pains to explain why they were able to support the draft
resolution and in so doing gave further evidence of the trend under discussion*
The United States, New Zealand, and Canada all supported this resolution because
they felt that it did not constitute intervention in the domestic affairs of South
Africa* However they made it plain that had it done so, it would not have re¬
ceived their support*
Explaining New Zealand's position in the competence controversy, Mr. Larkin
said that
His delegation took an intermediate position on the
question of the General Assembly's competence to deal with the
problems of human rights. While the General Assembly could
not impose standards of conduct, it could proclaim them,
directing attention to the principles to which the policies
of all Member States should conform. Again, where a human
rights problem had given rise to differences among States,
the General Assembly might recommend .methods for restoring
end harmonizing relations, and, in certain circumstances,
suggest in general terms, a basis on which a solution might
be sought*
1. ibid, Sp.Bsl.Com,, 124th mtg., paras. 9-11. The United States views were
similar to those expressed at the previous session!, cited supra, p. 113;
see ibid, paras* 1-5*
117.
The persons mentioned in the title of the item were
South Africans and the General Assembly could neither assume
nor share the South African Governments authority over them
nor could it alter the fact that decisive action towards a
solution would depend largely on the Union of South Africa.
Accordingly there would be no value in adopting resolutions which
were patently unpalatable to the Union. Fortunately, the draft
resolution was moderate in tone, its basic provision being on
appeal for negotiations. His delegation would therefore support
it, on the assumption that operative paragraph 4, inviting Member
States to use their good offices, contained no suggestion of com¬
pulsion.
In the same vein, the representative of Canada 3aid that
.♦•••The majority of persons of Indian origin in South Africa
were, of course, nationals of the Union of South Africa, and
the General Assembly could therefore not make any recommendations
of a coercive nature but could only appeal for negotiations and
encourage the parties to co-operat e.
While the vast majority accepted this resolution because they considered the
matter to be primarily international, these three were at some pains to differen¬
tiate between the kinds of resolutions which they found acceptable and those which
they did not. They did this because they did not consider that the United Nations
had full competence in the matter.
The exact legal value of the position taken by the United States, New Zealand
and Canada, and other States like them, on the question of competence is not
clear. It is perhaps debateable whether a matter can be, in this way, partly
within and partly outwith the competence of the United Nations. However, far our
purposes it is not important to answer this question. What is important is that
these three attempted to draw a distinction between various kinds of recaoMeada-
tions without answering the question as to whether a particular matter was or
was not within the domestic jurisdiction of a particular State. In so doing they
contributed to this trend in the evolution of the concept of intervention in United
2
Nations practice.
1. ibid, paras. 24-29.
2. At the thirteenth session, neither Australia, Belgium, France nor the United
Kingdom spoke.
11. Post Repertory Bsriod.
Erora the fourteenth session onwards, the debates on this subject practically
cease to be of any interest for the present purposes. The reason for this is
not hard to find - by this time practically nobody considered this subject to
be essentially domestic aany longer. Even the United Kingdom, for example, had
come round to the view that it was no longer an essentially domestic matter.^
However, one statement of interest was made at the sixteenth session. This
was the statement of the Erench delegation. It will be remembered that at
the ninth and tenth sessions Erance had abstained from voting on resolutions
which had very much resembled ones she herself had supported at the earlier
stages of this case and that this seemed to betoken a stricter approach to
what Erance considered as intervention. At the sixteenth session, however,
Erance appears to have returned somewhat to the compromise position. Her
delegate said that he was anxious to avoid any interference by the United
Nations in the domestic affairs of a Member State. However, Erance, he said,
was also strongly attached to the principles insoribed in the Universal Declara¬
tion of Human Rights and to the ideals of freedom and equality on which Erench
institutions were based. He would therefore vote in favour of the proposed
o
draft resolution.
Throughout the debates at these sessions interest in the question of compe¬
tence was minimal, it having become universally accepted that the matter ms no
longer donestic and eventually at the seventeenth session this item was at last
joined to the consideration of South Africa's racial policy and so disappeared
as a separate item of the agenda.
1. Gr.A.,(XV), ELen., Pbrt H, 981sfc mtg., para. 11.
2. G.A. ,(XVI), Sp.Ral.Cam., 298th ratg., para. 12.
12. General Conclusions.
Little need be added to the case history set out above* The general
trend in the practice of the various States which were concerned to avoid inter¬
vention in South Africa's affairs is fairly evident. The majority of them were
prepared to accept a resolution which called on South Africa to negotiate with
India and Pakistan on the subject and did not decline to consider the matter
Just because there was some doubt as to the status of the matter*
It should be emphasised, however, that this is only a general trend. Through¬
out the practice in this case, there are discrepancies which make any dogmatic con¬
clusions out of place. But that there was evident in this case such a general
trend is not* it is submitted, to be doubted.
Chapter IV
The Question of the Race Conflict in South Africa,
The question of the race conflict in South Africa, resulting from the
policies of apartheid of the South African Government, was brought to the
attention of the United Nations jointly by the representatives of Afghanistan,
Burma, Egypt, India, Indonesia, Iran, Iraq, Lebanon, Pakistan, Philippines,
Saudi-Arabia, Syria and Yemen*
1* The Seventh Session*
As already noted, South Africa attempted, unsuccessfully»to have this
item deleted from the definitive agenda, and in this attempt she was supported
try the delegations of Colombia, Prance, New Zealand and the United Kingdom."1"
The States which had requested the inclusion of this item in the agenda




flaying taken note of the communication dated 12 September, 1952,
addressed to the Secretary-General of the United Nations by the
delegations of Afghanistan, Burma, Egypt, India, Indonesia, Iran,
Iraq, Lebanon, Pakistan, Philippines, Syria, Saudi-Arabia, and
Yemen, regarding the question of race conflict in South Africa
resulting from the policies of apartheid of the Government of the
Union of South Africa,
Considering that one of the purposes of the United Nations is
to achieve international cooperation in promoting and encouraging
respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms for all, without
distinction as to race, sex, language or religion,
Recalling that the General Assembly declared in its resolution
10S(l) timt it is in the highest interestsof humanity to put an end
to religious and so-called racial persecution and called upon all
governments to conform both to the letter and to the spirit of the
Charter and to take the most prompt and energetic steps to that end,
Considering that the General Assembly has field in its resolutions
595(V) and 511(VI) that a policy of *racial segregation* (apartheid)
is necessarily based on doctrines of racial discrimination,
1. See Vol. I, Chap. VII, p. 186.
2. G.A., (VII), Anneas3, Vol. II, a.i.66, p.5, Doc.A/AC.6l/L.8/^ev.l
Conscious that international co-operation cannot be furthered
and that international peace may be disturbed by the policies of
racial discrimination and persecution, especially where such
policies affect majority populations in an area,
1* Establishes a commission consisting of ... to study and
examine the international aspects and implications of the racial
situation in the Union of South Africa in the light of the
purposes and principles of the Charter and the resolutions of the
United Nations on racial persecution and discrimination and to
report its findings to the eighth regular session of the General
Assembly;
2. Invites the Government of the Union of South Africa to
extend its fullest cc-operation to the Commission;
5. Bequests the Secretary-General to provide the Commission
with the necessary staff and facilities;
4. Decides to retain the question on the agenda of the eighth
regular session of the General Assembly of the United Nations.
(a) The Attitude of States.
The attitude of States towards this and the other resolution which was
eventually introduced^ vary. Some, albeit a minority, adopted a rigid
attitude towards the definition of intervention. Others, as in previous
cases,were mare flexible in their approach to the problem.
(i) The Rigid Approach
In this case, the United Kingdom was unwilling to compromise in liar approach
to the definition of intervention. In her opinion, the item fell essentially
within the domestic jurisdiction of South Africa and as a consequence the
United Nations was competent neither to discuss it nor to adopt recommendations
2 5 4 5
thereon. A similar position was taken by fiance, Australia, and Belgium.
At this session New Zealand, like the United Kingdom and Fiance voted far
the exclusion of the item from the agenda of the General Assembly.
1. See infra, p. 142.
2. G.A., (VTI), Ad Hoc Fbl.Com., 14th mtg., paras. 1-15.
5. ibid, 15th mtg., paras. 6-7; ibid, 21st mtg., para. 5.
4. ibid, 16th Hitg., paras. 54-49.
5. ibid, paras. 70-71; ibid, 21st mtg., para. 24.
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Howeverj once the substantive debate was underway, she seemed to have developed
some doubts on competence and suggested that this question should be remitted
to the International Court of Justice. Because of Jjer doubts on competence,
she did not vote in favour of the South African motion denying it, despite the
fact that she had voted to exclude the item from the agenda# However, she
voted against the operative part of the eighteen-power draft resolution and
u 1
abstained on the Scandinavian one# Turkey indicated that because of her
2
doubts on competence she trould abstain in all votes.
Though the numbers of those who opposed any form of United Nations action
was thus small, their opposition was of the strongest variety# The delega¬
tions of Belgium, France, the United Kingdom and South Africa all indicated,
for example, that they could not even accept a general recommendation on the
subject of racial discrimination, addressed to all States, because it would
have originated out of a debate on the domestic affairs of South Africa.5
The South African motion denying the competence of the United Nations
was defeated by substantial majorities, both in committee and in the plenary
4
session#
1. ibid, 14th mtg., paras. 20-34; and ibid, 20th intg., paras. 53-54.
2# ibid, 21st zutg., paras. 46-47#
3# See supra, Chap. I, p. 4.
4# In the Ad Hoc Political Comtaittee, it was defeated by 45 votes to 6, with 8
abstentions (21st mtg., para. 54) j in the plenary session it was rejected by
43 votes to 6, with S abstentions (4Clat mtg., para. 89), The votes in both
bodies were the same, except for Canada and Guatemala. Canada voted against
it in committee, and abstained in the plenary session. Guatemala, which
voted against it in committee, appears to have been absent when the vote was
taken in plenary session. The other details of voting were as follows:
In favour: Stance, Luxembourg, Union of South Africa, United Kingdom,
Australia, Belgium.
Against: China, Colombia, Costa Idea, Czechoslovakia, Denmark, Ecuador, Egypt,
SI Salvador, Ethiopia, Haiti, Honduras, Iceland, India, Indonesia, Iran, Iraq,
Israel, Lebanon, Liberia, Mexico, Nicaragua, Norway, Pakistan, Panama,
Paraguay, Philippines, Fbland, Saudi-Arabia, Sweden, Syria, Thailand, Ukrainian
S.S.R., U.S.S.R., U.S.A., Uruguay, Yugoslavia, Afghanistan, Bolivia, Brazil,
Burma, Byeolrussian S.S.R., Chile.
Abstaining; Dominican Republic, Greece, Netherlands, New Zealand, Peru,
Turkey, Venezuela, Argentina, Canada.
(ii) The Flexible Approach.
Although the South African motion denying the competence of the United
Nations »s defeated "by such substantial majorities, a considerable number of
States which voted in favour of the substantive resolutions at the end of the
debate expressed grave concern lest the United Nations, by adopting some of the
provisions thereof, should be guilty of intervening in South Africa's domestic
affairs. Indeed these fears of being guilty of intervention were responsible
for important amendments to the terms of the original draft resolution submitted
by the eighteen powers concerned.
The attitudes towards the question of competence varied considerably.
Some States considered that the United Nations was at least competent to discuss
this matter, but did not wish to see any further action taken* Others felt that
some kind of recommendation was intra vires of the General Assembly but that
great care would have to be exercised not to overstep the limit between legality
and prohibited actions*
Throughout these statements there ran the constant theme of doaiestic Juris¬
diction and the difficulty of defining where domestic Jurisdiction ends and inter¬
national responsibility begins. The problem is, of course,difficult, if not
insoluble, and some States attempted to circumvent it by postulating that a
matter can be within international jurisdiction to a certain extent and yet re¬
main, for many purposes, essentially within the domestic Jurisdiction of particular
States* The idea appears to have been that even though a matter were within the
domestic Jurisdiction of a particular State nevertheless, if it had international
implications the United Nations load a limited competence to deal with it*
This, of course, la Just another way of getting at the problem of defining
intervention, fear what such States are trying to say is that while the United
Nations may be competent to take some form of action with respect to a domestic
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matter, it cannot take another.
The Statements in which this idea has been put forward are often confused.
Notinfrequently, for example, a State will take note of the fact that the
competence to deal with a certain type of subject appears, according to the
terms of the Charter, to be shared between the United Nations and the lumbers
individually. The limitations on the powers cf the United Nations consequent
on such a view are noted. But then, so often, the State putting forward this
claim will negate it all by saaintaining that the subject matter under discussion
is not essentially within the domestic jurisdiciton of a particular State, The
question which immediately arises of course is why the powers of the United
Nations are limited if the subject is not essentially within the domestic juris-
dicition of a particular State?
however, despite the inconsistencies which are to be found in such statements
they do provide continuing evidence of the trend to regard the question of compe¬
tence as something specific, which is related to the terms of a particular resolu¬
tion and not a general question, the resolution of which denies to the United-
Nations all competence.
(l) Sweden
Sweden has attempted to avoid the extremes of both the technical and nan-
technical schools of interpretation. She does not agree with the view that all
United Nations action i3 prohibited by Article 2(7) just because a matter is
domestic nor with the idea that no recommendation can be construed as inter¬
vention. In the course of the debates on this item at various sessions she came
to the conclusion that the United Nations is competent to discuss a matter of thi3
nature and to make recommendations thereon of a general character addressed to a
particular State, but no more. In Sweden's opinion, the United Nations is not
competent to recommend that a State follow a particular course of action v/ith re¬
spect to its domestic affairs.
At the seventh session, the Swedish delegate told the Ad Hoc Political
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Committee that:'1'
It was generally agreed that the term 'domestic matter*
was a concept which was liable to change throi gh the evolu¬
tion of the law of nations and of international relations in
general. A domestic matter today might well become an
international matter tomorrow. For example, Chapter XI of
the Charter required Member States administering Non-Self-
Goveming Territories to transmit certain information on
such territories to the Secretary-General. Relations which
were in principle a domestic matter had thus acquired an
international character. The point was therefore whether
Member States had assumed any obligations in regard to human
rights. If they had, their policies on such matters were no
longer exclusively their own concern.
The Charter at least imposed on Member States the obligation
that they should not bar any discussion in the United Nations
of their policies in that field or the adoption of recommenda¬
tions in connection with such discussions. The General Assembly
itself had confirmed that view by repeatedly stating that it was
entitled to discuss racial policies of Member States and to
adopt recommendations on them. The Assembly had also called
for the investigation of alleged forced labour imposed in
violation of human rights, disregarding the objection that the
matter was within the domestic jurisdiction of a State.
The Swedish delegate was not prepared to formulate & rule
distinguishing between permissible recommendations and those
that infringed upon domestic jurisdiction* It could not#
however# subscribe to the opinion expressed on the matter by
the representative of South Africa.
Later on in the debate the Swedish delegate added that in her opinion the
United Nations was competent to make recomaendations stating the purposes to be
achieved and calling on States to adapt their policies to those purposes. But
it was not competent, she claimed, to draft specific measures to be imposed on
a State. Thus, Sweden felt that the eighteen-power draft resolution exceeded
2
the limits of the General Assembly's competence.
The statements of the Swedish delegate here dealt with represent a reasoned
attempt to resolve the problems inherent in Article 2(7). Unfortunately, she
1. G.A., (VII), Ad Hoc Pol. Com., 13th mtg., psr&3. 31-35.
2. ibid, 21st mtg., paras. 9-10.
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added for good measure that the question of race conflict in South Africa was
not essentially within the domestic jurisdiction of that country and it may well
he asked if that were so winy she went to the trouble to elaborate the above
distinctions.
(2) Brazil
As in other cases, Brazil was keen to avoid any hint of intervention in
the domestic affairs of a State, Her statements on this occasion again gave
evidence of her adherence to a more flexible definition of intervention. The
Brazilian delegate, Mr. Eragoao, said that competence was not a problem which
could be decided on the spur of the moment. By including this item on the
agenda, he said, the General Assembly had decided that it was competent to dis¬
cuss it. But whether or not it was competent to adopt recommendations was
another nutter which could only be decided in the light of specific proposals."''
Brazil guaged intervention not so much by the form of the action which the
United Nations took, i.e., by trie fact of a discussion having taken place or a
recommendation having been made, but by what those reoaamenclationa sought to do.
Later on in the debate Mr. Fragoso added that while he approved of the
Intentions of the proposers of the draft eighteen-power resolution, he had
certain doubts on the competence of trie United Nations to give the Commission
such terras of reference. lis said that the limitations imposed by the Charter
had to be respected and that the Committee must not encroach on the domestic
jurisdiction of States. lie felt that the tex-as of reference and powers of the
2 •
proposed Commission were likely to cause misgivings. To aleviate these , he
proposed that the Commission be instructed to carry out its functions with due
1. ibid, 14-th mtg., paras. 16-19.
2. ibid, 18th mtg., paras 00-05,
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regard for Article 2(7) and that it report its *conclusions* rather than its
•findings* to the Assembly.*" "81th trie acceptance of the as amendments, the
eighteen-powsr draft resolution became acceptable to Brazil as, In its amnded
fona, it seemed to safeguard against any possible invasion of the domestic
Jurisdiction of South Africa.
(5) Norway
2
The Norwegian delegation concurred with the views expressed by eweden.
In her opinion, Article 2(7) in no way prevented the United Nations firm at
least discussing the natter. Justifying this interpretation of the word
•intervene*, the Norwegian delegate added that in many cases, as in the present
one, there was no clear dividing line between the discussion of competence and
the discussion of substance, since the question of eonqpctsoee could not be
decided until more was known about the substance of the matter.3
While, however, Norway was prepared to allow the United Nations to discuss
the matter, she ms not too happy about allowing it to have unlimited power of
reconsaendatiori* Like Sweden she Imd certain reservations on this subject.
In particular, she objected to paragraphs 4 and 5 of the preamble and to para¬
graphs 1, 2 and 5 of the operative part of the eighteea-povaer draft resolution.
Powever, while horway doubted the competence of the United Nations to adopt
the cighteen-powor draft resolution, slie did not dispute its power to adopt sow
type of resolution. Together with the delegations of Denmark, Iceland, and
4
Sweden she proposed the foUowirvs amendments to the elghtoea-power drafts
1» Doc. a/?jC.61/L.10; See (s.&.( jxZ), Anneass, 7ol.II, p.7, Dc».A/2276, para. 11.
2. N.A. ,{7Il). Ad doc Pol.Com., ISth atg., paras. 26-45.
5. a.iw» (VII), Ad Hoc Bal.Caou, 15th mtg., paras 36-45.
4. iMd, Annexes, 7ol.II, a.i.66, Doc A/&C.Q1A>»9» p.4.
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Replace tl-ie fourth and fifth paragraphs of the preamble, aa well aa
paragraphs 1, 2 and 5 of the operative part by the following paragraphs:
Recognizing tlmt the methods for discharging the responsibilites
of Members under the Charter and for giying effect to their Charter
pledges may vary with circumstances such as the social structure of
the States concerned and the different stages of development of the
various groups involved,
1. Declares that in a multiracial society harmony and respect
for human rights and freedoms and the peaceful development of a
unified community are best assured when patterns of legislation
and practice are directed towards equality before the law of all
persons regardless of race, creed or colour, and when economic,
social, cultural and political participation of all racial groups
is on a basis of equality;
2. Affirms that governmental policies of Member States which
are not directed towards these goals, but which are designed to
perpetuate or increase discrimination, are inconsistent with the
pledges of the Members under Article 56 of the Charter;
5. Solemnly calls upon all Member States to bring their pol¬
icies into conformity with their obligations under the Charter to
promote the observance of human rights and fundamental freedoms.
It will be observed that whereas the clauses to which Norway objected in
the eighteen-power draft resolution specifically referred to the Union of South
Africa, the clauses with which she proposed to replace them did not. They
only contained a general appeal to all Members to re-examine their policies
in the light of the Charter provisions.
(4) Denmark
The attitude adopted by Denmark was similar to that of the other
Scandinavian countries just discussed. Denmark considered that the United
Nations was competent to discuss this question, but was not sure how much
further it could go. Her opinions on this subject were somewhat equivocal,
as indeed were those of Sweden and Norway and are only comprehensible if it is
accepted that Denmark too adliered to a more flexible definition of intervention
which leaves the United Nations certain powers with respect to the domestic
affairs of particular States.
Denmark indicated, on the one hand, that matters of human rights were
within the competence of the United Nations but, on the other, that it was
difficult to determine the limits of that competence. Her delegate said that
because of the obligations undertaken by Members in Articles 55 and 56, the
United Nations was competent to discuss questions of human rights, but that
it was doubtful what further action it oould take, and on this point favoured
an advisory opinion from the International Court of Justice.1
(5) Mexico
Although Mexico had, in the question relating to the relations of Members
of the United Nations with Franco Spain, espoused very broad views on the
powers of the United Nations with respect to the domestic affairs of Members,
in this case she seemed to be more wary and like many other States was keen
to avoid any hint of intervention in South Africa's domestic affairs, though,
at the same time, wishing to do something about the apartheid question.
In the course of the debate, the Mexican delegate indicated succintly
the difficulty facing the Assembly in dealing with this question. Stressing
the apparent contradiction between Article 2(7) and the human rights provisions
o
of the Charter, Mr. Quintanilla said that:
The United Nations, therefore, could neither ignore the
principle of non-intervention in matters falling within the
domestic competence of States nor could it condone the Viola¬
tion of human rights. For his part, he thought that the Com¬
mittee was legally justified in taking note of the regrettable
situation which existed, and in establishing, as proposed
by the joint draft resolution, a commission to study it. Such
a commission would be something quite different from a commis¬
sion of inquiry ..... It (the Mexican delegation) would, however,
have preferred that the contemplated study should relate not only
to the Union of South Africa but also to any similar situation,
wherever it existed. Moral principles knew no geographical
boundaries, and racial segregation or discrimination were to be
condemned in all countries. He hoped the contemplated study
would relate to all areas where it was needed.
1. Gr.A., (VII), Ad Hoc Fol.Com., 18th mtg., paras. 46-50.
2. ibid, 16th rotg., paras. 16-20, partic. para. 19.
It is not clear from the Mexican statement whether her wish to have the
proposed study refer to all areas where discrimination was to be found was
due to political motives or to some doubts as to the competence of the General
Assembly to deal with the affairs of one country in particular. However, the
wish of Mexico to avoid the charge of intervention in South Africans domestic
affairs, while at the same time doing something about the apartheid problem, is
clear.
Later in the same debate, the Mexican delegate introduced an amendment
supplementary to the irazilian one, by which the Commission would be directed
to study and examine the racial situation in South iifrica with due regard, not
only to the provisions of Article 2(7) but also of Articles 1(5), 15b, 55c, and
56 of the Charter. ^ In the opinion of the Mexican delegation, if this amend¬
ment were accepted, the proposed commission would then have balanced terms of
reference, which would take account of the contradiction which he had spoken
2
of above. Mr. Quintanjlla said that.
.... it would have an adequate legal basis cm which to operate;
it would be taking account of the Charter guarantee against
intervention in domestic affairs, on the one hand, and of the
Charter guarantees regarding human rights, on the other.
In previous sessions Mexico may have tended to the view that no recommenda¬
tion could constitute intervention in the domestic affairs of a Member State, but
such was not the case here. In this case she clearly felt that it was possible
for the General Assembly to overstep its powers, unless it was very careful.
Equally, however, she clearly supported the view that some kind of recommendation
was possible, provided it was warded in the correct fashion.




The Netherlands, like Norway, Sweden and Denmark, adopted a somewiat
equivocal position on the competence of the United Nations to entertain this
item. Indeed about the only thing which emerges with any certainty from the
statement of the Dutch delegate, is the confusion pervading Dutch thought on
this natter.
The part of the speech of the Dutch delegate reproduced here is somewhat
long. However, it is instructive regarding the contradictions end difficulties
1
which are to be found in the Charter in these matters. Mr. Patijn said that:
•. • • • the Netherlands delegation did not think that the General
Assembly could refuse to discuss a question which by its very
nature was bound up with respect for one of the essential prin¬
ciples of the United Nations. After adopting the statement of
principle laid down in Articles 55 and 56 of the Charter, the
Members could not evade the obligation to discuss questions
raised under those Articles by a group of Members. The extent
to which those Articles gave rise to legal international obliga¬
tions had not been clearly established, but it could at least
be said that they imposed on Member States the obligation not
to evade international discussion.... •
As regards the general question of whether the General
Assembly was entitled to take action on the item before the
Committee, the Netherlands representative observed that much
had already been said in the debate on the meaning of domestic
jurisdiction and about Article 2, paragraph 7, of the Charter.
There could be no doubt that the principle of non-intervention
in the domestic affairs of States was one of the fundamental
principles of the United Nations. The General Assembly could
not discuss or make recommendations an matters which were with¬
in the domestic jurisdiction of any State. Thus, before any
action was taken, it had to be determined whether the question
of race conflict in the Union of South Affrica was exclusively
within the competence of the South African Government. If it
were, the Assembly was not competent to take action on it.
If, on the other hand, the question had certain international
implications, the Assembly could, to a certain extent, declare
itself competent to deal with it.
A question ceased to be exclusively one of domestic
jurisdiction when its substance was subject to international
1. ibid, 16th ratg., paras. 27-53j et.iphasis added.
law. It had therefore to he determined whether the South
African Government ma hound by international obligations
in the matter, or, in other words, whetfrier the Articles of
tfrae Charter concerning respect for human rights and funda¬
mental freedoms for all without distinction as to race,
created international obligations for Member States. It
could be maintained that questions relating to friuraan arights
did not involve any specific legal obligations and that the
provisions of the Charter concerning respect for tfriose rights
were merely a statement of principle. On the otiier hand,
there was no doubt that the pledge taken by Member States
to act both jointly and individually in co-operation with
the United Nations had not been undertaken lightly and
could not be disregarded. % signing the Charter, Member
States had assumed certain obligations which though not formal
commitments voider positive law, were more than just an acknowledge»
ment of a principle. Any action by a Member State at variance
with those international obligations was therefore an inter¬
national matter and not merely a matter of domestic jurisdic¬
tion. Assuming that the obligations undertaken under Artiole
55 and 56 of the Charter were, to some extent, international
obligations, the question of racial discrimination should be
considered in the light of two mutually exclusive provisions
of the Charter. On the one hand, according to Article 2,
paragraph 7, the racial issue was a matter which was
essentially within the domestic jurisdiction of the Union
of South Africaj on tire other hand, it was subject to the
provisions of the Artiolea of Jie Charter concerning human
What could tfrie General Assembly do in tlie circumstancea?
Since tfrie question was to a certain extent an international
issue, the Hetfrierlands delegation felt that the General
Assembly was competent to discuss it. It was less certain
that tfrie Assembly was ccrapetent to make recommendations in
the matter. The Hetfrierlands delegation felt that only an
advisory opinion of tfrie International Court of Justice
could decide tfrie matter, but as none of tfrie parties to the
dispute seemed prepared to ask for such an opinion, it would
not make a formal proposal to tliat effect. .loreover, until
the question of competence was decided, tiie Hetfrierlands
delegation would probably abstain from voting in any
recommendations on the substance of trie question. It
would, liowever, reserve its position because of the
amendments submitted by tire Hcandanavian countries to
tlie joint draft resolution.
Tfriis statement is a veritable patchwork of confusion. First, Mr. mtijn
concerns friim ielf with the powers of the General Assembly where a matter is
exclusively witlrin tfrie domestic jurisdiction of a Member State, but of course,
this word nowirere appears in tfrie Charter. It is true tfriat tfriere is a certain
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amount of controversy concerning the exact legal effect of the substitution
of the word •essentially* in Artiole 2(7) of the United Nations Charter, for
the word *solely* used in Article 15(8) of the Covenant of the League of
Nations. However, this controversy forms no part of Mr. Ba-tijn's argument
and it would not, therefore, be reasonable to impute to him an intention to
take account of it in his speech. Secondly, he maintained, simply, that
the General Assembly could not discuss or make recommendations on matters
•within the domestic Jurisdiction of any State*. However, immediately prior
to that he claimed that the General Assembly had the right to discuss this
item. Therefore, from this it must be concluded that the matter did not fall
within the domestic Jurisdiction of South Africa. But if that were the case,
why would the competence of the Assembly be limited, as he indicates, throughout
the quotation, it is? Thirdly, the final assertion is that this item is
essentially within the domestic Jurisdiction of South Africa. However, this
assertion was made at the end of a paragraph devoted to proving that the matter
was not exclusively within that Jurisdiction and that as a consequence the
General Assembly had a certain competence to deal with it. No indication is
given of the reason for the change in terminology, from exclusively to essen¬
tially, or indeed whether this is material to the case.
It cannot be said that the Dutch analysis of Article 2, paragraph 7 in this
case was too meaningful. However, one thing of importance does emerge from these
statements. The purpose of these devious paths of logic was to point to a certain
limited competence of the United Nations to deal with questions of human rights
even in relation to a particular State* The Netherlands seemed here to be
striving to arrive at some formula whereby the General Assembly would be able to
do something about this question and yet not infringe the prohibition of inter¬
vention in the domestic affairs of a Member State. This is, of course, Just
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another way of saying that the Netherlands was attempting to arrive at a com¬
promise definition of intervention, one which did not depy to the General
Assembly all power with reference to the domestic affairs of Member States,
and at the same time did not allow it to exercise its full complement of powers
with respect thereto*
(7) Ecuador.
Ecuador did not consider that the setting up of a commission to study the
racial situation in the Union of South Africa constituted intervention in that
country's affairs* However, equally, Ecuador did not appear to be insensitive
to the suggestion that under the circumstances, some types of recommendations
might constitute intervention*
The Ecuadarean delegate, Mr* Trujillo, reminded the Committee that, in the
Indians in South Africa case, his delegation had voted for the establishment of
the Good Offices Commission as it had considered this the most effective means of
bringing the parties together* However, he also reminded the Committee that
Ecuador had opposed the parts of those resolutions which urged the suspension
of the Group Areas Act because such a recommendation would, in her opinion, have
constituted intervention in the domestic affairs of South africu. Mr* Trujillo
informed the Committee that his delegation would vote for the establishment of
the commission in this case, because its establishment was not incompatible with
Article 2, paragraph 7 of the Charter* The Ecuadorian delegate reviewed the
main provisions of the Charter by which the Member States had voluntarily pledged
themselves to promote respect and observance of human rights and had agreed to
co-operate within the United Nations to realize one of the 'common ends* most
vital to the achievement of good international relations and to the preservation
of world peace. He said that
1. ibid, 17th ratg., para. 5.
155.
... That Hedge and that agreement vrere not incompatible with
the protection afforded to every State as a legal entity under
Article 2, paragraph 7. The principle of non-intervention in
the internal affairs of States was the corner 3tone of the
security of Latin-America. As it had never been defined by
law, it roust be understood in its natural meaning. Inter¬
vention, according to an authorative dictionary of the
Spanish language, was the temporary direction by one State in
the internal affairs of another. % that standard, and in the
light of the growing interdependence of nations in the modern
world, the setting up of & commission to study economic, social
and cultural conditions inside Member States could not be con¬
strued as intervention in their domestic affairs. •••••Accord¬
ingly, tire joint draft resolution (A/AC .61A*8/Rev.l) which
would merely establish a commission to study and report on the
racial situation in South Africa, in no way intervened in that
country's internal affairs. In the light of the Commission's
findings the United Nations would determine how best to promote
the observance of human rights in South Africa.
At a later stage, Ecuador expressed the view that no recommendation could
constitute intervention in the domestic affairs of a State.However, her
concern both here and in the Indians in South Africa case to avoid any re¬
commendation which would contravene the tersas of Article 2(7) would seem to
2
indicate a different approach.
(8) United States
In this session the United States clearly espoused the view that the
competence of the United Nations to adopt a recommendation on any subject could
only be determined with reference to the terms of the recommendation proposed,
i.e., the United States here held to the view that competence was a specific
question, related to the action sought, not a general question which could be
determined a priori.
1. Supra, Chap. I, p. 5.
2. At the 17th mtg. of the Ad Noc Bol. Com., para 6, the Scuadorean delegate
proposed (Doc.A/AC,61/LllJ the deletion of the 5th paragraph of the preamble,
the deletion of the words 'and examine the international aspects and impli¬
cations of' in paragraph 1 of the operative part, and the deletion of
paragraph 4 of the operative part. It does not appear, however, that these
amendments were motivated by legal considerations.
1S6.
The United States delegate, Mr. Sprague, said that:
With regard to the legal issue of competence he felt that
the South African motion was too broad in that it would pre¬
clude discussion of the agenda item under consideration. The
exercise of the right of discussion did not contravene Article
2, paragraph 7 of the Charter | the legal restriction contained
in that Article should not prevent adequate consideration of the
vital question of human rights in a dynamic world. On the other
hand, it would be unwise to leave the door open to every kind of
proposal. In the light of its own experience with a written
constitution, the United States felt that the General Assembly
should steer a middle course and continue, as it had done in
the past, to feel its way in dealing with the legal aspects
of such difficult problems as the racial situation in South
Africa.
However, while the United States voiced these reservations on
of competence, she did not indicate her views on the legal aspects
eighteen-povwr draft or the Scandinavian amendments thereto. She
for the resolution as amended by the Scandinavian countries but it
her objections to the original terms were mainly political.
(9) Costa Rica.
In keeping with normal latin-American practice, Costa Rica indicated her
desire to avoid any intervention in the domestic affairs of South Africa.
However, she also differentiated between resolutions which, in her opinion, did
amount to intervention and those which did not.
2
Explaining the Costa Rican position, Mr. Fouraier said that:
.....The discussion of the problem in the United Nations
was no more intervention in the domestic affairs of Member
States than the dissemination of the concept of the rights
of man had been in the eighteenth century. Discussion would
lead to an exchange of ideas, the usual result of which was
that right and justice would triumph.
There was no intention of intervention or of violation
of sovereignly in proposing that a commission should he set
up to study and examine the international aspects and impli¬





1. ibid, 17th mtg., para. 10.
2. ibid, paras. 56-37} emphasis added,
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That country presented a concrete case of a problem regarding
the rights of large masses of human beings* Policies of racial
discrimination belonged to the same category as the policies of
3bate-domination which led to totalitarian regimes* Society
must be based on a general principle of justice for all* In
accordance with those principles, the Costa Bioan delegation
would vote In favour of the eighteen power joint draft resolu¬
tion with the amendments proposed by the Scandinavian delega¬
tions* To go further might take the Committee to the edge of
intervention* Mr* Foamier stressed the need to retain full
respect far national sovereignty, as defined in the Chwention
on rights and duties of States signed in Montevideo in 1955,
and also in Article 2 of the Charter.
Later in the same debate, after the Scandinavian amendments to the joint
1
draft eighteen-power resolution had been introduced as a separate resolution,
Mr. Fournier reminded the Committee that at the 17th meeting his delegation,
though regretting that the powers of the proposed fact-finding commission had
not been severely limited so as to avoid any risk of intervening in the domestic
affairs of the Union of South Africa, had nevertheless supported the eighteen
power draft resolution. He had jade it clear, he said, that his delegation
would vote for the draft if it were amended on the lines proposed by the
Scandanavian countries* He pointed out that the Scandinavian amendment
broadened the terms of the draft resolution and so made it applicable to any
similar situation* lie went on to add that as the Brazilian and Ecuador®an
amendments had been accepted by the sponsors of the eighteen power draft, there
was no longer any danger that the fact-finding coaraission might intervene in the
donestic affairs of South Africa. Therefore, Costa Eica would vote for the
draft resolution* Mr. Fournler remarked that he found it surprising that
some delegations which recognized the -assembly's competence to consider the
question, did not deem it competent to set lip a fact-finding commission which
was to seek a solution to a hitherto insoluble problem.
1* See infra, p. 142.
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Costa Rica would also, Mr. Fouraier said, vote for the, now independent
1
Scandinavian draft resolution.
It is quite clear that Costa Rican support far the recommendations adopted
at this session was entirely dependent upon safeguards against their being
construed as intervention in the domestic affairs of South Africa,
(Lo) China.
China also adhered to a middle-of-the road policy on this question of inter¬
vention. Her delegate pointed out that the question of competence was relative
and that the United Nations might be competent to deal with certain aspects of
a matter but not with others. The General Assembly, he said,might be competent
to take certain decisions but not to take others*
He went on to indicate that, in China's opinion, questions dealing with
human rights were within the scope of the Charter. Nevertheless, his state¬
ment does indicate that China is .live to the problems which surround the ques¬
tion of intervention and that she too will Judge the question of Intervention
2
on the results sought to be achieved, not by the external form of the action,
(ll) Canada.
In this case Canada adhered to the liberal view of the powers of the United
Nations which she had adopted in other sessions. She was prepared to approve
some measures, while at the same time opposing otriers because of her doubts on
the competence of the General Assembly to take them. Her representative,
Mr. Martin, said that
....His delegation had listened with interest to the interpreta¬
tion which certain representatives had placed on Article 2,
paragraph 7, of the Charter, but could not agree that those
1. ibid, 21st mtg., paras. 14-16.
2. ibid, 18th ratg., para. 52.
3. ibid, 20th mtg., paras. 12-15.
members who expressed concern about the international implica¬
tions and long-term consequences of what they regard as policies
of racial discrimination were trying to override the Charter.
He referred to a statement made by Mr. St. Laurent, then
Canadian Secretary of State for External affairs, in the first
Committee in 1946 that if too great an effect were given to
Article 2, paragraph 7, of the Charter it might seriously im¬
pair the extremely important rights of the General Assembly
to discuss and make recommendations for the peaceful adjustment
of any situation which it deemed likely to impair friendly re¬
lations among nations.
....The Canadian delegation had no intention of ignoring Article
2, paragraph 7, of the Aiarter, or dismissing it as a legal techni¬
cality. It felt, however, that a distinction should, be drawn
between intervention and the right of the General Assembly to
discuss any matters within the scope of the Charter. ......
The Canadian delegation had always felt tliat an author&tive
legal opinion was desirable whenever the interpretation of an
important article of the Charter was in dispute. ••••
With regard to the various draft resolutions before the
Committee, lie felt that in the absence of an authorative legal
opinion and because of the divergence of views on the question
of competence, the Committee sho^Ld proceed with the utmost
caution, especially since it was the first time that that
particular question had been brought before it. The
Canadian delegation would have voted in favour of the
eighteen-power draft resolution if the Scandinavian amend¬
ment as originally proposed had been carried. The language
of that amendment had appeared to his delegation not as a
means of dodging the issue, as some delegations had thought,
but rather as calculated to avoid a reaction which might be
harmful to the very people whom the Committee was anxious to
help. The racial problem was a matter of concern to the
whole world and not only to the Union of South Africa
Since the Scandinavian amendment had been re-issued as a
separate draft resolution his delegation felt that it had
lost some of its attractiveness, but still hoped that it
would receive a large majority vote. The Canadian dele¬
gation would be obliged to abstain from voting on the joint
draft resolution as a whole, because of doubts on the
United nations competence to take the action set out in
paragraph 1 of the operative part.
By her statements, Canada seemed here to be groping towards some kind of
compromise definition of intervention. Her statement is of importance for it adds
to the growing number of States which look upon the question of competence as some¬
thing to be decided,not a priori, on the basis of some preconceived definition, but
rather on an ad hoc basis, in the light of the action sought by the proposed
reconraenidation.
(12) Pferu.
Beru voted against the South Aftican draft denying the competence of the
United Nations to deal with the item. Nevertheless, she declined to vote
in favour of tl» eighteen-povwr draft resolution as this, in her opinion,
constituted interference in South Africa's domestic affairs. She was, however,
prepared to vote in favour of the Scandinavian draft, although even here she
declared her intention of abstaining on paragraph 1 of the preamble and
1
paragraph 2 of the operative part thereof# Explaining Peru's position
o
Mr# Maurtua said that!
• Rsru, like all other Latin-iuoerican States, was deeply
attached to the principles of freedom and equality and con¬
sidered the respect of human rights to be a fundamental tenet
of the Charter. Nevertheless, neither the Charter's injunc¬
tions to safeguard those rights, nor the proclamation of them
in the Universal Declaration of Human Sights could be binding
on Member States. Until an effective legal instrument obliging
nations to implement human rights had been adopted and ratified,
the General Assembly in exercise of what might be called its
moral Jurisdiction, could do no more than appeal to the
goodwill of States to promote observance of those rights.
Obviously, whenever human rights were safeguarded in
treaties, the signatories were bound contractually to ensure
respect for them. However, as the record of the San Erancisco
negotiations would show, the General Assembly had the right to
promote respect far human, rights, but the establishment of the
means whereby that respect was to be ensured had been left far
a later stage in the development of the United Nations. The
future covenants on human rights would consititute such means
and would set up the necessary enforcement organs#
.*#« Intervention had been interpreted to mean not only the
use of force but the tendency to interfere with the Judicial,
political, social, and economic factors which went to make up
such legal entity. Accordingly, Peru could not vote in favour
of any resolution which might compromise the sovereignty of a
1. See infra, pp.142-143.
2. G-.A., (VU), Ad Hoc Pol. Com., 20th rntg., paras. 55-50.
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State In administering its domestic affairs. The establishment
of the caaraLssion proposed in the eighteen-power draft resolution
would be tantamount to interference in the legislation of the
South African Government* On the other hand the Brazilian
amendment to paragraph 1 of the operative part of that text
would render the proposed commission inoperative and reduce
the entire issue to an academic discussion* While Peru did
not underestimate the moral factors Involved in the debate it
felt that any coercion would exacerbate South African nation¬
alism and would stiffen the resistance of the South African
Government. Moreover* any form of intervention in South
Africa's domestic affairs would establish a dangerous
precedent*
(15) Colombia
Colombia exhibited the same doubts on the competence of the Assembly to
adopt the eight sen-power draft resolution, although she felt that human rights
were to some extent within the competence of the United Nations. lier delegate
said that the debate which had taken place had enabled the Assembly to go
thoroughly into the question and that it ma therefore unnecessary to set up
the proposed commission. He took particular exception to the fact that it
was not known under what Article of the Charter it was proposed to set up the
commission. Colombia would have preferred,tier delegate said, that the
Committee direct an appeal to all Member States to harmonize their policies
with the pledge they had undertaken in signing the Charter to ensure respect
for human rights. She took this position because of the fact that racial
discrimination was to be found in all countries and in order to avoid any
interference in the domestic affairs of South Africa.^-
(14) Argentina
Explaining his country's vote on the eighteen-power draft resolution, the
Argentinian delegate said that he had abstained 'on the basis of the principle of
2
non-intervention in the domestic afiairs laid down in the Chatter'. Nevertheless
1. ibid, 21st mtg., paras. 12-15.
2. ibid, para.50.
the principle of non-intervention did not prevent her from voting in favour of
the Scandinavian draft,
(b) The cteandanavian Draft Resolution.
The amendments to the eighteen-power draft resolution introduced by
Norway on behalf of herself, Denmark, Iceland, and Sweden,1 were subsequently
2
reintroduced as a separate resolution sponsored by the same Governments. The
g
text was as follows:
The General Assembly,
Having taken note of the communication dated 12 September
1952, addressed to the Secretary-General of the United Nations
by the delegations of Afghanistan, Burma, Egypt, Indonesia,
India, Iraq, Iran, Lebanon, Pakistan, Philippines, Syria,
Saudi-Arabia, and Yemen, regarding the question of race
conflict in South Africa re suiting from the policies of
apartheid of the Government of the Union of South Africa,
Considering that one of the purposes of the United Nations
is to achieve international co-operation in promoting and
encouraging respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms
for all, without distinction as to race, sex, language or
religion,
Recalling that the General Assembly declared in its resolu-
tion 105CI ) that it is in the higher interests of humanity to
put an end to religious and so-called racial persecution and
called upon all governments to conform both to the letter and
to the spirit of the Charter and to take the most prompt and
energetic steps to that end,
Recognizing that the methods for discharging the responsi¬
bility of Members under the Charter and for giving effect to
their Charter pledges may vary with circumstances such as the
social structure of the State concerned and the different
stages of development of the various groups involved,
1* Declares that inn a multi-racial society harmony arid re¬
spect far human rights and freedoms and the peaceful develop¬
ment of & unified community are best assured when patterns of
legislation and practice are directed tov/ards ensuring equality
before the law of all persons regardless of race, creed or
colour, and when economic, social,cultural and political
Supra, p. 128.
2. G.A., (VII), Ad Hoc Pol. Com., 20th mtg», para. 1.
5. ibid, Annexes, Vol. II, a.i.66, p.4, DOC.A/AC.61/L.12.
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participation of all racial groups is an a basis of equality;
2. Affirms that the governmental policies of Member States
which are not directed towards these goals, but which are de¬
signed to perpetuate or increase discrimination, are in¬
consistent with the pledges of the Members under Article 56
of the Charter;
5. Solemnly calls upon all Member States to bring their
policies into conformity with their obligation under the
Charter to promote the observance of human rights and funda¬
mental freedoms.
It will be noted that this draft resolution is composed of the first
three paragraphs of the preamble of the eighteen-power draft resolution plus
the terms of the original Scandinavian amendments to that draft resolution,
(c) Voting on the Draft Resolutions.
(!) The Eighteen-Bower Draft Resolution.
Hie eighteen-power draft resolution as amended,^ was adopted by the Ad
2
Hoc Political Committee by 55 votes to 2, with 22 abstentions, and by the
1. The text adopted by the committee incorporated the amendments
proposed by Brazil, Mexico, and the Soviet Union, (see Annexes,
Vol.H, p.7, para.17, Doc.A/2276) and the first two points of the
Ecuadorian amendments (see supra, p. 135 An. 2. )
2. (J.A. ,(VII), Ad 3bc Pol,Com., 21st mtg., para. 42. The details were
as followB:
In favour? Mexico, Pakistan, Panama, Hiilippines, Poland, Saudi-
Arabia, Syria* Thailand, Ukrainian S.S.H., U.3.S.B., Uruguay,
Yugoslavia, Afghanistan, Bolivia, Brazil, Burma, Byelorussian
5.S.R., Chile, Costa Rica, Cuba, Czechoslovakia, Scuador, Egypt,
Ethiopia, El Salvador, Guatemala, Haiti, Honduras, India,
Indonesia, Iran, Iraq, Israel, Lebanon, Liberia.
Against i Peru, Union of South Africa.
Abstentionsi Luxembourg, Netherlands, Hew Zealand, Nicaragua,
Norway, Paraguay, Turkey, Sweden, U.K., U.3.A., Argentina,
Australia, Belgium, Canada, China, Colombia, Denmark, Dominican
Republic, FTance, Greece, Iceland, Venezuela.
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plenary session of the General Assembly by 55 votes to 1 with 23 abstentions.^"
(ii) The Scandinavian Draft Resolution.
The Scandanavian Draft Resolution was adopted in committee by 20 votes to
2
7, with 32 abstentions, and in the plenary session by 24 votes to 1, with 34
s
abstentions. *
1. 0.A,,(VTI), Tien., 401st ratg., para. 98. Res. 616"(VII). The details of
voting were as followss
In favour: SI Salvador, Ethiopia, Guatemala, Haiti, Honduras, India,
Indonesia, Iran, Iraq, Israel, Lebanon, Liberia, Mexico, Pakistan,
Ibnaaa, Philippines, Poland, Saudi-Arabia, Syria, Thailand, Ukrainian
S.S.R., U.3.3.R., Uruguay, Yugoslavia, Afghanistan, Bolivia, Brazil,
Burma, Byelorussian 3.3.11., Chile, Costa Rica, Cuba, Czechoslovakia,
Ecuador, Egypt.
Against: Union of South Africa.
Abstentions ; Stance, Greece, Iceland, Luxembourg, Netherland, New
Zealand, Nicaragua, Norway, Ibraguay, Peru, Sweden, Turkey, UnSA,
U.S.A., Venezuela, Argentina, Australia, Belgium, Canada, China,
Colombia, Denmark, Dc«ainican Republic.
2. G.A. ,(VH), Ad Hop Bol. Com., 21st mtg., para.45. The details of
voting were as follows;
In favour; Canada, Chile, China, Colombia, Costa Rica, Cuba,
Denmark, 21 Salvador, Iceland, Israel, Netherlands, Nicaragua,
Norway, Thraguay, Bsru, Sweden, U.SJU, Uruguay, Argentina,
Brazil,
Against; Czechoslovakia, Mexico, Poland, Ukrainian S.SJl., Union
of South Africa, U.S.S.R., Byelorussian 3.3.R.
Abstentions: Dominican Republic, Sknvxdor, Egypt, Ethiopia, Prance,
Greece, Guatemala, Haiti, Honduras, India, Indonesia, Iran, Iraq,
Lebanon, Liberia, Luxembourg, New Zealand, Pakistan, Ibnama,
Philippines, Saudi-Arabia, Syria, Thailand, Turkey, U.K.,
Venezuela, Yugoslavia, Afghanistan, Australia, Belgium, Bolivia,
Burma.
3. G.A., (VII), Plen., 401st mtg,, para.l05j Res. 616Ii(VIl). The details
of voting were as follows;
In favour: El Salvador, Guatemala, Iceland, Israel, Mexico, Netherlands,
Norway, Pakistan, Phnama, Paraguay, Peru, Sweden, U.S.A., Uruguay,
Argentina, Bolivia, Brazil, Canada, Cliile, China, Colombia, Costa Rica,
Cuba, Denmark.
Against; Union of South Africa.
-abstaining: Dominican Republic, Ecuador, Egypt, Ethiopia, irance, Greece,
iiaiti, Honduras, India, Indonesia, Iran, Iraq, Lebanon, Liberia, Luxembourg,
New Zealand, Nicaragua, Philippines, Poland, Saudi-Arabia, Syria, Thailand,
Turkey, Ukrainian S.S.R., U.S.SJl., U.K., Venezuela, Yugoslavia, Afgbanistan,
Australia, Belgium, Burma, Byelorussian S.S.R., Czechoslovakia.
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(d) Conclusions:
Taking into account that a considerable number of the States present
and voting did not consider that the matter was within the domestic? jurisdic¬
tion of the Union of South Africa,"'" and that therefoz-e the issue of Inter¬
vention far them did not arise, certain facts about the nature of interven¬
tion become evident from this debate.
It is clear that while a few States did take up a very rigid attitude
on what constitutes intervention, the majority which wore concerned with
this problem were prepared to adopt a much more flexible attitude. These
States were Argentina, brazil, Canada, China, Colombia, Costa Rica, Denmark,
Ecuador, Mexico, Norway, Netherlands, Peru, Sweden and the United States.
Notall these States took the same view of what does constitute intervention
in the domestic affairs of a particular State. However, it is important to
note that all of them were unite! in the belief that the United Nations has
the power to adopt some kind of recommendation without being guilty of
intervention in domestic affairs. None of them espoused the view that as
the item was domestic all discussions thereof and recommendations thereon
were illegal." Each of them, in her own way* supported the idea that the
question of competence is a specific one, to be decided with reference to a
1. The following states, either expressly or by implication, maintained
that the matter was not domesticj Czechoslovakia, Pakistan, Haiti,
Indonesia, Uruguay, Burma, Saudi-Arabia, India, Byelorussian 3.SJS.,
Cuba, Jugoslavia, Iran, Israel, Chile, Ethiopia, Afghanistan, Honduras,
Guatemala, Ukrainian S.3.R, and U.S.2J1. See mtgs., 16-20 of the Ad
Hoc Pol.Com., Greece, Liberia, Bolivia did not deal with the issue of
domestic jurisdiction.
2. But see supra, p.1'31, the statement of the NetherLuads.
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specific proposal, and not a general question which, if it were decided in
South Africa's favour, would rule out all United Nations action on the
subject.
The attitudes towards the two resolutions varied considerably, and are not
without interest for the present purpose. Iter example, some States were pre¬
pared to discuss this item, relating as it did to a particular country, but
were not prepared to support any resolution which was addressed to one parti¬
cular ^tate. They appeared to attach considerable importance to the form of the
recommendation and the fact that the Scandinavian resolution was in reality
as explicit in its way as the eighteen-power one does not appear to have
bothered them.
Of the fourteen States dealt with here only four - Brazil, Costa Eica,
Ecuador and America - voted in favour of the eighteen-power draft resolution
in the plenary session. The rest abstained. On the other hand, only
Ecuador did not vote in favour of the Scandinavian draft in the plenary
session. On the basis of this analysis therefore, it seems that the
majority of States considering the question of intervention viewed the forma¬
tion of a commission to study the racial policies of a particular State as
intervention in its domestic affairs, or at least had sufficient cbubts
regarding its legality as to render it a dubious procedure.
2. The Eighth, Ninth, and Tenth Sessions.
At these sessions little that is of any use for the present purposes
was added by the States which took part in the debates.
(a) States whioh adhered to the non-technical interpretation of intervention.
As was to be expected, certain States adhered to the view that as the
question of race conflict in South Africa was within the domestic jurisdiction
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of that country, the United Nations had no competence in the matter. Those
States included Australia,1 Belgium,** Colombia,*5 Stance,^ Rsru,5 and the
6 7
United Kingdom. At the eighth session of the Assembly Greece and
0
Luxembourg also voted in favour of the South African motion denying the
competence of the General Assembly to adopt the resolution before it. It
will be evident that in making this assertion, a certain degree of incon-
9
sistency must be attributed to Colombia and Beru.
(b) States which adhered to the technical interpretation of intervention.
Just as a few States adhered to the nan-technicttl view of intervention,
so too same maintained that it meant dictatorial interference. These included
Ecuador,1^Guatemala?"'" India,1** and Syria.13
1. G,A. , (Vld), Ad Hoc Pol.Com. 56th ratg., paras. 10-24} ibid, 9th session,
44th mtg., para. 1} ibid, 10th session, 11th ratg., paras. 46-55.
2. ibid, 8th session, 52nd mtg., para.54; ibid, 9th session, 45rd mtg.,
para.18; ibid, 10th session, 11th mtg., paras.15-15.
5. ibid, 8th session, 55rd mtg., paras. 41-47; ibid, 58th mtg., paras.
21-35; ibid, 9th session, 44th mtg., para.50.
4. ibid, 8th session, 58th mtg., paras. 1-18; ibid, 9th session, 47th ratg.,
para.51*
5. ibid, 10th session, 11th ratg., paras. 56-59.
6. ibid, 8th session, 54th mtg., paras. 1-14; ibid, 9th session, 43rd mtg.,
paras. 1-2; ibid, 10th session, 5th ratg., para.25.
7. Gr.A., (VIII), Plen., 469th mtg., para, 52.
8. ibid.
9. Cf. these attitudes with those adopted in the previous session; see
supra, ppj.41 andl40reap.
10.G.A., (VIII), Ad Hoc Pol.Cora. , 36th ratg., paras. 25-41; ibid, 10th session
7th mtg., para.25.
11.ibid, 10th session, 8th mtg., para. 2.
12.ibid, 9th mtg., para. 30.
15.ibid, 8th session, 55th ratg., para. 15.
In adhering to the technical interpretation of intervention in these
debates Ecuador departed from the views which she had expressed on other
occasions, both in connection with this case and otters. In other places
she had opposed certain recoursendation3 on the grounds that they would have
constituted intervention in the domestic affairs of the States concerned#
In particular, she declined to support any recommendation which requested
South Africa to suspend the operation of any of her legislation# It might
well be asked why she did this if, in her opinion, intervention carried the
technical meaning of dictatorial interference? Ecuador's position is
somewhat obscure#
This confusion is not lessened when statements made by Ecuador at the
ninth session are compared with those she made at the eighth and tenth#
At the ninth session, she appeared to suggest that any reooaoandatiaa which
exerted pressure on South Africa contravened Article 2(7), whereas in the
other two sessions here cited alio maintained that no recommendation could do
1
so#
(c) States which were uncertain cm the question of competence#
A third group of States was uncertain on the competence of the United
Nations to entertain this question and would h&v© preferred an advisory opinion
from the International Court of Justice cm the subject# These States included,
<5 » j H
Denaaark, tew Zealand, the Netherlands and Norway# Turkey also Indicated
1# ibid, 9th session, 44th mtg,, paras. 19-20; and G-.A., (IX), Hen., 511th
ratg., para. 110.
2. G.A#, (VIII), Ad Hoc Bol.Cotn., 56th mtg., paras. 44-45.
3# ibid, 59th mtg., paras. 40-46; ibid, 10th session, 8th mtg., para. 48.
4. ibid. 8th session, 42nd mtg., paras. 21-25.
5. ibid. 59th ratg., paras. 25-50.
her doubts on the competence of the United Nations, and in view of this,
indicated her intention to abstain in all votes.*'
(d) The Cbaapraaise View.
Just as in other cases, and in the previous discussion of this item, so
here, there was opposed to the two extreme interpretationsof tlws word 'inter¬
vene ' a third one. As in other debates, States which espoused this point of
view were prepared to support a certain amount of United Nations action, Yfhile
at the same time opposing forms of action which they considered would consti¬
tute intervention.
Sons States were prepared to allow the United Nations to discuss this
matter and as a result tlicrcof to adopt recommendations of a general character
on the subject of racial discrimination addressed to the generality of States,
Others were prepared to go slightly further and to support recommendations
addressed to South Africa itself, provided that they did not exert pressure on
that State to carry out specific measures,
The views expressed are, on the one hand, varied, and on the other, not
sufficiently numerous to allow any detailed conclusions to be drawn as to the
existence of any consensus on exactly what fonn of action the United Nations
is competent to take where a matter does fall essentially within the domestic
Jurisdiction of a Member, However, it will at least be seen that nations are
alive to the problem of intervention, on the one hand, arid on the other, are not
disposed to dismiss all forms of United Nations action as intervention Just
because a matter falls within the domestic jurisdiction of a particular State,
or because the Jurisdiction of the United Nations is doubtful. As in other
1. ibid, 42nd mtg., para, 57.
150.
places there are the same attempts to arrive at sane compromise solution,
(i) Greece.
At the eighth session of the General Assembly, the Greek delegate told
the Ad Hoc Political Committee that hi3 country had throughout contested the
Assembly•s competence to consider "the question. Greece held that the matter
was essentially within the domestic jurisdiction of South Africa and that
consequently the United Nations had no right to intervene therein* However,
the Greek delegation had voted in favour of the inclusion of this item in
the agenda out of deference to the resolutions adopted thereon at the
previous session, but this in no way, the Greek delegate said, altered his
1
position on the question of competence*
These statements are conducive to the conclusion that Greece would oppose
any form of United Nations action with respect to this subject, and indeed, at
the previous session sloe had abstained on even the ucandinavian draft resolu-
tion. However, at this session, she appears to have changed her mind. The
2
Greek delegate, continuing his speech, said that]
The South African Government was in fact being charged,
first, with having created, by its policy of apartheid, a
dangerous situation that constituted a threat to international
peace and security and, second, with having flouted the prin¬
ciple of respect for human rights. ... With regard to the
second charge, in reply to those who contended that any action
on the part of the United Nations might be precluded if the
principle of non-intervention was invoked to debar application
of the Charter provisions relating to human rights, he would
say that it was wrong to suppose that the provisions of Article
2, paragraph 7, were completely irreconcilable with those of
the various articles of the Charter relating to human rights.
A distinction should be made between the Assembly's power to
1. G.A.,(VTII), Ad Hoc Pol. Com., 33rd mtg., paras. 35-37.
2. ibid, paras. 58-59; emphasis added.
discuss a matter and to initiate investigations, and it3 power
to make recommendations. The Assembly would not be able to
make a recoramendation on a matter within the domestic Jurisdic¬
tion of a State without intervening in its internal affairs,
but the discusaion and examination of such a question by the
Assembly might not constitute interference in the domestic
affairs of States, if the Assembly took no further action.
In including the question of racial conflict in South
Africa in its agenda on two occasions, and by setting up the
Commission, the Assembly had reached the extreme limits of
its powers. It should avoid creating a dangerous precedent
and should be careful not to pass Judgement on the racial
situation in South Africa. It should not regard itself as
authorised to dictate the racial policy which the South
African Government should adopt.
(il) Canada.
At the eighth session of the General Assembly, the Canadian delegate
said that
. • • • In view of the possible international repurcusaions of
South Africa's racial policies and of the obligation in¬
cumbent upon member States to promote human rights, the
Canadian delegation fait no doubt of the United Nations
competence to discuss the issue of race conflict.
The South African draft resolution was also unsatis¬
factory in that it left undecided what constituted inter¬
vention, a problem which was not brought closer to solution
by the restatement of Article 2, paragraph 7. Canada
agreed that there were serious doubts as to whether the
establishment of the Commission by the Assembly at its
seventh session and its continuance by the Assembly at
its present session amounted to intervention. That was
one of the reasons why it had abstained in the vote on
the subject at the seventh session. .....
Jlevertheleas, to contend that the Assembly could
make recommendations in any matter whatsoever, at its
discretion, would, be to deny any effect to Article 2,
paragraph 7. Even if it were agreed that that Article
prohibited 'dictatorial interference* tlie term atill
remained to be defined. ....
His delegation did not propose to attempt to solve
the legal riddle, but believed that a practical approach
was possible. A discussion on matters of human rights
1. Ad Hoc Rjl.Com., 55th mtg., paras. 19-2SJ emphasis addedj see further,
G.A.",T(rX) Ad Hoc Pol.Corn., 12th mtg., para, 16.
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could do some good. It was to be hoped that the present
discussion and general concern expressed regarding South
Africa's racial policies which many regarded as being in
conflict with the Charter, would have sone effect in that
it might bring the pressure of public opinion to bear on
irfomber States. That in itself, would not constitute
intervention in the form in which it was prohibited try
the Charter. »**•
It was, however, quesionable whether the Assembly
should go beyond discussion and the egression of concern
and whether it should take the further steps proposed in
the Joint draft resolution. •••«•
(lii) Denmark.
The Danish delegation, as already noted, had certain doubts on the compe¬
tence of the United Nations to deal with this item and had supported the idea
of an appeal to the International Court of Justice for an advisory opinion
thereon.1 However, while she did harbour these doubts, she held the view
that the General Assembly was at least competent to discuss the matter and
as a result of these discussions to adopt recommendations of a general nature
addressed to all States on the subject of racial discrimination. Iier doubts
on competence were particularly centred on the question of recommendations
addressed to South nfrioa itself.
Speaking in the debate at the eighth session the Danish delegate, Mr.
2
Lannung said that:
• ••• his delegation had said at the previous session that
the United Nations should have the right to discuss the
problem of apartheid, but that it should exercise that
right with self-restraint and moderation and toIterance.
But beyond the right to discuss that matter a legitimate
doubt existed regarding the competence of the United Nations
to deal with the question. Like the Belgian and sone other
delegations, the Danish delegation believed that Articles
10 and 14 of the Charter authorized the General Assembly
to exercise in the form of general recommendations, wide
powers in respect of questions within the domestic
1. Supra, p. 148.
2. G.A., (VIII), Ad Hoc Fol.Com., 56th mtg., paras. 42-45j emphasis added.
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jurisdiction of Member States* But it was quite a different
matter when it was a question of determining the competence
of tiie United Nations to pass judgement on specific legisla¬
tion*
In the light of those considerations, the Danish delega¬
tion had the previous year supported a draft resolution which
had not been addressed to any specific country and had called
upon all Member States to bring their policies into conformity
with their obligations under the Charter* ••••
(iv) The United States*
At the eighth session, tlie United States made no pronouncement on the
status of specific recommendations addressed to particular states. However,
she did indicate that, in her opinion, discussion did not constitute inter¬
vention. In addition to this she recalled her support for resolution
616B(VTl) at the previous session of the General assembly. The American
delegate, Mrs* Bolton, said that in her country's opinion, tliis resolution
represented the best way in which the General nssembly could diacliarge its
responsibilities in this matter* This resolution, she reminded the
Committee, was not directed at any particular State, but yet everyone knew
wiiat it meant in connection with the policy of apartheid."" The inference
to be drawn from this statement is that such a recommendation did not
constitute intervention in thedomestic affairs of South Africa.
(v) Sweden*
At these three sessions Sweden maintained the position which she had
adopted at the seventh* She continued to oppose any recommendations which
sought to specify the measures which a particular State should take in order
to solve a certain problem* However she asserted the right of the Assembly
to call on a State to reconsider its position in tl© light of the Charter




New Zealand, a3 noted above, vnxa doubtful of the competence of the United
Nations in this raatter. However, these doubts did not prevent her from
supporting a general recororasndation on the subject of racial discrimination
2
addressed to all States. She did not, apparently, consider that any such
recocsnendation would be tainted with illegality because it had originated in
a discussion of the domestic affairs of South Africa as had, for example, the
United Kingdom, "franee and Belgium.
(vii) The Netiierlands
The Netherlands expressed the view that the United Nations had a limited
competence with respect to questions of human rights. However, she objected
to the faot that this Jurisdiction was being exercised selectively against
5
South Africa* This, in her opinion, was indefensible,
(viii) Norway*
Like other Scandanavian countries and in keeping with her own stand on
this question at other sessions, Norway opposed too broad an interpretation
of the word •intervene* which would rule out all United Nations activity in
such matters. On tiie other hand, she was not prepared to support detailed
criticisms of South African legislation. However, she did indicate her
support for recommendations which were of a general nature and vrere addressed
to the generality of States.
1. 0«A., (VIII), Ad Hoo Pol.Cora., 53rd mtg,, paras. 43-4©} ibid, 9th session
47th mtg., para. 71} and ibid, 10th session, 5th 'mtg., para. 2.
2. Cr,A,,(X), Ad Hoc Tbl.Com., 8th mtg., para. 50,
3. ibia, 12th mtg., para. 1,
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At the tenth session, her delegate said that;**"
He would support any proposals reaffirming previous
resolutions of the General Assembly concerning human rights
and urging iSember States to abstain from racial discrimination,
which was incompatible with their obligations tinder the Charter.
His Government would bs chary, however, of supporting more do-
tailed recommendations on specific points, for such recommenda¬
tions might infringe the domestic jurisdiction of states re¬
ferred to in Article 2, paragraph 7 of the Charter, ...
He would vote for the second and third paragraphs of the
preamble of the joint draft resolution (A/AC,QO/L,lj and
abstain on the first paragraph because it referred to all the
previous resolutions on the question, some of which his Govern¬
ment had not supported. He would vote fear paragraphs 4 and S
of the operative part of the text, but not for paragraph 6,
which was superfluous and inaccurate, introducing, as it did,
the word 'obligations* which did not appear in Article 56 of
the Charter*
(e) Substantive hesolutions Proposed at these sessions, and the voting
thereon,
(i) The Eighth Cession.
At the eighth session of the General Assembly, the Ad Hoc Political
2
Committee recommended the following resolution to the General Assembly:.
The General Assembly,
leaving considered the report of the United Nations Commis¬
sion on the Racial Situation in the Union of South Africa
establislied under resolution 616A(VTl) of 5 December 1952,
Noting with concern that the Commission, in it3 study of
the racial policies of the Government of the Union of South
Africa, has concluded that these policies and their conse¬
quences are contrary to the Charter and the Universal
Declaration of Human Rights,
1, G.A. ,(X), Ad Hoc.Pol.Com., 12th mtg., paras. 4-5; see also, ibid, 8th
session, 59th mtg., para. 31.
2. G.A. ,(VIII), Annexes, a.i. ,21, Doc.A/2610, p.5, para.20. The text had
originally been sponsored by the delegations of Afghanistan, Bolivia,
Burma, Egypt, Guatemala, Haiti, India, Indonesia, Iran, Iraq, Lebanon,
Liberia, Pakistan, Hiilippinea, tyria, oaudi-uirabia and Yemen; see ibid.
The text was amended by Chile, whose amendment added paragraph one of the
final text to that proposed by the 17 nations; see ibid, p.2, para. 11.
Uotim that the Coisaisaion has concluded that
(a) 'It is highly unlikely, and indeed improbable, that
the policy of apartheid will ever be willingly accepted by
the masses subjected to discrimination, * and
(b) That the continuance of this policy would make
peaceful solutions increasingly difficult and endanger
friendly relations «»"(; nations,
I-fotins further that the Commission considered it desir¬
able that the United Nations slsould request tie Government of
the Union of South Africa to reconsider the components of its
policy towards various ethnic groups*
Considering that in the Commission's opinion, the time
available was too short for a thorough study of all the
aspects of the problem assigned to It,
Considering also the Commission's view that one of the
difficulties encountered by it was tie lack of co-operation
from the Government of the Union of oouth Africa and, in
particular, its refusal to permit the Cocnission to enter
its territory,
1* Reaffirms its resolutions 105(1) of 19 Boves&er 1246,
577A(V), seotion £, of S Hoveober 1950 and 616B(VIl) of 5
December 1952, particularly the passages in those resolu¬
tions which state respectively that 'it is in the higher
interests of humanity to put an immediate end to religious
and so-called racial persecution and discrimination* j that
♦enduring peace will not be secured solely by collective
security arrangements against breaches of international
peace and acts of aggression, but that a genuine and
lasting peace depends upon the observance of all the
Principles and Purposes established in the Charter of
the United rations, upon the implementation of the
resolutions of the Security Council, the General Assembly
and other principal organs of the United Rations intended
to achieve the maintenance of International peace and
security, and especially upon respect far %nd observance
of human rights and fundamental freedoms for all and an
the establishment ax d maintenance of economic and social
well-being in all countries' j and that 'in a multi-racial
society harmony and respect for human rights and freedoms
and the peaceful development of a unified cotaaxnity are
best assured when the patterns of legislation and practice
are directed towards ensuring equality before the law of
all persons regardless of race, creed or colour, end when
economic, social, cultural and political participation of
all racial groups is on"^basis of equality*,
2* Bacaresaea appreciation of the work of the United
Nations Commission on the Facial Situation in the Union
of South Africa,
5. Bequests ire Cetaaisaion:
(a)~To continue its study of the development of the
racial situation in the Union of South Africa i
(1) With reference to the various implications of
the situations on the populations affectedj
(ii) In relation to the provisions of the Charter and
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in particular to .Article 14; and
(b) To svggest measures which would help to alleviate
the situation and promote & peaceful settlement;
4. Invites the Government of the Union of South Africa
to extend its fullest co-operation to the Commission;
5. Bequests the Commission to report to the General
Assembly at its ninth session.
This text was adopted by the Ad Hoc Political Committee by 57 votes to
10, with 9 abstentions."^
o
The recoursendation, with the addition of an administrative paragraph,
was adopted "by the General Assembly in plenary session by 58 votes to 11,
5
with 11 abstentions.
(li) The ninth Session.
At the ninth session, the M Hoc Political Committee recommended the
1. G»A. ,(VUI), Ad Hoc Pol.Com., 42nd mtg., para. 69; the details of
voting were as follows:
In favour: Afghanistan, Bolivia, Brazil, Burma, Byelorussian 3.S.R.,
Chile, Costa Rica, Cuba, Czechoslovakia, Ecuador, Egypt, El Salvador,
Ethiopia, Guatemala, Haiti, Honduras, Iceland, India, Indonesia, Iran,
Iraq, Israel, Lebanon, Liberia, Mexico, Nicaragua, Pakistan, Philippines,
Poland, Saudi-Arabia, Syria, Thailand, Ukrainian S.S.R., U.S.S.R.,
Uruguay, Yemen, Yugoslavia.
Against: Australia, Belgium, Canada, Prance, Greece, Netherlands, New
Zealand, Union of South Africa, U.K.
Abstaining: Argentina, China, Denmark, Norway, Pteru, Sweden, Turkey,
U .S *A., Venezuela.
2. This paragraph, proposed by the delegations of Chile, and Uruguay read:
"Decides that should any members of the Commission be unable to continue
their membership, the member or members shall, if the General Assembly is
not sitting, be replaced by a person or persons appointed by the present
President of the General Assembly in consultation with the Secretary-
General." See ibid, ELen., 469th mtg., para. 6.
5. ibid, para. 66, Res. 72l(\TCIl). The details of voting were as follows:
In favour: U.S.S.R., Uruguay, Yemen, Yugoslavia, Afghanistan, Bolivia,
Brazil, Burma, Byelorussian S.SJt., Chile, Costa Rica, Cuba, Czechoslovakia,
Ecuador, Egypt, El Salvador, Ethiopia, Guatemala, Haiti, Honduras,
Iceland, India, Indonesia, Iran, Iraq, Israel, Lebanon, Liberia,
Mexico, Nicaragua, Pakistan, Paraguay, Philippines, Poland, Saudi-
Arabia, Syria, Thailand, Ukrainian S.S.R.
Against: U.K., Australia, Belgium, Canada, Colombia, Prance, Greece,
Luxembourg, Netherlands, New Zealand, Union of South Africa.
Abstaining? U.S.A., Venezuela, Argentina, China, Denmark, Dominican
Republic, Norway, Panama, Peru, Sweden, Turkey.
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following resolution to the General Assembly'
The General Assembly,
leaving Considered the second report (a/2719) of the United
Nations Commission on the Racial Situation in the Union of
South Africa,
Recalling General Assembly resolution 105(l), which states
that it is in the higher interests of humanity to put an end
to racial persecution and discrimination, and resolutions
595(v) and 51l(Vl),
Further recalling that the Commission, in its first report,
had concluded that the racial policies of the Government of
the Union of South Africa are contrary to the United Nations
Charter and to the Universal Declaration of Human Rights,
Noting with apprehension the adoption of new laws and
regulations by the Union Government which in the Commission's
view are also incompatible with the obligations of that
Government under the Charter,
Noting further the profound conviction of the Commission
that the policy of apartheid constitutes a grave threat to
the peaceful relations between ethnic groups in the world,
1* Commends the United Nations Commission on the Racial
Situation in the Union of South Africa for its constructive
work]
2. Notes with regret that the Government of the Union
of South Africa again refused to co-operate with the
Commission;
5* Notes the Commission's suggestions for facilitating
a peaceful settlement of the problem contained in paragraphs
568 to 584 of its report (a/2719)j
4* Invites the Government of the Union of South Africa
to reconsider its position in the light of the high
principles expressed in the United Nations Charter, taking
into account the pledge of all Member States to respect
human rights and fundamental freedoms without distinction
as to race; and further taking into account the valuable
experience of other multi-racial societies as set forth
in Chapter VII of the Commission's report:
5* Further invites the Government of the Union of
South Africa to take into consideration the suggestions
of the Commission for a peaceful settlement of the racial
1* See G.A», (IX), Annexes, a.i«,23, p.7, Doc,A/260. This resolution had
been sponsored by the delegations of Afghanistan, Bolivia, Burma,
Chile, Costa Rica, Egypt, Ethiopia, Haiti, India, Indonesia, Iran, Iraq,
Lebanon, Liberia, Pakistan, Philippines, Saudi-Arabia, i^yria, Yemen and
Yugoslavia,
problem, namely, those detailed in paragraphs 370 to 583
of its report ;
6* Requests the Commission to keep under review the
problem of race conflict in the Union of South Africa;
7, Requests the Commission to report to the General
Assembly at its tenth session;
8, Decides that should any of the members of the
Commission be unable to continue their membership, the
member or members concerned shall, if the General Assembly
is not sitting, be replaced by a person or persons appointed
by the present President of the General Assembly in consulta¬
tion with the Secretary-General.
In the Ad Hoc Political Committee, this resolution was adopted by 54 votes
to 9, with 10 abstentions.*
The plenary session adopted this recommendation by 40 votes to 10, with
2
10 abstentions.
(iii) The Tenth Session.
At the tenth session, the Ad Hoc Political Committee recommended the
1. See G.A., (IX), Ad Hoc Pol. Com. 4?th mtg., para. 69. The details of
voting were as follows}
In favour: Czechoslovakia, Ecuador, Egypt. Ethiopia, Greece, Haiti,
Honduras, Iceland, India, Indonesia, Iran, Iraq, Israel, Lebanon, Liberia,
Mexico, Norway, Pakistan, Phnaraa, Philippines, Poland, Saudi-Arabia,
Sweden, Syria, Ukrainian S.S.R., U.S.S.R., Uruguay, Yemen, Yugoslavia,
Afghanistan, Bolivia, Burma, Byelorussian 3.S.R., Chile.
Against: France, Netherlands, New AealSnd, Union of South Africa, U.K.,
Australia, Belgium, Canada, Colombia.
Abstaining: Cuba, Denmark, Guatemala, Peru, Turkey, U.S.A., Venezuela,
Argentina, Brazil, China.
2. Ibid, Plen., 511st mtg., para. 129; Sea. 820(IX). The details of voting
were as follows:
In favour: Bthopia, Greece, Guatemala,Haiti, Honduras, Iceland, India,
Indonesia, Iran, Iraq, Israel, Lebanon, Liberia, Mexico, Nicaragua,
Norway, Pakistan, Panama, Paraguay, Philippines, Poland, Saudi-Arabia,
Sweden, 8yria, Thailand, Ukrainian S.S.R., U.S.S.R., Uruguay, Yemen,
Yugoslavia, Afghanistan, Bolivia, Burma, Byelorussian S.3.R., Chile,
Costa Rica, Czechoslovakia, Ecuador, Egypt. El Salvador,
igainst: France, Luxembourg, Netherlands, New Zealand, Union of South
Africa, U.K., Australia, Belgium, Canada, Colombia.
Abstaining: Peru, Turkey, U.S.A., Venezuela, Argentina, Brazil, China,
Cuba, Denmark, Bomdnicari Republic.
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following resolution to the General .assembly*"'"
The General Assembly,
Recalling its previous resolutions on the question of
race conflict in South Africa resulting from the policies
of apartheid of the Government of the Union of South Africa;
Becalling sedion 2 of resolution 577(V) in which the
General Assembly has expressed its conviction that a
genuine and lasting peace depends also upon the observance
of all the principles and purposes established in the Charter
of the United Nations, upon the Implementation of the resolu¬
tions of the General Assembly and the principal organs of the
United Nations intended to achieve the maintenance of international
peace and security, and especially upon respect for and observance
of human rights and fundamental freedoms for all,
Reiterating its resolutions 105(l) and 616B(VTl) in which the
General Assembly has declared, among other tilings, that it is in
the higher interests of humanity to put an Immediate end to
religious and so-called racial persecution and discrimination;
and that governmental policies which are designed to perpetuate
or increase discrimination are inconsistent with the pledges of
the Members under Article 56 of the Charter,
Noting that the United Nations Commission on the Racial
Situation in the Union of South Africa has now submitted its
third report*
1* Commends the Commission far its constructive work;
2* ^otes with regret that the Government of the Union of
South Africa again refused to co-operate with the Commission;
5. Recommends to the Government of the Union of South
Africa to take note of the Commission's report;
4. Expresses its concern at the fact that the Government
of the Union of South Africa continues to give effect to the
policies of apartheid, notwithstanding the request made to it
ty the General Assembly to reconsider its position in the
light of the high principles contained in the Charter and
taking into account the pledge of all Member States to
promote respect far human lights and fundamental freedoms
without distinction as to race;
5. Reminds the Government of the Union of South Africa
of the faith it had reaffirmed, in signing the Charter, in
fundamental human rights and in the dignity and worth of
the human person;
6. Calls on the Government of the Union of South Afrioa
to observe the obligations contained in Article 56 of the
Charter;
7. Requests the Commission to keep under review the
racial situation in South Africa, including, as the General
1. See G.A., (X), Annexes, a.i», 23, p. 1, Doc,A/AC.80/l.1. The text had
been proposed by 17 nations, vis., Afghanistan, Bolivia, Burma, Sgypt,
Ethiopia, Haiti, India, Indonesia, Iran, Iraq, Lebanon, Liberia,
Pakistan, Philippines, Saudi-Arabia, Syria, Yemen.
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Assembly hopes, improvement, If any, in the situation, and to
report to the Genera.! Assembly at its eleventh session*
8. Decides that should any members of the Consaission be
unable to continue their membership, the member or members
shall, if the General Assembly is not sitting, be replaced
by a person or persons appointed by the present President
of the General Assembly in consultation with the Secretary-
General}
9* Requests the Secretary-General to provide the Commis¬
sion with the necessary staff and facilities;
10. Requests further the Union of South Africa to extend
its fullest co-operation to the Commission.
In the Ad Hoc Political Committee this recommendation was adopted by 37
votes to 7, with 15 abstentions.^"
The General Assembly, however, rejected paragraphs 7 and 8 and hence the
United Rations Commission on the Racial Conflict in the Union of South Africa
q
was discontinued.
1. G.A.,(X), Ad Hoc Bol.Com., 12th mtg., para. 44. The details of voting vere
as follows}
In favour} Afghanistan, Bolivia, Burma, Byelorussian 3.S.R., Chile, Costa
Rica, Czechoslovakia, Ecuador, Egypt, El Salvador, Ethiopia, Greece,
Guatemala, Haiti, Iceland, India, Indonesia, Iran, Iraq, Israel, Lebanon,
Liberia, Mexico, Pakistan, Phnama, Ihraguay, Philippines, Poland, Saudi-
Arabia, Sweden, Syria, Thailand, Ukrainian S.S.R., U.S.S.R., Uruguay, Yemen,
Yugoslavia.
Against: Australia, Belgium, Canada, Netherlands, New Zealand, Union of South
Africa, U.K.
Abstaining} Argentina, Brazil, China, Colombia, Cuba, Denmark, Honduras,
Nicaragua, Norway, Rsru, Turkey, U.S.A., Venezuela.
2. Paragraph 7 of the operative part was rejected as it did not receive a two-
thirds majority. The details of voting were, 33 in favour, 17 against, 9
abstentions, as follows}
In favour} Byelorussian S.S.R., Chile, Czechoslovakia, Ecuador, Egypt,
El Salvador, Ethiopia, Greece, Guatemala, Haiti, India, Indonesia, Iran,
Iraq, Lebanon, Liberia, Mexico, Pakistan, Panama, Paraguay, Philippines,
Poland, Saudi-Arabia, Syria, Thailand, Ukrainian S.S.R., U.S.S.R., Uruguay,
Yemen, Yugoslavia, Afghanistan, Bolivia, Burma;
Against; Canada, Cuba, Denmark, Stance, Israel, Luxembourg, Netherlands,
New Zealand, Nicaragua, Norway, Peru, U.K., U.S.A., Venezuela, Australia,
Belgium, Brazil.
Abstaining: China, Colombia, Costa Rica, Dominican Republic, Honduras,
Iceland, Sweden, Turkey, Argentina.
Paragraph 8 was rejected far the same reason. No roll call was taken.
The whole resolution, as amended, was adopted by 41 voted to 6, with 8
abstentions. No roll call was taken. See G.A., (X), Hen., 551st mtg.,
paras. 45-46} Res. 917(X),
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5. The Eleventh, Twelfth and Thirteenth Sessions*
The pattern of the previous sessions is continued in these three. Certain
States maintained that the natter was domestic and that as a consequence the
United Rations had no cosnpetence at all.1 The vast majority however were
of the opinion that the matter was not domestic and so no question of inter¬
vention arose. In between these two positions there was the compromise.
Some States doubted the extent of the Jurisdiction of the United Rations in
this matter but were prepared to at least discuss it, and even adopt some kind
of recommendation thereon. The recommendations which were acceptable to
States of this persuasion varied of course, but in the now familiar way.
Some would discuss the specific question but would only accept recommendations
which were addressed to the generality of States. Others were prepared to
accept mild resolutions addressed directly to South Africa. Furthermore, in
these sessions; a3so, souse States which were of the opinion that the matter was
not domestic nevertheless objected to certain clauses in the proposed resolu-
• * t ;
tions as they were afraid that they amounted to intervention. As before,
the trend was to examine the resolutions proposed and to decide on the basis
of the action which they sought whether or not they amounted to intervention.
3-* Australia: (J,A. , (Xl), Sp.FOl.Com., 15th mtg., para. 11; ibid, 12th
session, 57th mtg., paras. 22-25} ibid, 15th session, 94th mtg. paras.
20-25.
Belgium: ibid, 11th session, 12th mtg., para.18; ibid, 12th session,
57th mtg., paras# 24-26} ibid, 15th session, 94th mtg., para, 27.
Dominican Republic: ibid, 12th session, 57th nifcg., para. 59} ibid,
15th session, 94th mtg., pen-as. 17-19.
Portugal: ibid, 12th session, 57th mtg., para 40} ibid, 15th session,
24th mtg., para. 24.
Spain: ibid, 15th session, 90th mtg., paras. 52-56.
United Kingdom: ibid, 12th session, 57th mtg., paras, 55-57; ibid,
15th session, 94th mtg., paras. 9-15.
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South Africa was absent from these debates and in general, regret was
expressed at this. The general tone of the debates was conciliatory, even on
the part of those who considered that the matter was entirely within the com¬
petence of the United Nations. Moreover there was evident in the debates -
not in actual concrete terms but rather in expressions of sentiment and in
the general tone of the speeches - a view that perhaps a resolution aiming
at conciliation would not be so offensive to South Africa and that she might
be persuaded as a consequence to co-operate. The principal effort at these
sessions was not to condemn South Africa outright but to find some means of
inducing her to review her policies. It appears to have been a general
feeling that resolutions aimed at conciliation would not raise, to the same
extent, the legal aspects of the matter and that therefore South Africa
would not take the same exception to them."*"
(a) The Compromise View.
(i) New Zealand
At each of these three sessions the New Zealand delegation pursued the
middle-of-the road policy which she had followed on prior occasions. She had
doubts as to the extent of the competence of the United Nations to deal with this
matter but felt that it was at least competent to discuss it and as a result
of these discussions to adopt a reccranendation reminding all States of their
o
responsibilities to promote and respect human rights. New Zealand told
1. While examining the material tending to demonstrate the desire to adopt a
compromise definition of intervention, it is worth while noting that the
need to define the concept of intervention vis A vis the rest of the Charter
was brought to the attention of the United Nations forcefully by Venezuela in
the debate cm the subject at the 15th session; See U.A. (XEIl), 3p.Bol.Cora.
88th mtg., pp. 21-25.
2. Gr.A.,(XI), 3p.Bol.Com., 14th mtg., paras. 55-55; ibid, 12th session, 53rd
mtg., paras. 57-45; ibid, 13th session, 90th mtg., paras. 27-50.
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the Special Political Committee that its objective was to secure an improve¬
ment in the situation in South Africa but reminded it that such an improvement
could only be achieved as a result of a change of opinion in South afrioa*
The General Assembly could not impose such a change which depended upon
factors beyond its control. In seeking to ameliorate the situation the
Assembly should take note, the New Zealand delegate said, of the balance which
existed in the Charter between the various provisions. The Charter, he re¬
minded the Members, established a relationship between the rights of States
and the rights of human beings. On the one hand, the United Nations could
not disregard the provisions of the Charter protecting the rights of States
to conduct their own affairs without interference} and on the other, it
should seek to give practical expression to those provisions of the Charter
which were directed towards equality of rights for all.
Hie New Zealand delegate believed that it would be a mistake to brush
aside the immense difficulties which faced South Africa and that the
advocacy of extreme measures might only increase the estrangement of that
country from the United Nations. Squally, however, the United Nations
could not disregard the anxiety which the South Aftrioan policy of apartheid
had aroused in the world. In New Zealand*s opinion, a resolution which
reminded all Members of their obligations under the Charter would be best
suited to the exigencies of the situation."*"
At the thirteenth session, however, New Zealand went further than was her
usual wont. Her delegate indicated that he was prepared to consider 'sympathetically*
a more specific resolution which recorded the Assembly's concern in regard to
the question before it, provided that was, such a resolution was moderate and
1. See the references fn. 2. p.163,in partic. C.A. , (XIIl), 3p.Fol.Gom., 90th
mtg., paras. 87-60.
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constructive, and left the way open for a positive response from South Africa.*
(li) Canada.
Canada too continued to differentiate between recommendations which she
felt to be within the competence of the General Assembly and those which she
did not. Far example, at the eleventh session, she was of the opinion that
2
the draft five-power resolution might involve constitutional problems but
s
reserved her judgement on the Hiilippine draft. At the thirteenth session,
she indicated that she was willing to accept a resolution calling upon all
4
Member States to bring their policies into line with their obligations,
(iii) Mexico
The care with which delegates avoided the charge of intervention is further
demonstrated by the statements of Mexico at the eleventh session. At this
session Mexico had voted for the inclusion of the item on the agenda. In
general she did not consider that the matter was essentially within the
domestic jurisdiction of the Union. And yet 3tll.l she was careful to avoid
supporting a clause of the resolution adopted by this session which seemed to
call upon the Union Government to revise its done atic legislation. Mexico
doubted if tlie General Assembly were competent to make recommendations of that
kind.*'
1, G.A. ,(XEIl), Sp.Bol.Com., 90th mtg., para. 50.
2. See infra, p. 168.
5. See infra, p. I69.
4. G.A. ,(XIIl), 3p.Ebl.Com., 92nd mtg., paras. 24-27.
5. G.A. ,(Xl), 3p.Ibl.Com., 16th mtg., para. 27; ibid, Hen. Vol.II 643th
mtg., para. 56; and see clause 5 of Kes. 1016(H), infra, p.169.
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(!▼) Colombia.
Also at this eleventh session, the Colombian delegate feated that one clause
of the resolution in particular might be construed as intervention. However
this did not stop hiia supporting the rest of it.*
(v) Argentina.
'fhe cosaprooiae approach to the definition of intervention - considering
30xae reooiKisnd&tiofis as intervention hut not others - found an open supporter
at the twelfth session in the delegate of Argentina. Bear delegate said that
in his Government** opinion, the way in which the Uouih African Government
handled the problem of segregation of its population was a matter which did
not come within the purview of the United liatlons since it was a domestic affair.
However, he did not therefore oppose all discussion of the matter and recommenda¬
tions thereon. He reminded the Members that the action taken by any country
with respect to matters within its domestic Jurisdiction should always be in
keeping with the fundamental principles which inspired and constituted the
raiaon d'etre of the United nations. It was, he said, the duty of Members to
adopt such measures as were within their power as would implement the great
purposes and principles of the Charter. Be added that in this spirit and
subject always to the principle of not interfering in the domestic affairs of
the Union, his delegation would examine favourably any studies or recommenda¬
tions by the General Assembly with a view to assisting in the realization of
universal respect for and observance of human rights and. fundamental freedoms.
In the course of Mb speech the Argentinian delegate referred to the two
schools of interpretation of intervention, but refrained from definitely
1. G.iU,(Xl), HLen., 648th atfcg., para. 33; see clause 3 of Res. 1036(H), infra, p.
169.
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couiaitting himself to either one. However, the whole tenor of his speech
suggests that even if a natter is domestic some recommendations are still
within the competence of the General Assembly, hut not all.'''
(vi) Sweden.
Sweden adhered to the analysis of the legal aspects which she had given
in earlier sessions. She continued to support discussions of and general
recommendations on the xaatter hut objected to the direction of specific re*
quests to South Africa to take certain measures with respect to her domestic
affairs.®*
(rii) The Netherlands.
The Netherlands continued to doubt the competence of the United
Nations to deal with the matter. But as elsewhere these doubts did not
prevent her from approving of a discussion of the item nor supporting a
recommendation addressed to all States, as a result thereof, which called
on them all to take heed of tl» relevant Articles of the Charter and the
Universal Declaration of Human Rights. However, she continued to object to
5
a recommendation that was specifically addressed to South Africa.
1. G-.A. ,(XXI), 3p.Bol.Cora., 54th ratg., paras. 59-43} ibid, 15th session,
86th mtg., paras. 16-25.
2. G.A.,(XIl), Sp.Bol.Com., 55th mtg., para. 2} 15th session, 95rd mtg.,
paras. 5-8.
5. G.A., (XIII), 3p.Dol.Com., 92nd atg., paras. 15-13} note also the
statements of Peru: G.A.,(XIl), Sp.Dol.Cosa., 55th mtg., paras.
16-20} ibid, 57th mtg., para. 54} of Denmark, G.A. ,(XEII),
Sp.Pol.Com., 95id iirtg. , para. 17, and the Philippines, G-,-"-. ,
(XT), ELen. Vol.11, 648th ratg., paras. 54-47.
(b) Resolutions -proposed and adopted at the above Sessions.
(i) The Eleventh Session.




Recalling its previous resolutions on the question of
race conflict in South Africa resulting from the policies
of apartheid of the Government of the Union of South Africa,
Recalling in particular paragraph 6 of the General Assembly-
resolution 917(X) of 6 December 1955 calling upon the Govern¬
ment of the Union of South Africa to observe its obligations
under the Charter of the United Nations,
Noting that resolution 616B(VII), of 5 December
1952 declared inter alia, that govermental policies
which are designed to perpetuate or increase discrimina¬
tion are inconsistent with the Charter,
Further noting that resolution 595(V) of 2 December
1950, 511(VI) of January 12, 1952 and 616A(VIl) of 5
December 1952 have successively affirmed that a policy
of^racial segregation* (apartheid) is necessarily based
Oil doctrines of racial discrimination,
Convinced that, in a multi-racial society, harmony and
respect for human rights and freedoms and the peaceful develop¬
ment of a unified community are best assured when patterns of
legislation and practices are directed towards ensuring a legal
order that will ensure equality before the law and the elimination
of discrimination betireen all persons regardless of race, creed
or oolour,
Convinced also that a conciliatory approach in accord¬
ance with the principles of the Charter is necessary for
progress towards a solution of this problem,
1* Deplores that the Government of the Union of South
Africa has not yet observed its obligations under the
Charter and has pressed forward with discriminatory mea¬
sures which vrould make the future observance of these
obligations more difficult;
2* Affirms its conviction that perseverance in such
discriminatory policies is inconsistent not only with the
Charter but with the forces of progress surd international
co-operation in implementing the ideals of equality,
freedom and justice j
1. See: S*A.,(Xl), Annexes, Vol. II, a.i.61, p. 5, Res. 1016(XT).
2. G.A,,(XI), Plen. Vol. II, 648th mtg., para. 61.
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3. Calls upon the Government of the Union of South
Africa to reconsider its position and revise its policies
in the light of its obligations and responsibilities under
the Charter and in the light of the principles subscribed
to and progress achieved in atlier contemporary multi-racial
societies;
4. Invites the Government of the Union of South Africa
to co-operate in a constructive approach to this question,
more particularly fey its presence in the United Nations;
5. Requests the Secretary-General, as appropriate, to
cormuunicate with the Government of the Union of South
Africa to carry forward the purposes of the present
resolution.
The Philippines also sponsored a resolution before the Special Political
Committee."*" It would have had the Seoretary-Goneral contact the South
African delegation to invite it to return to the Committee and conduct
exploratory talks with a view to solving the problem. However, it was with¬
drawn*
(id) The Twelfth Session*
2 S
The text of the resolution adopted at this session was as follows:
The General Assembly,
Recalling its previous resolutions, in particular
resolution 1016(II) of 30 January 1957, on the question
of race conflict in South Africa resulting from the policy
of apartheid of the Government of the Union of South Africa,
1. See G*a.,(XI), annexes, Vol.11, a.i.61, p. 5, Poc.A/SrC/L.5.
2. G.A*,(XEl), Plen., 723rd ratg., para. 104. The voting - 59»6»14. - was
as follows:
In favour: Uruguay, Venezuela, Yemen, Yugoslavia, Afghanistan, Albania,
Bolivia, ;.razil, urgaria, Burma, Byelorussian 3.S.R., Cambodia, Ceylon,
Chile, China, Colombia, Costa Rica, Cuba, Chechoslovakia, Denmark,
Ecuador, Egypt, £1 Salvador, Ethiopia, Ghana, Greece, Guatemala, Haiti,
Hungary, Iceland, India, Indonesia, Iran, Iraq, Ireland, Israel, Japan,
Jordan, Laos, Liberia, lybia, Malaya, Mexico, Nepal, Norway, Bakistan,
Panama, ihraguay, Philippines, Poland, Romania, Saudi-Vvrabia, Sudan,
Sweden, ^yria, Thailand, Tunisia, Ukrainian S.3.R., U.3.S.R.
Against:Australia, Belgium, France, Luxembourg, Bartugal, U.l.
Abstaining: Argentina, Austria, Canada, Dominican Republic, Finland,
Honduras, Italy, Netherlands, New Zealand, Nicaragua, Bsru, Spain, Turkey,
U ,S .A.
3. G.A. ,(XEI), Annexes a.i.60, p. 3, Res. 1178(111).
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Recalling in particular paragraph 6 of General Assembly
resolution 917(X) of 6 December 1955, calling upon the
Government of the Union of South Africa to observe its
obligations under the Charter of the United Rations,
Noting that the General Assembly in resolution 616B(VIl)
of 5 December 1952, decided, inter alia, that governmental
policies which are designed to perpetuate or increase
discrimination are inconsistent with the Charter,
Further noting that resolutions 395(V) of 2 December
1950 , 511(VI) of 12 January 1952 and 616A(VIl) of 5
December 1952 have successively affirmed that a policy
of 'racial segregation* (apartheid) is necessarily based
on doctrines of racial discrimination,
1, Deplores that the Government of the Union of South
Africa has not yet responded to the call and invitation
conveyed in paragraphs 5 and 4 of General Assembly resolu¬
tion 1016 (XI) of 50 January 1957;
2. Again draws the attention of the Government of the
Union of South Africa to that resolution and, in particular,
to paragraphs 5 and 4 thereof)
3* Appeals to the Government of the Union of South
Africa, in the interest of the common observance by
Members of the United Rations of the high purposes
and principles enshrined in the Charter, to which the
Government of the Union of South Africa has subscribed
and is as much committed as any other Member, to revise
its policy in the light of those purposes and principles
and of world opinion and to inform the Secretary-General
of its response.
(iii) The Thirteenth Session.
1
At this session the following resolution was adopted:
The General Assembly,
Recalling its previous consideration of the question
1. G>4»,(XIII), Hen., 778th mtg., para. 48. The voting - 70;5;4. - was as
follows:
In favour: Cuba, Czechoslovakia, Denmark, Ecuador, El Salvador, Ethiopia,
Fed. of Malaya, Finland,, Ghana, Greece, Guatemala, Haiti, Honduras, Hungary,
Iceland, India, Indonesia, Iran, Iraq, Ireland, Israel, Italy, Japan,
Jordan, Laos, Lebanon, Liberia, Lybia, Mexico, Morocco, Nepal, New Zealand,
Nicaragua, Norway, Pakistan, Panama, Paraguay, Dsru, Philippines, Poland,
Romania, Saudi-Arabia, Sudan, Sweden, Thailand, Tunisia, Turkey, Ukrainian
S.8.R., U.S.3.R., U.A.R., U.3.A., Uruguay, Venezuela, Yemen, "Jugoslavia,
Afghanistan, Albania, Argentina, Austria, Brazil, Bulgaria, Byelorussian
S.S.R., Cambodia, Canada, Ceylon, Chile, China, Colombia, Costa Rica.
Against: France, Portugal, U.K., Australia. Belgium.
Abstaining: Dominican Republic, Luxembourg, Netherlands, Spain.
For the text see, G.A.,(XEH), Annexes, a.i.67, p.4; Res.
1248(XHI).
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of race conflict in South Africa resulting from the policies
of apartheid of the Government of the Union of South Africa,
Recalling in particular paragraph 6 of its resolution
917(X) of 6 December 1955 calling upon the Government of
South Africa to observe its obligations under the Charter
of the United Nations,
1 Declares again that, in a multi-racial society,
harmony and respect for human rights and freedoms and
the peaceful development of a unified coirsaunity are best
assured when patterns of legislation and practice are
directed towards ensuring equality before the law of all
persons regardless of race, creed or colour, and when
economic, social,cultural and political participation of
all racial groups is on a basis of equality;
2. Affirms that governmental policies of Member States
which are not directed towards these goals, tout which are
designed to perpetuate or increase discrimination, are in¬
consistent with Hie pledges of the Members under Article
56 of the Charter of the United Nations;
5. Solemnly calls upon all Member States to baring
their policies into conformity with their obligations
under the Charter to promote the observance of human
rights and fundamental freedoms;
4. Expresses its regret and concern that the
Government of the Union of South Africa has not yet
responded to appeals of the General Assembly that it
reconsider governmental policies which impair the
right of all racial groups to enjoy the saiae rights and
fundamental freedoms.
4. The Boat-Repertory Period - The I'tourteenth to Seventeenth Sessions.
In this period objections to the policy of apartheid reached a
crescendo and even the United Kingdom came round to the view that the matter
was no longer essentially within the domestic jurisdiction of South Africa.^"
There was therefore little in these debates that is of itaportance for the
present purposes. However, certain States did exhibit the satae desire to
get round the problem of Article 2(7) by adopting in practice a compromise
definition of intervention.
At the fourteenth session New Zealand continue! upon the middle course she
1. G.A. ,(XV), Sp.Pol.Com., Rart.II, 242nd mtg., para. 13,
had pursued in the most recent debates on this subject and declared that
while she would support an appeal to South Africa to review her racial policies
she could not go further. At tine same session Belgium, the Netherlands,
franco, Finland and Italy all declared their support for general condemna¬
tions of racial discrimination but declined to support recommendations which
2
dealt specifically with South nfrica* In the case of Belgium and France
this represented a significant departure from previous sessions where they
had adhered to the view that as the matter was domestic no United Nations
action was posssble.
At the fifteenth session, however, French opinion on the question of
intervention seems to have undergone a transformation, and from this session
5
onwards she supported mild appeals to the South African Government. However,
in doing so the French delegation stressed the need to observe the provisions
to article 2(7)^ In effect therefore, France appears to have come round to
the view that where a matter is domestic or where the status of a matter is
somewhat equivocal, appeals can be made to specific governments and need not
be restricted to the generality of States.
5
A similar stand was taken by Canada.
1. G.A. ,(XIV)» 8p.Fol.Com,, 142nd mtg., paras. 1-5.
2. ibid, 142nd intg., paras. 25-24; ibid, 143rd mtg., paras. 26-30; ibid,
146th mtg., para, 10; ibid, 147th mtg., paras. 10-11; and ibid, paras.
19»20 resp.
5, See G.A»,(XV), 3p.Ipl.Com., Bart II, 244th mtg., paras. 16-18; ibid,
16th session, 3p.Bol.Com., 277th ratg., para. 8; See further, S.A.,
(XVII), Sp.Bol.Conn, 337th ratg., para. 24.
4. 3.A., (XV), 3p.Rol.Cota. , 244th ratg., para. 16.
5. Gr.A. ,(XV), Sp.Pol.Cora., Bart II, 243rd mtg., para. 2*
3ven Australia ultimately abandoned her strict position on domestic
jurisdiction and intervention# At the fourteenth session, the Australian
delegate indicated that as lie considered the matter to be within the domsstio
jurisdiction of South Africa he would oppose the draft resolution before the
Committee. However, from the fifteenth session Australia altered her position
somewhat# At the fifteenth session alio noted that the weight of world opi-
nion was against apartheid# However she also stressed that there were
limitations on the powers of the United Nations on such matters end indicated
that she would consider any proposals put before the Committee with these
limitations in mind#'*' Ultimately, despite these limitations, Australia
was able to support a resolution which was in effect an appeal to South
Africa to reconsider her position, but declined to support one which would
2
have authorised sanctions against her#
5# Conclusions#
As in the other eases so far examined, the practice in this ease is
varied and often difficult to assess from a legal point of view# However,
it does appear that a considerable number of otates were prepared in practice
to accept a certain amount of United Nations action wish respect to a matter
the exact status of which was in doubt# However much they might espouse
%
doctrinaire definitions of intervention, a3 a matter of principle, in
practice they appear to do something else#
1# 3#A#,(2Sf), Np.Fol.Cora., Part II, 241st mtg,, paras. 25-26.
2, ibid, 244th atg., paras. 3-5; ana ibid, lien., Bart II, 981st mtg.,
paras. 115-116.
Chapter V
The Question of Cyprus.
The substantive debates on the Cyprus question are not particularly
instructive for present purposes. In the agenda debates1 the United Kingdom
did contend that the United Nations was not competent to even discuss the
domestic aspects of the matter, but in the later stages of the case history
it becomes evident that she ceased to press her views on competence. While
the United Kingdom took care to refute Creek charges and claims, she was only
too eager to try to find a way out of the Cyprus impasse which would in some
way be satisfactory to all the interests involved. The United Kingdom
Government came to accept that, in the main, the problem of Cyprus was inter¬
national# Therefore, the question of competence ceased to be important.
Such practice as there is concerning the question of competence is,
however, in line with the general trend already established.
2
1. The Eleventh Session.
At this session, it will be remembered, the General Assembly had before it
a dual item on this question. On the one hand, Greece asked that Cyprus be
given self-determination. On the other the United Kingdom complained about
Greek support for terrorist activities in Cyprus. Both these Governments
presented draft resolutions to deal with their parts of the item. Neither,
2
however, was pressed to a vote, and in the end of the day a compromise
1. See Vol. I, Chap. IV, p. 91.
2. The ninth and tenth sessions are not instructive for present purposes. The
item was not included on the agenda for the tenth session. At the ninth
session, few state;.ients were made which give any light on the attitude of
States towards the question of intervention.
5. G.A.,(XI), 1st Com., 856th nrfcg., para. 32.
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resolution, sponsored by India,was adopted.
In the course of the debate, very few States dealt with the question of
competence and such statements as there were on the subject were all to the
effect that the United Nations was not competent to deal with the Greek re¬
quest that self-determination be granted to Cyprus. This was held, by the
United Kingdom,"** Turkey,** Australia.** New Zealand,"* Branca,^ Belgium,® and
7
Portugal , to be a matter within the domestic jurisdiction of the United Kingdom
and therefore unfit far discussion in the United Nations.
These rigid attitudes were soon given up, hovnver, by most of the
States concerned. Australia, for example, later added that the General
Assembly, pursuant to Article 35(1), should attempt to facilitate concilia¬
tion by expressing its hope and convictions that a solution in the spirit of
8
Articles 1 and 2 would be found.
The element of compromise was also seen in the statement of the Italian
delegation. The Italian delegate said that he wished to associate himself
with those delegations which did not believe that it was useful for the United
Nations to be called upon to intervene in questions which, like that of Cyprus,
1. G.A,,(XI), 1st Cam., 347th mtg., paras. 55-76.
2. ibid, 848th mtg., paras. 14-66, partic, para. 16.
3. ibid, 849th mtg., paras. 22-35.
4. ibid, 851st ratg., paras. 20-31, partic, para. 24.
5. ibid, 852nd mtg., paras. 30-31.
6. 853rd mtg., paras. 4-10.
7. ibid, paras. 53-54.
8. ibid, 855rd mtg., para. 52.
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concerned the territory of a Member State and in addition some particular
ethnic group. .Article 2, paragraph 7, he said, ruled out intervention by
the United Nations in matters which were essentially domestic. Nevertheless,
while he held these views, he was of the opinion tliat the Indian draft resolu¬
tion represented a useful contribution to the solution of the problem.^"
Tlie draft resolution which was sponsored by India and ultimately adopted
2
by the Committee was as follows.
The General Assembly,
having considered the question of Cyprus,
Believing that the solution of this problem requires
an atmosphere of peace and freedom of expression,
Expresses the earnest desire that a peaceful, democratic
and just solution will be found in accordance with the
purposes and principles of the Charter of the United Nations,
and the hope that negotiations will be resumed and continued
to this end.
5
This draft resolution was adopted by the 1st Committee by 76 votes to
0, with 2 abstentions and it is noteworthy that the United Kingdom, Turkey
and Portugal all voted for it. The United Kingdom and Turkey voted for
4
it because they felt it was conducive to a solution of the problem. Portugal
felt that this resolution was not inconsistent with the principles she had
g
stated earlier.
The resolution was adopted by the Plenary session by 57 votes to 0, with
1. ibid, 856th mtg., paras. 5-8.
2. ibid, Annexes, Vol. II, a.i.55, p. 18, Bes. 1015(Xl); submitted, 1st Com.,
855th mtg., para. 56, Doc. A/C.l/L.172.
5. 1st Com., 856th mtg., para. 52.
4. ibid, para. 56 and 40-41 reap.
5. ibid, para. 48. There was no roll-call vote so no details are available
of how the other Members voted.
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1 abstention, that abstention not being the United Kingdom,
The practice on the point is scanty, but none the less interesting. The
resolution proposed by India confined itself to expressing the universal wish
that a settlement be found. Nevertheless, no matter how mild the resolution,
its passage is of legal interest for the passage of a resolution can only
mean that far one reason or another, the General Assembly considers itself
competent to adopt it. In this case the majority of States did not regard
the matter as essentially domestic. But of those which did regard it as
principally a domestic matter, few of them declined to vote for this resolu¬
tion calling far the resumption of negotiations on the matter.
2. The Twelfth Session.
The significance of these votes in the eleventh session is brought into
relief by the outcome of the voting on a resolution sponsored by Greece at




jSaving examined the question of Cyprus,
Reaffirming its resolution 1015(XI; of 26 February 1957,
Expressing its concern that more progress has not been
made towards the solution of this problem,
Considering further that the situation in Cyprus is still
fraught with danger and that a solution at the earliest
possible time i3 required to preserve peace and stability
in that area,
1. ibid, HLen. Vol. H, 660th mtg., para. 4. No details of voting were given,
but the Repertory, Suppl. No. 2, Vol. I, p. 156, para. 50, states that the
United Kingdom supported the resolution.
2. G.A., (XIl), 1st Com., 954th mtg., para. 55. For the text see, ibid, Annexes,
a.i.58, p.9, Doc. a/5794, para. 12. For the original text proposed by Greece,
see ibid, para. 5; for amendments submitted jointly by Canada, Chile, Denmark,
and Norway see ibid, para, 6; for Spanish amendments, see ibid, para. 8} and
Greek amendments ibid, para. 7.
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Expresses Its earnest hope that further negotiations and
discussions will be undertaken in a spirit of C o-operation
with a view to having the right of self-determination
applied in the case of the people of Cyprus.
However, this resolution failed to receive a two-thirds majority in the
General Assembly and was therefore rejected.'*'
It is noticeable that delegations which in the previous session regarded
the question of self determination as within the domestic jurisdiction of
the United Kingdom but had nevertheless been prepared to vote in favour of
a mild recommendation on the general Cyprus question, in this session opposed
2
specific mention of the question of self determination in a resolution. It
is equally noticeable that a country like Portugal which also maintained that
the Cyprus question was within the domestic jurisdiction of the United Kingdom
g
and which voted against the draft resolution would still have been prepared to
vote in favour of a resolution similar to the one adopted at the previous session.
1. G-.A. ,(XIl), ELen., 731st mtg,, para. 138.
2. See the statements of Belgium, ibid, 1st Com., 930th mtg., paras. 31-52;
Branca, ibid, paras. 35-39; and Australia, ibid, 931st mtg., paras.
5. G.A.,(XIl), ELen., 731st mtg., para. 138.
4. ibid, 1st Com., 931st mtg., para. 62. In the plenary session the details
of voting were as follows j
In favour: Bolivia, Bulgaria, %elorussiar. 3.S.R., Costa Rica, Czecho¬
slovakia, Ecuador, Egypt, El Salvador, Ethiopia, Ghana, Greece, Guatemala,
Haiti, Hungary, Iceland, Indonesia, Ireland, Lebanon, Panama, Poland,
Romania, Saudi-Arabia, Sudan, Syria, Tunisia, Ukrainian S.S.R., U.3.3.R.,
Uruguay, Yemen, Yugoslavia, Albania.
Against8 Australia, Belgium, Canada, Chile, Colombia, Denmark, Dominican
Republic, France, Iran, Italy, Luxembourg, Motherland, Mew Zealand,
Nicaragua, Norway, Pakistan, Portugal, Spain, Sweden, Turkey, Union of
South Africa, U.K., Argentina.
Abstaining; Austria, Brazil, Burma, Cambodia, Ceylon, China, Finland,
Honduras, India, Iraq, Israel, Japan, Laos, Liberia, Malaya, Mexico,
Nepal, Paraguay, Peru, Philippines, Thailand, U.S.A., Venezuela,
Afghanistan.
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5. The Thirteenth Session.
At this session, the question of competence had almost completely ceased
to have any importance, it not being pressed by the United Kingdom.
During the debates in the First Committee numerous draft aresolutions
2
were presented. None however received & two-thirds majority and so were not
voted on in the General Assembly. The General Assembly confined itself to
expressing its confidence that the parties would continue to seek a solution
in accordance with the principles of the Charter. The resolution embodying
5
this hope was adopted without formal vote.
1. See the statements of Australia, G.A. ,(XIIl), 1st Com., 1000th mtg., paras.
19-21, and South Africa, ibid, 1010th mtg., para. 44.
2. For a list of them see G.A,,(XIII), Annexes, a.i.68, p. 15, et seq.
Doc.A/4029 and Add. 1.
5. G.a,,(XIII), ELen. 782nd mtg., para. 64. This question was not considered
at the 14th session of the General Assembly and Cyprus was admitted
to the United Nations in the loth session.
Chapter VI
The Question of Algeria
The tendency to adopt a modified approach to the definition of interven¬
tion vis A vis the United Nations is very marked in this case. From these
debates it appears that practically nobody considers a call to a State to
negotiate on its differencies - internal or otherwise - as intervention in
its domestic affairs - a conclusion reminiscent of the earlier stages of the
Indians in South Africa case*
1* The Eleventh Session*
The attitude of States towards the question of intervention is well
demonstrated by their views on the three draft resolutions which were pre¬
sented to the First Committee.
(a) The Sighteen-Bawer Draft Resolution*
t 1
The text of this resolution was as follows}
The General Assembly,
Having regard to the situation of unrest and strife in Algeria
which is causing much human suffering and disturbing the harmony
between nations*
Recognising the right of the people of Algeria to self-
determination according to the principles of the Charter of the
United Nations,
1* Aequoata France to respond to the desire of the people of
Algeria to exercise their fundamental right of self-determination;
2. Invites France and the people of Algeria to enter into
immediate negotiations with a view to the cessation of hostilities
and the peaceful settlement of their differences in accordance with
the Charter of the United Nations;
5. Requests the Seoretary-General to assist the parties in con¬
ducting such negotiations and report to the General Assembly at its
twelfth session.
1* £*»A** (XI), Annexes, Vol. II, a.i*62, p. 2, Doc. A/C.l/li.165. The resolution
was sponsored by the following Members} Afghanistan, Burma, Ceylon, Egypt,
Indonesia, Iran, Iraq, Jordan, Lebanon, Lybia, Morocco, Nepal, Pakistan,
Saudi-arabia, Sudan, Syria, Tunisia, and Xemen.
(b) The Sia&-Bower Draft Hesolution.
The text of this resolution was as follows}
The General Assembly,
Having heard the statements of Prance and other delegations and
discussed the question of Algeria*
Expresses the hope that a peaceful and democratic solution of
this question will be found.
(c) The Three-Rwer Graft Besolution.
2
The text of this resolution was as follows:
The General Assembly,
Having regard to the situation of unrest in Algeria which is
causing much human suffering and loss of lives*,
Believing that the unsatisfactory situation now prevailing
in Algeria may be normalized by the joint efforts of France and
the Algerian people to find an equitable solution in conformity
with the principles of the Charter of the United Nations,
Expresses the hope that Prance and the Algerian people will
endeavour, through appropriate negotiations, to bring about the
end oi she bloodshed and the peaceful settlement of the present
difficulties*
(d) The Attitude of States » The First Committee*
With the exception of Prance, all States which were concerned to avoid
any hint of intervention in the domestic affairs of Prance, were prepared to
vote in favour of at least one of these resolutions*
(i) Prance.
The French representative, M. Pineau, said that Prance had never admitted
and never would admit any competence on the part of the United Nations in a
problem which she regarded as within her domestic affairs. Nevertheless she
had not objected, he said, to the inclusion of the item on the agenda partly
because the General Assembly could, in many cases, discuss a matter without
1. S.A., (XI), Annexes, Vol. II, a.1.62, p. 5, Doc.A/3.l/L.167. It was
sponsored by: Argentina, Brazil, Cuba, Dominican Republic, Italy, and
Peru.
2. G.A., (XI), Annexes, Vol. II, a.1.62, p. 5, Doc. A/C.l/L.166. It was
sponsored by Japan, Philippine s and Thailand.
thereby acquiring the right to adopt recor&aendations thereon. stance had
not objected to the inclusion, of this item also in order that she might have
an opportunity of putting her side of the case and to drew attention to the
amount of foreign interference which was taking place in Algeria. This
attitude of not opposing the inclusion of the item on the agenda was quite
consistent, M. Fineau said, with France*s challenge, under Article 2(7), of
the competence of the General Assembly. In making this claim he recalled an
earlier statement by the representative of Thailand that the General Assembly
should study the question of Algeria without making any recommendations that
might constitute intervention in the domestic affairs of France.
In keeping with this position, M. Pineau added that France could not
accept any recommendation concerning the Algerian problem.^"
(ii) The United Kingdom
In this case, the United Kingdom adopted a curious attitude to the
question of competence. She maintained, on the one hand, that the United
Nations was not even competent to discuss the matter. Thus she opposed the
eighteen-power arid three-power draft resolutions as intervention in the domestic
2
affairs of France* On the other, she was able to support the six-power draft
j
resolution. The United Kingdom representative explained that he was able to
do this as this resolution expressed sentiments which were strongly shared by
his Government. Moreover, he claimed, the resolution involved no recommendation
by the General Assembly. lie then added, for good measure, that his vote in
favour of this resolution did not prejudice his opinion that the General Assembly
1. G.A., (XI), 1st Com., 830th mtg., paras. 1-11.
2. ibid, 834th mtg., paras. 1-4; ibid, 346th mtg., paras. 63-64.
3. ibid.
185.
ma not, in any case, competent to even discuss the matter.
(iii) She United States.
She American representative said that he welcomed the French decision not
to oppose discussion of the matter in the General Assembly, lie added however,
that lie would oppose any resolution which amounted to intervention in France *s
domestic affairs.* After the three draft resolutions had been presented to
the Committee he indicated that for that reason he would oppose the eighteen
and three-power drafts, but not the six-power one.
(iv) Cuba.
In the opinion of the Cuban delegation the matter was within France's
domestic jurisdiction. however, she did not on that account believe that the
United Cations was totally incompetent.
Cuba, her representative said, believed that any United Nations interven¬
tion would establish a dangerous precedent. Article 2(7) was, in her opinion,
emphatic. Therefore, the United Nations was precluded from suggesting to France
a line of conduct similar to that proposed by the Syrian delegate who had given a
rough outline of a suitable Algerian constitution*
Cuba had not opposed the inclusion of the item on tlie agenda despite the
fact that it did not feel that the Assembly was competent to deal with the
substance of the question. It had done so as it felt that a debate would be
valuable and would assist France to find a solution to the problem.
The Cuban delegate added that from a procedural point of view it would be
better not to adopt any resolution at all. but if the Committee wanted to
follow established practice, he said, it could adopt a text. The Cuban
delegation felt that such a text should express the hope of all delegations
1. ibid. 855th mtg., para. 52-57; ibid, 844th mtg., paras. 41-42.
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that the Algerian question might be settled by peaceful and democratic means.1
Later in the debate, Cuba indicated that she opposed both the eighteen and
the three-povrer drafts as both violated Article 2(7). The eighteen-power draft
attempted, the Cuban delegate said, to set at naught the provisions of Article
2(7). The three-power draft, while it did not so manifestly flout the Charter,
nevertheless prejudiced the Assembly's competence.
The Cuban delegate said, however, that he was anxious to make a con¬
structive contribution to the debate and to that end had been one of the
sponsors of the six-power draft. By adopting that text, he said, the General




The representative of Chile recalled that the United nations was forbidden
to intervene in domestic affairs. lie added that the principle of self-
determination ought to be subject to the principle of non-intervention.
Chile objected to the terras of the eighteen-power draft resolution be¬
cause , in her opinion, it took no account of the principle of sovereignty. ®
4
She also voted against the three-power draft resolution. However, her views
on the competence of the General Assembly did not prevent her from voting in
5
favour of the six-power draft resolution.
(vi) New Zealand.
New Zealand, Sir Leslie Monro said, still had doubts on tire competence
1. ibid. 836th mtg., paras. 29-58.
2. ibid. 844th mtg., para. 25; See also ibid. 846th mtg., paras. 75-75.
5. ibid. 841st mtg., paras. 10-16.
4. 846th mtg., para. 62.
5. ibid. para. 52*
of the General Assembly to deal with the nutter, tout welcomed Stance'3 action
in explaining her position to the Committee. He said that his country opposed
the eighteen-power draft resolution as it was an example of intervention in
the domestic affairs of Stance. It sought to interpose the authority of the
United Nations between Stance and the Inhabitants of a French territory.*"
While however, New Zealand objected to this resolution and also voted against
2 5
the three-power draft , she voted in favour of the six-power resolution.
(vii) Israel.
Israel maintained that the matter was within the domestic jurisdiction of
France. However, she also recognized that there were present various com¬
peting interests. To reconcile these she said that it might be well to follow
4
the middle position she herself had suggested at an earlier session of making
a distinction between the discussion of a question and the adoption of re-
consaendations or measures which would constitute an intervention inconsistent
5
with the principle of national sovereignty.
In the execution of her middle course Israel voted against the second
paragraph of the preamble and operative paragraph one of the eighteen-power
6 7
draft and against the three-power resolution. However, she voted in favour
8of the six-power draft resolution.
1. ibid. 841st mtg., paras. 25-30.
2. ibid. 346th mtg., para. 62.
5. ibid. para. 52.
4• (J.A. (VIII), Hen., 44Sth ratg., para. 20.
5. Gt.A. (XI), 1st Com., 841st mtg., paras. 43-54.
6. ibid, 846th mtg., paras. 15-14,
7. ibid. para. 62.
8. ibid. pora. 52.
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(viii) Sweden*
Sweden noted that Algeria was pert of metropolitan Stance and that the
problem was therefore domestic. However that fact did not deprive, in her
opinion, the General Assembly of the power to discuss it. The General Assembly,
the Swedish representative said, had power to discuss and made recommendations
on human rights and fundamental freedoms.
Sweden indicated that she objected to the eighteen-power draft - but more
on political grounds than on legal. She abstained on the three-power draft
2
but voted in favour of the six-power one.
(ix) Colombia
The Colombian delegate stressed the importance of Article 2(7) in the
structure of the United Nations. This Article was, he said, a fundamental
point in the present debate. lie recalled that the Latin-American States
generally had been very interested in that provision at the United Nations
Conference on International Organisation at San Francisco in 1945. lie
maintained that if the principle of non-intervention had not been included in
the Charter many Latin American countries, not to mention others, would not have
been represented la the United Nations. The inclusion of that principle had
been, he said, essential for its signature and ratification and must be re¬
spected. Hie maintained that in virtue of this principle domestic matters could
not be discussed in the General Assembly. Article 2(7) was, in his opinion,
the cardinal principle and took precedence over the others in the Charter, in
J
particular the aright of self-determination.
1. ibid. 842nd mtg., paras. 51-57,
2. ibid, 846th mtg., paras. 62 and 52 reap.
5. ibid, 845rd mtg., paras. 1-15.
187.
However, while she held sueh strong views on the effect of .Article 2(7),
she was still able to vote in favour of the six-power draft.^
(x) Australia
The position adopted by Australia was similar to that of Colombia, She
too stressed the overriding effect of Article 2(7). Sir Percy Spender added
that the Charter was an international contract the import of which could only
2
be altered by international agreements.
In keeping with these opinions Australia objected to both the eighteen
and the three-power draft resolutions. Of the three-power draft, Sir Percy
said thatalthough its sponsors had been guided by very proper motives, their
draft assumed the competence of the United Nations and the existence of an
entity separate from France, namely the Algerian people. These implications
were, he maintained, inconsistent with the constitutional position of Algeria.
fiw. -Nvv~ ' • •
However, he claimed that the six-power draft was not inconsistent with the
5
attitude adopted by Australia, and that he would support it. *
(ad) The Netherlands
The Dutoh representative opposed both the eighteen and the three-power
drafts because of the unacceptable interpretation of the competence of the
United Nations to #iich they were conducive. However, like other States in
this position, she did not object to the six-power draft. It was not open, he
said, to the same objections on the grounds of competence since it did no more
than express the hope that the French Government would be successful in carrying
1. ibid, 846th mtg., para. 52.




(adi) The Dominican Reoublio.
The Dominican representative said that his delegation considered that the
United Nations should not treat the Algerian question as one on which it was
competent to suggest a solution because in the oase of Algeria such an action
would not be in keeping with the mission of the United Nations in the matter
of peaceful solutions. There were, he continued, two opinions on the ques¬
tion of competence s that of relative competence or the right of limited
intervention, and that of complete incompetence. In his opinion, a
solution should be sought on the basis of programmes of gradual and pro¬
gressive action.
For these reasons, the Dominican representative said that he would support
2
the six-power draft as the only prudent one.
(xtii) Argentina.
The Argentinian delegate said that he would vote for the six-power draft
resolution of whioh his delegation was a co-sponsor. Ho added that in his
opinion, the Algerian question waa within the domestic jurisdiction of Krance
and that the United Nations could not *deal with* such matters without pre¬
judicing the specific provisions of the Charter and establishing a precedent
dangerous to the peace of independent Member States. The Brench Government,
he said, had declared its intention of seeking, without delay, a peaceful and
democratic settlement by means of free and supervised elections. All knew that
there had never been ary reason to doubt Sranee *s word. His delegation believed
1. ibid, paras. 96-29.
2. ibid, 845th mtg., paras. 17-18.
that the aspirations of the Algerian people would he taken into account and that
its wishes would he met.^
(xiv) Thailand
The Thai representative did not make it clear whether or not, in his
opinion, the matter was domestic. However, it seems to he suggested that even
if it were domestic, it would still he within the power of the General Assembly
to adopt some kind of recommendation thereon* Speaking of the three-power
draft of vVtich Thailand was a co-sponsor, the Thai representative made reference
to the objections of the Australian delegation* The first objection to the
three-power draft was, he recalled, that it assumed the competence of the First
Committee and of the General Assembly to discuss the Algerian question* This
he denied* lis claimed that it in no way assumed such competence. He then
added that in any case France had not opposed such discussion.
Speaking of the substance of trie three-power draft, he said tliat he could
not conceive of their being any objection to the specific mention of the princi¬
ples of the Charter in the draft, since all Members of tlie Committee were
signatories of the Charter and respected its provisions. In conclusion he
added that if the draft of which he was a co-sponsor in any way constituted an
interference or an intervention in the domestio affairs of France, it would be
the duty of every member to oppose it. However he was convinced that it did
2
not violate the provisions of Article 2(7).
(xv) and (xvi) Belgium and Spain
These two States both indicated that they would oppose the eighteen and
the three-power drafts because of doubts about the competence of the General
Assembly to adopt them. Both however announced their support for the six-power
1* ibid, para. 37.




In explaining his votes on the three drafts submitted to the First Committee
the Portuguese delegate said that he had refrained from participating in the
debate since he load fbund it impossible to disregard a fundamental principle
of the Charter in which his country strongly believed and which it desired to
obey. As a consequence he said that he had been unable to support either the
eighteen or the three-power drafts. However, he had been able to support the
six-power draft - a draft which confined itself to taking note of the discussion
which had taken place in the Committee and which had not been, he claimed, opposed
by the French delegation - an incorrect statement since France had stated that she
would oppose any resolution on the subject and in fact took no part in the voting
at all.2
(e) Voting on these draft resolutions.
The eighteen-power draft resolution was not accepted by the Committee.
4
The six-power draft was accepted by 41 votes to 55, with 5 abstentions. The
1. ibid, paras. 6 and 7-8 resp.
2. ibid, paras. 65-66,
5. ibid, paras. 10-18.
4. ibid, para. 52, The details were as followss
In favour! Colombia, Costa Rica, Cuba, Denmark, Dominican Republic,
Ecuador, El Salvador, Finland, Guatemala, Haiti, Honduras, Iceland, Israel,
Ireland, Italy, Laos, Liberia, Luxembourg, Mexico, Netherlands, New Zealand,
Nicaragua, Norway, Bmama, Paraguay, Beru, Bortugal, Spain, Sweden, UdC.,
U.3.A., Uruguay, Venezuela, Argentina, Australia, Belgium, Brazil# Canada
Chile, China.
Against: Czechoslovakia, Egypt, Ethiopia, Greece, India, Indonesia, Iran,
Iraq, Japan, Jordan, Lebanon, Lybia, Morocco, Nepal, Pakistan, Philippines,
Poland, Romania, Saudi-Arabia, Sudan, Syria, Thailand, Tunisia, Ukrainian
S.S.R., U.S.S.R., Yemen, Yugoslavia, Afghanistan, Albania, Bulgaria, Burma,
Byelorussian S.S.R., Ceylon.
Abstentions: Turkey, Bolivia, Cambodia.
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three-power draft was adopted by 37 votes to 27 with 15 abstentions.^
(f) The Plenary Session.
Heither of the two drafts adopted at the meeting of the First Committee
received a two thirds majority and so were not considered try the General Assembly.
1
At its plenary session, nine delegations - those of Argentina, Brazil, Cuba,
Dominican Republic, Italy, Japan, Psru, Philippines and Thailand - combined to
2
sponsor the following resolution which was adopted unanimously:
The General Assembly,
having heard the statements made by the various delegations
and discussed the question of Algeria,
Having regard to the situation in Algeria which is causing
much suffering and loss of human lives,
Sxsreaaea the hone that, in a spirit of cooperation, a
peaceful, democratic and Just solution will be found, through
appropriate means, in conformity with the principles of the
Charter of the United Nations.
Explaining why his delegation had voted in favour of this resolution the
Portuguese delegate said that this resolution did not prejudice his position
on the question of competence since it merely represented an expression of the
hope and wish that existed in the hearts of all peace-loving governments and
1. ibid, para 62. The details of voting were as follows:
In favour: Bulgaria, Burma, Byelorussian S.8.R., Cambodia, Ceylon,
Czechoslovakia, Egypt, Ethiopia, Greece, India, Indonesia, Iran, Iraq,
Japan, Jordan, Lebanon, Liberia, Iybia, Morocco, Nepal, Pakistan,
Philippines, Ibland, Romania, Saudi-Arabia, Sudan, Syria, Thailand,
Tunisia, Turkey, Ukrainian 3.S.R., U.S.3JR., Yemen, Yugoslavia,
Afghanistan, Albania, Bolivia,
Against: Canada, Chile, Colombia, Costa Rica, Cuba, Dominican
Republic, Ecuador, Haiti, Honduras, Israel, Italy, Laos, Luxembourg,
Netherlands, New Zealand, Nicaragua, Pbnama, Paraguay, Portugal, U.K.,
U.3.A., Uruguay, Venezuela, Argentina, Australia, Belgium, Brazil.
Abstaining: China, Denmark, El Salvador, Finland, Guatemala, Iceland,
Ireland, Mexico, Norway, Dsru, Spain, Sweden, Austria.
2. G.A., (XI), Hen., Vol. II, 654th ratg., para. 2; Res. 1012 (XT).
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1 2
peoples. The Colombian delegate expressed similar views. Explaining the
5
views of the United Kingdom, the British delegate said:
As the Assembly is aware, my delegation does not admit
the competence of the United Nations to discuss the question
of Algeria* Nevertheless, in the First Committee, while
reserving our position on competence, we voted in favour of
the six-power draft resolution, which contained no recccsaerela¬
tion on the matter, but simply expressed the hope far a peace¬
ful and democratic solution. Since the new compromise draft
resolution presented this morning contained some elements which
were not present in the six-power draft resolution, try delegation
felt unable to vote far it without very careful consideration.
However, after reflection, it seemed to us that we could do so.
The resolution, in fact derogates in no way from the sovereign
rights of Stance in respect of Algeria; it expressed the hope,
which my Government shares to the full, that the efforts of
France to achieve a settlement will be successful
4
The representative of Belgium made similar remarks.
(g) Conclusions:
The overwhelming conclusion to be drawn from this debate is that States
do not consider a resolution of the General Assembly which expresses the hope
that another Member of the United Nations will find a solution to its internal
troubles, as intervention in the domestic affairs of that State. Of the
States which were concerned to avoid any hint of intervention in the domestic
affairs of France in this case, 15 in the First Committee voted in favour of
the 3ix-power draft and only 1 against. In the plenary session a similar
resolution was adopted unanimously. However, it appears that a resolution
which goes even the slightest bit further will be viewed with some suspicion.
1. ibid, para. 81.
2. ibid, 655th ratg., paras. 2S-30.
5. ibid, paras. 24.
4. ibid, 654th mtg., para. 108.
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Tho grounds wiiich these States gave for holding that such a resolution
was permissible are themselves of interest. Some, e.g., Argentina, Australia,
Belgium, Colombia, Cuba, the Netherlands, Portugal and the United Kingdom voted
for Resolution 1012(H) because in their opinion it did not prejudice the
question of the competence of the United Nations to deal with the substance of
the matter. As it merely expressed the hope that a solution would be found
to the problem, they were not prepared to take exception to it. Of this group,
two - the United Kingdom and Belgium - were more explicit. They voted for this
resolution because, they said, it contained no recommendation*
It is not true that the adoption of a substantive resolution on a particu¬
lar subject by the General Assembly or any other organ of the United Nations
does not prejudice the competence of the United Nations to deal with the
matter. Such a contention is plainly erroneous. The United Nations is
either competent to deal with & certain item or it is not. It either has
certain powsrs or it lacks them. A legal personality cannot exercise powers
which it does not possess. It cannot operate in a legal vacuum. The
General Assembly can only adopt resolution on subjects with which it is
competent to deal. If it is not competent to deal with the substance of a
certain matter, then it can neither discuss it nor adopt any kind of resolution
thereon, no matter how mild. This is one of the consequences of the nature of
a legal personality* It does not possess the full plenum of State powers, but
only those wiiich have been conferred on it. If it has the power to do a certain
thing, then it is competent. If it lias not this power, it is incompetent.
There can be no tertium quid.
Doubtless, of course, What nations which made these assertions really
wanted to say was that the resolution in question did not amount to intervention
in the domestic affairs of France. But they did not say this and the reason
they did not Is perhaps not too hard to find. To admit formally that the
United Nations was competent to adopt this kind of resolution would entail an
admission that the United Nations has a certain degree of competence over
domestic affairs. It would entail adaitting that mere discussion of domestic
affairs was not intervention. It would admit that the General Assembly has a
certain power of recommendation in relation to domestic affairs. This these
States have been unwilling formally to do. However, it should he stressed that
in fact this is what they have done in practice. One cannot maintain that a legal
personality has no power to deal with the substance of a particular matter and
then support action thereon by that body. Action by the General Assembly is
either legal or ultra vires. There is nothing in between. It is a perfectly
correct line of argument to say that a certain kind of action is legal because
it does not amount to intervention in the domestic affairs of a State. The
General Assembly is only prohibited from intervening not from dealing with
altogether. But it is incorrect to maintain that a certain action is legal
because it does not raise the question of the competence of the General Assembly
to take it* Such an argument does not bear examination.
The additional assertion of the United Kingdom and Belgium that they voted
for Resolution 1012(Xl) because it involved no recommendation can only be termed
ridiculous. The General Assembly has two blanket powers. It can discuss and
it can make recommendations - no more and no less. It is not given power to
adopt something called a •resolution* which lias an effect less than a recommenda¬
tion. The word •resolution* in fact nowhere appears in the Charter. Whatever
it is called, what was adopted by the General Assembly at the eleventh session
in connection with the Algerian question was, technically, a recommendation and
had the legal attributes of a recommendation. It is true that this recommendation
gave no executive directions to any body that certain things should be done.
However, this is something quite different from aedntaining that Beaolutton
1012(H) was legal because it involved no recognition* The absence of the
word 'recommend* In that resolution is, for tida purpose, of no importance*
It can be argued that a recoareid&tion of this type, which does not give any
executive directions to anybody does not constitute intervention in the doneetie
affairs of a particular State* This is a valid and useful line of argument*
But it Is useless to say that a certain course of action is legal because it is
not a recommendation. The General Assembly can only recommend*1
2* Tim Twelfth deaaiou
exactly the same picture is presented by the debates in the twelfth session*
At this session, the General Assembly expressed the wish that talks be entered
into in order that a solution might be found. Again the general trend of the
debates was to accept some recommendations or parts thereof, but to object to
others as they were felt to go too fur and to verge on intervention*
(a) The LeveateeaABawer Uraft Resolution





Having discussed the Algerian question,
Recalling its resolution 1012(H) of 15 i?boruary 1957,
Betaeettla« that the hope expressed in that resolution has
not yet been realised,
Beco^aislng that the principle of self-determination is
applicable to the Algerian people,
Kotim that the situation in Algeria continues to cause
much suffering and loss of human life,
Calls for negotiations for the purpose of arriving at a
solution In accordance with the principles and purposes of
the Charter of the United nations.
1. Jee the statement of the Egyptian delegate, G.A., (xi)» Pleiu, 655th ratg.,
para. 40.
2. G.A*, (XII), Annexes, a.i.59, p.2, Doc.A/5'772, para. 4. It was sponsored by
Afghanistan, Burma, Ceylon, Egypt, Ghana, Indonesia, Iraq, Jordan, Lebanon,
lybia, Morocco, Aepal, daudi-Arabia, Judan, Gyria, Tunisia, feaen*
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(b) Amendments proposed thereto.
To the above draft resolution, the delegates of Ireland, Canada and Norway
i
Jointly proposed the following amendments l
1. The fburth preambular paragraph of the 17 power draft would
be replaced by the following}
"Recognizing that the people of Algeria are entitled
to work out their own future in a democratic way."
2. The operative paragraph would be replaced by the following i
"proposes effective discussion far the purpose both
of resolving the present troubled situation and of reaching
a solution in accordance with the purposes and principles of
the Charter of the United Nations."
(c) The Seven-Braer Draft Resolution.
The first Committee also had before it a draft resolution sponsored by
the delegations of Argentina, Brazil, Cuba, Dominican Republic, Italy, Peru,
2
and Spain. The text was as follows I
The General Assembly,
Having heard the statements made by the various delegations and
having discussed the question of Algeria,
Bearing in mind the situation in Algeria, which continues to cause
much suffering and loss of human lives,
1. Takes note of the attempts which have been reported to the
-assembly to settle the problem both through the good offices of
Heads of State and by French legislative measures;
2. Expresses the hope once again that, in a spirit of co¬
operation, a peaceful, democratic and Just solution will be found
through appropriate means, in conformity with the principles of
the Charter of the United Nations.
(d) The Attitude of States - The First Committee#
(i) Belgium
At the beginning of the debate the Belgian delegate indicated that where a
1. fbr text, see ibid, p.5, Doc.A/5772, para. 0.
2. &.A., (XII). Annesss, a.i. ,59, p.2, Doc.A/5772, para. 5.
matter was within the domestic jurisdiction of & particular State the United
H&tions was Incompetent to act*1 However, later on he indicated that he
would vote in favour of the three-power amendments to the seventeen-powsr
draft resolution* He particularly favoured the incorporation of a reference
to the purposes and principles of the United Nations into the resolution as this,
he said, implied that the provisions of Article 2(7) would he observed in all
circumstances.2
(ii) The United Kingdom.
The ITitish delegate said that his participation in the debate should not
s
be taken as prejudicing his country's views on domestic jurisdiction* However,
whatever he meant by that, when it came to the voting stage he voted in favour of
the three-power amendments to the aeventeen-power draft and for the seventeen
4
power draft as amended.
(lil)
The Italian delegate said that in his delegation's view Stance was era-
g
powered to consider the question as within her domestic jurisdiction* However,
he did not conclude as a result that the General Assembly was totally incompetent.
Bather he supported the compromise view of intervention, fen* Italy was one of
the co-sponsors of the seven-power draft and in addition voted in favour of the
three power amendments to the seventeen-power draft iresolution, and the seventeen
I* G*A*, (HI), 1st Com*, 914th mtg., paras. 35-41*
2* ibid, 926th mtg., para* 60*
3. ibid, 915th mtg*, para. 55.
4. ibid, 926th mtg,, paras. 71 and 72.
5. ibid, 916th mtg., paras. 16-17*
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1
power draft as amended.
(iv) Cuba.
Like Italy, Cuba maintained that the matter was domestic and that the
United Nations could not intervene* The United Nations, the Cuban delegate
maintained, could not issue directives to licence on how to settle the Algerian
2
problem. This however, did not prevent her from co-sponsoring the seven-
power draft resolution. This resolution, the Cuban delegate said, was sub¬
stantially the same as resolution 1012(XI), which had been adopted unanimously
at the eleventh session. lie maintained that the Assembly could not now do more
than reaffirm this resolution.
(v) Peru.
The Peruvian delegate said that the role of the United Nations was
necessarily limited. It was limited, in the first place, by the legal pro¬
hibitions of the Charter, which were, he asserted, not mere technicalities.
These prohibitions were rather standards of conduct, standards of law and
prudence* The United Nations, he reminded the Members, could not legally re¬
vise the constitutional structure of Prance* Prance, like all other States
which had signed the Charter, could not countenance any interference in its
internal structure and the Organization had neither the right nor the authority
to do so* Yet it had been claimed, he said, that the Algerian issue could only
be settled by such constitutional reform. That he admitted, might well have been
the case, but such reform would have to be the unilateral and individual act of
Prance. The United Nations could not, in a recaamendation, implicitly or
1. ibid, 926th mtg., para. 71 and 72.
2. ibid, 920th ratg., paras. 1-4.
3. ibid, 925th mtg., para. 5-7.
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eaplicitly advise or recognize changes in the constitutional structure of France.^"
These views however did not prevent Eteru from co-sponsoring the seven-power
draft, or ft*am voting in favour of the three-power amendments to the seventeen-
2
power draft Or the seventeen-power draft itself as amended. Speaking of the
seven-power draft, the Peruvian delegate claimed that it did not prejudice the
5
juridical questions involved. Moreover, he asserted that the United Nations
could properly concern itself with the bloodshed in Algeria even though it was
recognised that there had to be a voluntary and spontaneous acceptance of a
cease-fire by both sides.^
(vi) Argentina.
In the opinion of Argentina, the raatter was domestic and outside the
competence of the United Nations.® However, despite this opinion, the
Argentinian delegation joined with the six others concerned in sponsoring the
joint seven-power draft resolution* Speaking of this draft he reminded the
Members that the Assembly was not a super-state and could not pass judgement on
French legislation. In adopting the seven-power draft resolution, however, the
General assembly would simply be taking note of the passing of an Act* It would
be simply recording a fact and noting French attempts to find a peaceful solution
for the problem. It would also take note of the offer of good offices and in
tliat way pay tribute to two Heads of State whose high motives were, he said,
1. ibid, 920th mtg., para* 14.
2. ibid, 926th mtg., paras.71 and 72.
5. ibid, 924th mtg., paras. 47-51.
4. ibid, 920th mtg., para. 15.
5. ibid, 921st ratg., paras. 21-31,
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appreciated by all Members of the Committee.
Argentina also supported the three-power amendments and the seventeen-
2
power draft as amended*
(vii) Israel*
The Algerian problem, the Israeli delegate said, had come before the
General Assembly at a particular political and international level which made
it distinct from all other questions hitherto discussed by the Assembly. Algeria
lay within a territorial framework and a human setting over which there extended
the exclusive sovereignty of the French State* For more than a century, he re¬
minded the Members, Algerian territory had been legally part of French territory.
However, despite these facta, certain powers were again asking the United Nations
to take up & position in favour of the detachment of that territory* The Members
of the Assembly were being asked to reduce the sphere of French sovereignty by
outside action* This, he maintained, they could not do* Tlia United nations
was precluded from moving towards a settlement of the Algerian problem which
did not embody full respect for the French constitution.
It was true, he continued, that the evolution of the Assembly had gradually
led its Members to give a broader interpretation to Article 2(7). Nevertheless
a rigorous distinction was still required between the discussion of a problem by
the United Nations and United Nations intervention within the sphere of national
sovereignty. It was only by drawing this distinction that the present debate
became compatible with the provisions of the Charter*
The Israeli delegate maintained that despite the restrictions on its powers,
tie Assembly was nevertheless competent to express the heartfelt wish that
1* ibid, 924th ratg., paras. 52-55.
2. ibid, 926th mtg., paras. 71 and 72.
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concord might be restored in a peaceful, democratic and just manner. Diplo¬
matic channels remained open to the States most directly concerned and whose
action would be more effective if it were not attended by the publicity of
United nations debates. The United Nations could not, however, decide on any
measure which would mean any sort of intervention in French affairs, for France
would be entitled to invoke the Charter against any initiative of that kind.*'
Israel voted for the three-power amendments to the seventeen-power draft
2
and far the seventeen-power draft as amended.
(viii) tortuma.
Portugal maintained that the matter was domestic and that Article 2(7)
was therefore applicable. She indicated however that while 3he would not
discuss the substance of the problem she would support a resolution similar to
Resolution 1012(u)3 and in fact did vote for the three-power amendments to the
4
seventeen-power draft and that draft resolution as upended.
(±x) The Netherlands*
The Dutch delegate stated that the General Assembly was not competent to
make any recommendations to France regarding the manner in which it should
settle the Algerian problem because under the terms of the Charter the question
fell within French domestic jurisdiction. In these circumstances, he continued,
the Dutch' delegation would only be able to vote in favour of a draft resolution
which would not impede the French Government in the performance of its task and
1. ibid, 221st mtg., paras. 64-68.
2. 926th mtg,, paras. 71 arid 72.
5. ibid, 922nd aitg., paras, 46-51,
4. ibid, 926th uitg., paras. 71 and 72.
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1
which would, he compatible with the principles laid down in article 2(7).
Under these circumstancea, the Netherlands opposed the seventeen-power
o
draft resolution as it originally stood, but voted in favour of the amend¬




The Australian delegate said that he had not taken part in the debate
because he was convinced that the item fell within ITench domestic jurisdiction.
It seems to be implied from this that where this is the case Australia considered
even discussion to be ultra vires. Nevertheless, she was able to vote in favour
of the draft seventeen-power resolution as amended, her objections being con-
A
fined to the original form thereof.
(xi) Colombia.
Colombia also indicated her doubts on competence, but said she would vote
s
for a mild resolution. In fact she too voted in favour of the seventeen-power
draft resolution as amended.^
(e) Voting on the above proposala
The three-power aiaendiaents to tiie seventeen-power draft resolution were
7
carried by 57 votes to 56 with 7 abstentions* Hie whole draft seventeen-power
1. ibid, 924th mtg., paras. 5-5.
2. ibid.
5. ibid, 926th mtg., paras, 71 and 72.
4. see ibid, 924th mtg., paras. 15-18} and 926th mtg., paras. 71 and 72.
5* ibid, paras, 16-50.
6. ibid, para. 72.
7. ibid, para. 71. The votes in favour wsre the same as those in favour of the
whole; see infra, p. 203.
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resolution, as amended,ms rejected by 57 votes to 57, with 6 ausenticsis.1 21ms
seven-power draft ma not preseed to a vote.
(f) The Plenary oessiotu
After the presentation of the report of the First Committee the Bresideat
of the General Assembly read the text of a resolution submitted Jointly by the
delegations of Argentina* Br&sil, Canada* Cuba* Doainiean Republic, India, Iran,
Ireland, Italy, Japan, Mexico, Ilarmy, Beru, Jpain and Thailand, The text»
as follows:2
The (literal ^ae-illy.
Having Aiaouaaed 'this question of Algeria,
Recalling its resolution 1012 (H) of 13 February 1957,
1. Fxpreases again its concern over the situation in
Algeria;
2# Takes note of the offer of good offices raade by His
Majesty the liiag of Morocco and His Hxelleatsy the Breeddent
of the Republic of Tunisia;
3« Bxcreasea the wish that, in a spirit of effective co¬
operation, pour parlors will he entered into and other
appropriate mans utilised with a view to a solution in con-
fonaity with the Purposes and Principles of the Charter of the
United nations.
without any farther discussion,this resolution was adopted unanimously,^
!• ibid, para, 72, The details of voting mres as follows:
In favour: Luxembourg, Fatherlands, Hew Zealand, Nicaragua, iJorway,
t&nasaa, Paraguay, Beru, Rartug&l, Jpoin, Sweden, U,K«, U.3.&., Uruguay,
Venesuela, Argentina, .Australia, Austria, Belgium, Brasil, Canada,
Chile, China, Colombia, Costa Eiea, Cuba, Denmark, Stoinican Republic
Ecuador, El Salvador, Finland, Honduras, Iceland, Ireland, Israel, Italy,
Xaos,
Against: Xybia, Malaya, Morocco, Ttopal, Pakistan, Poland, Romania,
3audW*raM&, Sudan, Syria, Thailand, Tunisia, Ukrainian J.3.R., U.3.S.H.,
leoen, Jugoslavia, itfghanist&n, Albania, Bulgaria, Burma, Byelorussian
3.3,R», Ceylon, Csechoslovakia, Sgypt, Ethiopia, Ghana, Greece, Haiti,
iaaagary, India, Indonesia, Iran, Iraq, Japan, Jordan, Lebanon, Liberia,
Abstaining: Mexico, IMlippines, Turkey, Bolivia, Cambodia, Guatemala.
2. ibid. Flen., 726th otg,, para. 109.
5* ibid, para. 110. The voting was 80:0. Ho roll-call vote ms taken.
Ties. 1134(aII).
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5. The Thirteenth Sesalon.
Whereas at the previous two sessions the vast majority of States -which
were concerned to avoid cuy hint of intervention in the domestic affairs of
France, had nevertheless voted for resolutions whioh, however it is looked
at, 'dealt with* the Algerian question, by contrast at this session the same
States either voted against the resolution which was ultimately adopted or ab¬
stained. However, these facts do not alter the continuing trend in the
practice under consideration for it appears that while voting against this
resolution some, at least, indicated their willingness to vote for milder
resolutions which did not infringe the prohibition of intervention*
(a) The Draft Seventeen-Bawer Resolution*
The first Committee had before it the following draft resolution
sponsored jointly by the delegations of seventeen nations
The General Assembly,
Having discussed the question of Algeria,
Recalling its resolution 1012(a) of 15 February 1957 by
which the General Assembly expressed -the hope that & peaceful,
democratic and just solution would be found, through appropriate
means, in conformity with the principles of the Charter of the
United Nations,
Recalling further its resolutions 1184(aII) of 10 December
1957 by which the General Assembly expressed the wish that
pour parlers would be entered into, and other appropriate
means utilized, with a view to a solution, in conformity with
the purposes and principles of the Charter of the United Nations,
Recognising the right of the Algerian people to independence,
Deeply concerned with the continuance of the war in Algeria,
Considering that the present situation in Algeria constitutes
a threat to international peace and security,
Taking note of the willingness of the Brovisional Government
of the Algerian Republic to enter into negotiations with the
Government of France,
Urged negotiations between the two parties concerned with
a view to reaching a solution in conformity with the Charter of
the United Nations;
1* G.A,, (XIII), Annexes, a.i,65, p.2, Doc.A/4075, para. 4. The sponsors were i
Afghanistan, Burma, Ceylon, Ghana, Indonesia, Iraq, Jordan, Lebanon, Liberia,
Lybia, Morocco, Nepal, Saudi-Arabia, Sudan, Tunisia, U.A.R., and Yemen.
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(b) iiaitlan Aiaendraenta to the above resolution. .
Also before the Committee were two amendments to the above resolution,
proposed by the delegation of Haiti.1 Hie first of those amendments would
have replaced the fourth preambul&r paragraph by the following i
Becognising, in virtue of Article 1, paragraph 2, of the
Charter, the right of the Algerian people to decide for them¬
selves, their own destiny,
She second amendment would hose replaced the seventh preaaflbular paragraph
with the followingj
faking note that both the Srenoh Qovemxsnt acid the Algerian
leaders have affirmed their wish to enter into negotiations,
(e) She Attitude of States - Hie Hrat Committee.
(1) C^.
In the opinion of Cuba, Article 2(7) deprived the United Ilations of
any jurisdiction with respect to this question, since it was a domestic
natter Which concerned only France. She Cuban delegate reminded Members that
at the time when the United nations had been established Algeria had been an
integral part of rfcanee and no country had made any objections on that score,
without the consent of France, therefore, the United nations could not
arbitrarily alter that country's political geography* these reasons, his
delegation would be unable to vote in favour of any resolution which involved
intervention in the domestic affairs of JErance. In his opinion, the more
prudent thing fen* the Assembly to do was to esprees once more its hope for a
o
peaceful and just solution. Later on in the debate, he indicated his opposi¬
tion to both trie seventeeiv-power draft resolution and tic Haitian amendments
1. ibid, p.3, poms. 5-6.
2. Gr.A., (JCEII), 1st-Com., 1020th mtg., parao. 5-7.
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thereto. Both of these sets of proposals went beyond the limits of permitted
action, in his opinion.
(11) The United Kingdom.
The United Kingdom again said that her participation in this debate did
not alter in any way her views on competence. The British delegate then in&i-
2
c&ted his more concrete objections to the proposals. Inter in the debate,
eplaining his votes on the various paragraphs, the British delegate said that
lie had voted against the first Haitian amendment because, like the fourth para¬
graph of the preamble of the draft resolution it represented 'a degree of United
nations Intervention in the Algerian question unwarranted under the Charter*,
lie had also voted against all paragraphs of the draft resolution because there
seemed to be little profit in attempting to distinguish between the acceptable
and unacceptable parts of a draft resolution the whole character of which
g
seemed to be mistaken.
(ill) Spain.
The Spanish delegate eaid that if the United Nations recognised the right
of States to intervene in the internal affairs of other States, it would become
a force for disruption rather than conciliation. The draft resolution under
consideration would have had, he claimed, such an effect regardless of whether
it were adopted in its original form or as modified by the Haitian amendments.
His delegation would therefore abstain on all parts of it. The General Assembly,
he said, should confine itself to encouraging contacts between the parties
4
concerned as it had done at past sessions.
1. ibid, 1023rd mtg., para . 4.
2. ibid, 1022nd mtg., paras. 48-52.
5. ibid, 1023rd mtg., para. 42.
4. ibid, para. 20.
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(d) Voting on the above proposals - First Committee
The first Haitian amendment was defeated by 48 voted to 13, with 19
1 2
abstentions. The second one was withdrawn. The whole resolution was
5
adopted by 32 votes to 18 with 50 abstentions.
(e) The Plenary Session.
At the plenary session of the General Assembly, on a motion from Ceylon
the seventh preambular paragraph of the resolution approved by the First Committee
was deleted in the hope that this might enable more Members to vote in favour of
A
the whole. However, despite this amendment, the whole resolution was rejected
5
as it failed to receive a two-thirds majority*
4. The Post-Repertory Bsriod - Fourteenth to Seventeenth Sessions.
As in the debates on the affairs of South Africa so here « the longer the
matter was considered the less became the interest in the question of competence
and intervention. Little of any interest for the present purpose was said at
1. ibid* para. 30.
2. ibid, para. 31.
5. ibid, para. 57. The details of voting were as follows j
In favour i Guinea, Hungary, India, Indonesia, Iran, Iraq, Jordan,
Lebanon, Liberia, lybia, Mexico, Nepal, Pakistan, Poland, Romania,
Saudi-Arabia, Sudan, Tunisia, Ukrainian S.S.R., U.S.SJR., U.A.R.,
Yemen, Yugoslavia, Afghanistan, Albania, Bulgaria, Burma, Byelorussian
S.S.R., Ceylon, Czechoslovakia, Ethiopia, Ghana.
Against: Israel, Italy, Laos, Netherlands, New Zealand, Nicaragua,
iferaguay, Portugal, Union of South Africa, U.K., U.S.A., Australia,
Belgium, brazil, Canada, Chile, Cuba, Dominican Republic.
Abstentions; Guatemala, Haiti, Honduras, Iceland, Ireland, Japan,
Mexico, Norway, Panama, Bsru, Philippines, Spain, Sweden, Thailand,
Turkey, Uruguay, Venezuela, Argentina, Austria, Bolivia, Cambodia,
China, Colombia, Costa Rica, Denmark, Ecuador, El Salvador, Malaya,
Finland, Greece.
4. ibid, Plen. 792nd mtg,, para. 206.
5. ibid, paras. 235-260.
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these sessions. Belgium end Portugal, for example,tended to take up a harder
line on intervention^ hut other than that none of the other statements are
important for the present purpose* Eventually the French Government granted
full independence to Algeria which was admitted to the United Nations at the
seventeenth session*
5* G.A., (XIV), 1st Can., 1070th mtg., para* 14j and ibid, 1078th mtg., para. 25,
Chapter VII
The Hungarian Question,
The communist States apart, this matter was regarded almost universally
as an international matter and so the question of intervention did not arise."*"
The debates an this item are therefore not too relevant to the present line of
inquiry. However, some of the developments are of great interest, for it
appears that even the Soviet bloc has found it useful to vote for some resolu¬
tions dealing with this matter even though the States concerned had all main¬
tained that the General Assembly could not even discuss the matter.
At the eleventh session of the General Assembly, the President brought to
the attention of the ^Members a draft resolution, sponsored by the delegates of
Argentina, Belgium, Denmark and the United States, dealing with the refugee
2
problem which had arisen as a result of the uprising. While Hungary did not
accept the competence of the General Assembly to even discuss the question, she
nevertheless submitted an amendment to this draft which, inter alia, would have
had the General Assembly recommend all Governments to take speedy measures to
s
ensure the return of Hungarian refugees.
When the Hungarian amendments came to be voted on, the entire Soviet bloc
4
voted in favour.
This is but one more instance, admittedly a small one, of States saying
one thing and doing another. To have been consistent,the Soviet bloc should
1. On the international status of the matter see the Report of the Special
Consnittee on Hungary, G-.A., (XI), Suppl. No. 18, (a/5592), para. 785
(sdii); and also G.A., (XXII), Annexes, a.i. 69, A/3849, para. 8.
2. G-.A., (Xl), Annexes, Vol. II, a.i.67, p. 12, Doc. A/3574.
5. ibid, Doc. A/L.214.
4. G-.A., (XI), ELen., Vol. I, 587th mtg., paras. 157-160.
have neither introduced nor voted for any resolution or amendment thereto where
the subject was held to have been within the domestic jurisdiction of Hungary*
These States maintained throughout these debates that the United Nations had
no competence at all with respect to this subject* If that were so, how was
it possible for it to deal with the refugee problem arising from the Hungarian
revolution?
In fact this slight instance points again to the need to recognise that even
where a matter is domestic the United Nations is not devoid of competence.^
1. No statements relevant to the present line af enquiry are to be found in
subsequent debates on this subject. The communist bloc continued to
maintain that the U.N. was not competent to deal with this item and the
majority of the others that the matter was not essentially domestic.
Chapter VIII
Requests to States to Stay Execution of Death Sentences
The general trend in United Nations practice towards an acceptance of the
view that some kind of United Nations actions is possible even where the
subject matter is within the domestic jurisdiction of a particular State
underwent curious developments in two cases dealt with by the General
Assembly* These two cases raised the question whether the United Nations
was in any way competent to request a State to stay sentences of death
passed by its courts on its own nationals far offences against its laws* This
question became important in debates on the affairs of Greece and Spain*
The debates on this subject are not conducive to any categorical conclu¬
sion, but they do indicate that the trend towards the acceptance of some kind
of competence was continued, though in a very mild degree* Whereas the case
histories so far examined show that there is a general tendency not to regard
very mild resolutions as intervention in the domestic affairs of a particular
nation, these two cases - the Greek one in particular - indicate that the
majority of Members retreated even from this position. They showed them¬
selves unwilling to address a formal resolution to a State requesting it to
commute death sentences passed by its courts* At the same time, however,
they were not inclined to ignore the subject altogether and deny all compe¬
tence. The general trend was to accept that the United Nations was coupe-
tent to address an informal request to a State to this effect, the feeling
being that the prohibition of intervention was not thereby contravened*
X* Greece.
In its earlier years the United Nations was continually concerned with the
affairs of Greece - the problems which arose out of the Greek civil war which
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fallowed on the close of the Second World War, and the frontier disputes
of that State with her Balkan neighbours. At its third, fourth., fifth
and sixth sessions the General Assembly, during debates cm the alleged
threats to the political independence and territorial integrity of Greece,
became especially concerned with the question of whether or not it was
competent to address an appeal to Greece asking for clemency for certain
Greeks who had been condemned to death as a result of their part in the
Greek Civil War.1
These debates are of interest for the curious attitudes adopted by a
considerable number of States to the question of the competence of the
General Assembly and its committees to entertain such a question. The
majority tended to view that a humanitarian appeal to the Greek Government
not to execute the persons concerned would not amount to intervention in
that State1 s domestic affairs, provided that it was on a very informal
plane. Few of thein, however, were prepared to go the length of adopting a
formal resolution calling on the Greek Government to refrain from carrying
out these sentences, whether the moving spirit behind such a resolution
was humanitarian or not. Such a move appeared to constitute, in the majority
opinion, intervention in a State's domestic affairs, whereas an informal appeal
did not.
It is, of course, of considerable interest to compare the attitude
adopted by the various States in this question with that adopted on the
very similar question of the violation of human, rights in the Soviet Union.
1. This subject was also raised in the Security Council. However, the
proceedings on this point in the Security Council are not particularly
enlightening far the purposes of this study and are therefore not dealt
with; See Repertory, Vol. I, p. 112.
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1. The Third Session.
At the second session of the General assembly, a United Nations Special
Committee on the Balkans was set up to study the situation resulting from the
Civil War in Greece."*" This Committee consisted of Australia, Brazil, China,
France, Mexico, the Netherlands, Pakistan, the United Kingdom, the United
States, Poland and the U.S.S.R. The last two, of their own choice, took
no part in the work of the Committee. It was in the debate ensuing cm the
presentation of the report of this Committee that the subject of the death
2
sentences passed on certain trade union leaders, was raised.
During the course of the debate in the First Committee a considerable
number of resolutions was presented. The majority of those dealt with
the substantive question of threats to the territorial integrity and political
independence of Greece. Those presented by Yugoslavia, France and the Soviet
Union, however, were concerned with the death sentences.
1. G.A., Bes. 109(11).
2. Fear a review of the history of the Committee's origin and work, see the
statement of the Rapporteur to the First Committee on the presentation
thereto of the Committee' s first report, G.A., (iIlA) 1st Com., 171st
ratg., pp. 261-264.
5. Resolutions, or amendments to resolutions dealing with the general
question of threats to the territorial integrity and political in¬
dependence of Greece were submitted by the following States:
a. Jointly by the delegations of China, France, the United Kingdom
and the United States, G.A., (Ill/L)» 1st Com., Annexes, a.i.15,
p. 29, Doc. A/C.1/552.
b. SI Salvador, ibid, p. 40, Doc jJC*1/557,
c. Australia, ibid, p. 41, Doc. A/C.l/361.
d. Australia, ibid, p. 42, Doc. A/c.l/562.
e. Yugoslavia, ibid, p. 46, Doc. A/2.1/568.
f. Poland, ibid, p. 47, Doc. A/C.1/570.
g. Dominican Republic, ibid, p. 48, Doc. A/C.1/574. (This was an amendment
to an amendment proposed by the Lebanese delegation, Doc.A/C.1/359,
which, for some reason, is not reproduced in the annexes.)
h. Poland, ibid, p. 49, Doc. A/C.1/575.
i. Belgium, ibid, p. 55, Doc. A/C.1/578.
j. Greece, see 1st Com., 190th nrtg. p. 496j Doc. A/C,1/554.
At the 186th me sting of the Fist Committee, the Yugoslav delegation
introduced the following draft resolution
The First Committee
Calls upon the Royal Greek Government to take steps to
see that the trade union leaders Ambatieloa, Gatalis, Diak-
rouais, Tlu-ioyankis, Katsanis, Rapesis, Koliarkis, Gotsis
and Lambedarios are not executed.
In introducing this resolution the Yugoslav delegate, Mr. Bebler, said
that as the United Nations are enjoined to defend human rights, it should
take steps to save these lives. At the same meeting of the First Com¬
mittee the Polish delegate. Mr. Katz-Suehy, asked that this draft resolu¬
tion should have priority in the debate as it was a matter of urgency in
2
which human lives were involved.
(a) The Attitude of States towards the Yugoslav proposal.5
The Venezuelan delegate, Mr. Stalk, said that his delegation looked
upon the appeal made by the Yugoslav delegation with sympathy but doubted
whether the matter was within the oocqpetence of the Committee or the General
Assembly since Article 2, paragraph 7, of the Charter forbade intervention
by the United Nations in matters which were essentially within the domestic
4
Jurisdiction of any State.
The Greek delegate, Mr. Pipinelis said that while the incident was
outisde the competence of the Committee and the General Assembly, he was
ready to enter into a discussion and to examine the dispatch which was the
1. See G.A. ,(lIl/L), 1st Com., 186th mfcg», p. 427; end ibid, Annexes, a.i.,15
p. 48, Doc.A/C .1/571.
2. G.A. ,(lll/i), 1st Com,, 186th mtg., p. 441.
5. Contrary to normal practice, the statements of the various delegations are
set out here in the order in which the States spoke, and have not been
grouped according to their various attitudes.
4. G.A, ,(IH/L), 1st Com., 186th mtg., p. 442.
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origin of the present request."*"
The Polish representative, lir. itatz-buchy, said that lie did not agree
that the matter fell under article 2, paragraph 7 of the Charter, for the
whole Greek question was an internal affair which had become an inter¬
national problem because of the Civil War and this was only one of its
many aspects.**
The Venezuelan delegate, in augmentation of the statement made earlier
in this debate said that he saw the humanitarian aspect of the problem but
doubted the competence of the Committee. In his opinion, it could not
examine the laws of Greece and the sentences of its courts without inter¬
fering in its domestic affairs. Referring to Venezuela's intervention with
the Spanish Government on behalf of certain individuals, he appealed that the
question raised by the Yugoslav delegation should be settled outside the
Committee through the good offices of the delegations, on humanitarian
j
grounds and without prejudice to the good faith of the Greek Government.
M. Couve de Murville, the Prerich representative, said that the Yugoslav
draft resolution raised complicated legal problems since it was not clear
whether the Committee or the Assembly had the competence to deal with it.
nevertheless he agreed that it was a humanitarian matter to which the Committee
could not remain indifferent. lie therefore suggested that the Committee take
up the suggestion of the G&reek representative and decide to proceed with its
discussions on the various draft resolutions on the Greek question on the
understanding that the Chairman of the Committee would get in touch with the
1. ibid, p. 442.
2. ibid, p. 442.
5. ibid, p. 445.
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haad of the Greek delegation to see if any measure could he taken in the
1
matter raised by the Yugoslav* delegation.
2
The Greek delegation indicated its support for the Erench proposal.
The Syrian delegation expressed similar doubts on the competence of the
Committee to adopt a recommendation on this subject and thought that it ought
g
to limit itself to calling on the Greek Government to examine the matter.
The delegate of Ecuador pointed out that his country had abolished
capital punishment over fifty years before* He was tlierefore in favour of
any measures which would save lives. However, he indicated that he had
strong doubts as to whether the Committee could take a definite decision on
this matter and thought that the Committee could give effect to its desire
through its Chairman rather than by voting on a matter beyond its competence.*
The Soviet delegate said that all legal argument should be subordinated to
5
the voice of conscience and Justice.
In supplement of what he had said earlier, M» Couve de Murville said that
1 rT r r 1 ~ T '• ^ 1 1 11 * "■ 4
earlier he had not proposed that there should be a vote upon aiy resolution in
this connection, first because the Committee was aware only of a telegram on
6
the subject from the Federation of Greek Maritime Unions and could not
therefore take a decision on the substance of the matter, and secondly,
because it was doubtful whether the question was within the competence of
1* ibid, p. 445.
2* ibid, p. 445.
5. ibid, p. 445.
4* ibid, p. 443*
5. ibid, p. 444.
6* See ibid, p. 427, per Yugoslavia.
the Committee or the General Assembly. However, because of the humanitarian
aspects of the matter , he suggested that the committee note the suggestion
made by the Greek representative that he discuss the matter with the Chair-
1
man and that the Committee proceed with its debate.
The Soviet delegate, Mr. Vyshinaky, said that he believed that the
representative of France was incorrect in believing that the Yugoslav pro¬
posal should be dismissed as interference in the internal affairs of Greece.
It was, he said, no mare than an appeal to the Greek Government. It was a
matter of saving lives. The appeal should be made in the interest of justice
and there was no necessity to study the matter fully. The Consaittee should
2
make the voice of humanity heard.
In the opinion of the United Kingdom, it was doubtful whether the Committee
was competent to deal with the matter. It was true, Mr. McNeil said, that
Article 2, paragraph 7, was difficult to interpret, but if the Committee arro¬
gated to itself the right to reverse decisions taken by the courts of Member
3
States, that task might become its only work.
Mr* Stalk of Venezuela said that he believed that a humanitarian pro¬
posal to save lives was one which should be given -priority. The delegations
should not waste time discussing the whole matter, but should adopt a practical
solution. lie therefore suggested that the Chairman of the Committee, acting
outside his office, might prepare a telegram to the Greek Government which
did not prejudice the question but asked far clemency and this telegram would
4
be open for the signature of any delegation.
1. ibid, p. 444.
2. ibid, p. 444.
5. ibid, p. 444.
4. ibid, p. 445.
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Tiia Qrgck delegate, Mr. Pipinelis, said that when he had previously
spoken he had not yet read the Yugoslav draft resolution contained in
Document A/C.1/571. He had now received that paper and reiaarked that it
constituted an invitation to "toe Coonittee to intervene in Greek affairs
solely on the basis of a telegram which it had not seen. The question of
competence arose, he said, Nevertheless, he supported the French suggestion
which would, he believed, satisfy the Committee's constitutional requirements
X
and also the humanitarian sentiments of the Members.
At this point in the debate, the Chairman of the Committee read out a
2
formal French proposal. The text was as follows:
The First Committee,
Having noted the offer made by the Greek Government to
get in touch with the Chairman of the Committee for the
purpose of examining the matter raised by the Yugoslav
delegation, and trusting that the Chairman will take all
the necessary steps to that end,
Hroceeds to the next item on the agenda,
As soon as this French proposal had been formally submitted to the
Committee, the Soviet delegate, Mr. Vyshinslsy, introduced an amendment which
would have deleted the words 'take all the necessary steps to that end', and
substitute far them the words 'take measures to save the lives of the trade
unionists who have been condemned to death*.®
Greece maintained that this was not an amendment to the French proposal
at all, but a completely new resolution. ^ Yugoslavia, on the other hand,
maintained that the Soviet amendment only clarified the French proposal by
1. ibid, p. 445.
2. ibid, p. 446; Doc.A/C. 1/572.
5. ibid, p. 446; Doc.A/C. 1/575.
4. ibid, p. 446.
x
specifying the steps to be taken.
The United Kingdom said that it could not accept the Soviet amendment as
it put the subject in an improper light and converted the Stench suggestion
into an appeal to the Greek Government to set aside the decisions of its
courts. His delegation could not be a party to such an approach to any
Government. However, it would, Mr. McNeil a&id, support action which was not
formal but expressed personal anxieties. Moreover, he pointed out that if it
was desired to base the proceedings on the Charter, it should be noted that the
Committee had no executive functions. He suggested that Mr. Vyaiiinsky should
not insert a phrase with a political connotation when the Committee was seeking
2
to avoid having the question of competence raised.
M. Gouve de ..uville, on behalf of Prance, said that the spirit which had
motivated his suggestion had been humanitarian, not political. However, the
U.S.S.R, amendment changed the spirit of his draft resolution by entering into
matters of substance. This was, he claimed, unnecessary and the moral value
of the Prench suggestion would be diminished if it became neoesaary to take a
vote upon the U.S.S.R. amendment.
Mr, Vyahinaky, on the other hand, was surprised at the suggestion that
his amendment had a political character since it merely asked in a humanitarian
way that certain men should not be executed. It was not, he said, a question
of propaganda but of giving clear instructions to the Chairman. fie pointed
out that his amendment did not call for the irevocation of the sentences but
1. ibid, p. 446.
2. ibid. p. 446.
5. ibid. p. 446.
only that the Chairman take steps to save human lives. With regard to the
Yugoslav proposal, ho believed that there should be no legal quibbling about
interference in internal affairs. There was nothing political in the pro-
1
posal; it was entirely humanitarian and in no way violated the Charter.
Mr. Castro, of El Salvador, on a point of order, observed that the
Committee should separate the question of competence from the humanitarian
question. lie reminded the Committee that his country had previously main¬
tained that it could not entertain the Yugoslav proposal and now added that
in the opinion of his country it could not deal with the Soviet amendment
either#**
There followed a short discussion an the question of corapetence between
tlie representatives of Poland, El Salvador and the Chairman of the Committee,
from which it was made clear that the question of the Committee^ competence
was only relevant to the Yugoslav .roposal end the Soviet amendment and not
5
to the French proposal. However, no reasons were given far this conclusion.
The delegate of Belgium then added his voice to those who maintained that
4
the Committee was not competent to entertain the Yugoslav proposal.
( b) Voting an the various proposals.
The Comittee decided that it was competent to entertain neither the
1. ibid, p. 447.
2. ibid, p. 447.
5. ibid, p. 448.
4. ibid, p. 448.
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Yugoslav proposal nor the Soviet amendment to the French one. However it
adopted the iVench proposal by 41 votes to 0,with 9 abstentions.3
( c ) Conclusions.
The vote on the Yugoslav proposal and on the Soviet amendment to the
French one showed very decisively that at the third session of the General
Assembly, at least, the majority of delegations felt that the United Nations
was not competent to call on a State, formally, by means of a resolution, to
suspend or otherwise interfere with decisions handed down by its courts.
Nevertheless, the fact that the French proposal was adopted and by audi a
large majority si so shows that the majority felt that the domestic status of
the question did not bar all United Nations action an the subject. It is
significant, far example, that no State belaboured the argument that as the
matter was domestic the General Assembly was incompetent even to discuss the
1, G«A.,(lIl/i), 1st Com., 18Qth mtg., p. 449. The voting - 45.6.2. - was
as follows:
In favour: Byelorussian S.S.R., Czechoslovakia, Poland, Ukrainian S.S.R.,
U.S.S.R., Yugoslavia.
Against: Canada, Chile, China, Colombia, Costa Rica, Cuba, Denmark,
Dominican Republic, Egypt, 31 Salvador, Ethiopia, France, Greece, Haiti,
Honduras, Iceland, India, Iran, Iraq, Lebanon, Liberia, Mexico, Netherlands,
New Zealand, Nicaragua, Norway, Pakistan, Paraguay, Pteru, Sweden, Syria,
Turkey, Union of South Africa, U.K., U.S.A., Venezuela, Yemen, Afghanistan,
Australia, Argentina, Belgium, Bolivia, Erazil.
Abstentions: Ecuador, Uruguay.
2. ibid. The voting - 57.6.6. - was as follows:
In favour: Byelorussian S.S.R., Czechoslovakia, Poland, Ukrainian S.S.R.,
U.S.3.R., Yugoslavia.
Against: Canada, Chile, China, Colombia, Cuba, Denmark, Dominican
Republic, Egypt, El Salvador, Ethiopia, France, Greece, Honduras,
Iceland, India, Iraq, Lebanon, Liberia, Mexico, Netherlands, New
Zealand, Nicaragua, Norway, Pakistan, Paraguay, Peru, Sweden, Turkey,
Union of South Africa, U.K., U.S.A., Yemen, -Argentina, Australia, Belgium
Bolivia, Brazil.
Abstentions: Costa Rica, Ecuador, Syria, Uruguay, Venezuela, Afghanistan.
5. ibid, There was no roll-call, the vote being taken on a show of hands.
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However, the fact that the action finally taken by the Cosanittee was of
such an informal nature emphasises the lock of competence in such a case to
adopt a formal resolution addressed to the State in question* The Soviet
bloc States apart, all States which spoke indicated their support for the
informal humanitarian appeal through the Chairman of the Committee, but at
the same time, were unwilling to commit themselves to a formal resolution*
To adopt a formal resolution seemed, to those States, to involve the United
Nations in intervention in the domeotic affairs of a State*
The implications of this debate are rather wide, for indeed, it seemed
to be the prevailing opinion that any formal resolution addressed to the
Greek Government would amount to intervention. Tliere was not evident the
tendency seen in other cases to distinguish between different types of
formal resolutions. On the contrary, there was present a strong desire to
avoid adopting any formal resolution, no matter how mild its content. The
almost universal desire was to leave the subject to behind-the-scenes informal
negotiations between the Chairman of the Committee and the head, of tlie Greek
delegation*
It is worthy of note, however, that in the Soviet view even a formal
•humanitarian' appeal did not constitute intervention in the domestic affairs
of a Member State* In Mr* Vysiiinsky'a opinion, there should have been no
legal quibbling over such a humanitarian appeal. Oddly enough, this was
not the attitude taken by the Soviet Union in the question regarding the
refusal of the Soviet authorities to allow Russian bora wives of foreign
nationals to leave Russia in the company of,or in order to Join, their
husbands* In that case the Soviet Union maintained that to adopt ary
resolution on that subject would constitute intervention in her domestic
affairs.
2. The Fourth Session.
The subject of the threats to the political independence and terri¬
torial integrity of Greece was again raised at the fourth session of the
General Assembly and along with it the attendant subject of the conduct of
Greek courts.
At this session, a variety of resolutions was presented dealing with the
death sentences passed on Greek nationals. However, the prevailing opinion
on the question of the competence of the General Assembly and its committees
to adopt these does not appear to have varied a great deal from that evident
at the third session. At this session also the only resolution to gain
acceptance was one which did not call formally on the Greek Government to
take steps to commute the sentences passed by its courts, but left it to an
officer of the United nations to convey the feelings of tlie Members to the
Greek Government.
Early in the debate, Boland introduced a resolution calling on the Greek
Government to suspend all executions and court martial procedures in that
1
country. The resolution was as follows.
Taking into consideration the attempts to reach a
solution to the Greek question through the formation
of a Conciliation Committee and other conciliatory
means,
The First Committee
Appeals to the Greek authorities to suspend all
1. G.A. ,(IV), 1st Com., Annexes, a.i,21, p. 12, Doc.A/S.l/485. The Con¬
ciliation Committee referred to was proposed by the Australian
delegation in its resolution which dealt with the whole Greek ques¬
tion, not just the question of political executions} see G.A., (IV),
ELen. Annexes, a.i.21, p.61, Doc.A/L062 and Corr.l, para. 7.
e>»cutions and all court martial procedures and in particu¬
lar to set aside the death sentences issued "by the Military
Tribunal in Piraeus against Catherine Zevgos*
In introducing this resolution the Palish delegate, Mr. iteta-ducby>
said that since the question of conciliation had been brought forward it
should be reme ibered that, if it was to be successful and if a stable peace wis
to be established, certain preliminary moves were required on the part of the
Greek Government. The First Committee should, he said, appeal to the Greek
authorities in the interest of a solution through conciliation to suspend
political terrorism e asscutions and courts martial immediately. The press
daily gave news of persons sentenced fear tiieir political beliefs, he said*
In particular lie called to the notice of the Committee the case of Catherine
Zevgos, sentenced to death by a military tribunal at I-iraeus. If the Greek
Government genuinly desired peace and that the conciliation committee should
succeed in its task, its first step should be the good will gesture of sus¬
pending such activities,
(a) Attitudes of States towards this proposal.
The Byelorussian delegate, Mr. Aiaelev, said with regard to the informa¬
tion concerning Catherine Zevgos, that she had been sentenced solely fear her
progressive opinions and her refusal to subscribe to the actions of the Greek
Government. That was typical, he claimed, ox" the terrorism pursued by the
Athena regime and would not foster the results which the Committee was seeking.
Mis delegation believed that the Committee should approve the draft resolution
appealing against the death sentence and thus produce evidence on the port of
the Greek Government of a desire to co-operate and to end its terrorism.1
1, G*A,,(IV), 1st Com*, 275th mtg., para. 8.
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Liberia opposed the Iblish draft resolution because it dealt with the
internal affairs of Greece.*''
The United Kingdom did not state clearly at this stage what her attitude
towards the Bolish draft was. The British delegate, Mr, McNeil, inferred that
the jnatter was within the domestic jurisdiction of Greece, but then added that
it would be very difficult for any United Nations organ to reject cur assume a
neutral attitude towards any humanitarian approach such as that which the
2
Polish representative had made.
The Yugoslav delegate, Mr. Djilaa, said that the question of ending the
repression in Greece was purely a humanitarian one* lie did not deal e*»
5
plicitly with the question of domestic jurisdiction.
Mr. Vyshinsky, on behalf of the Soviet Union, said that his country
regarded the Polish proposal, which was concerned with the repressive mea¬
sures being taken by the Greek Government, and in particular with the
sentencing of individuals solely because of their democratic convictions, as
in the case of Catherine Sovgoa, as an essentially humanitarian one and that
the Soviet Union intended to support it. lie criticised the legalistic atti¬
tude of the United Kingdom in the matter. It was true, lie admitted, that
the delegation of the Soviet Union had in the past opposed interference in
the internal affairs of States on the basis of Article 2, paragraph 7 of
the Charter. It had opposed such interference with regard to the charge
of volation of human rights in Bulgaria and Hungary and it vrould certainly
1. ibid, para. 9.
2. ibid, paras. 12-13.
5. ibid, para. 17,
maintain the same attitude in connection with such cases in the future. But,
he contended, this situation wis different. This appeal was directed to
humanitarian feelings which sere stronger than legal considerations.
Furthermore, in the case of Catherine Zevgos, there was no reason to inflict
such a harsh punishment. She was true victim of injustice.
Mr, Vyshinsky went on to recall that the proposed appeal was not without
precedent. During the third session of the General Assembly, be said, the
Mrst Committee had issued a similar appeal to the Greek Government on be¬
half of certain Greek trade union leaders, which had resulted in the post¬
ponement of their execution.1 At that times, he claimed, Article 2, paragraph 7
of the Charter had not been applied and the appeal had been based only on
humanitarian considerations. The present Fblish proposal was, he said,
similar and was likewise an appeal to the conscience of mankind. The pro¬
posal was simply a request to the Chairman of the First Coaialttee to contact
the Greek delegation with a view to setting aside the death sentence passed
upon a woman who had been unjustly convicted. Mr. Vyshinsky said he was
convinced that all delegations imbued with humanitarian ideals would vote
2
in favour of its adoption.
In reply to the Soviet statement, the representative of Greece, Mr.
1. It will be noted, however, that Mr. Vyshinsky somewhat overstressed the
effect of the resolution adopted at the third session. It did not
appeal to the Greek Government, but merely noted the offer of the Greek
delegation to discuss tlx; matter with the Chairman of the First Com¬
mittee; see supra, p. 218.
2, G.A.,(IV), 1st Com., 275th artg., paras. 19-20. It will be noted, however,
that the Polish proposal in fact made no mention of the Chairman of the
First Committee and was in fact a direct appeal to the Greek Governjaent.
227.
Pipinelis, recalled that Mr. Vyshinsky had maintained that nothing in the
Charter could "be construed as forbidding an appeal to humanitarian feelings*
But, he said, to accept such an appeal presupposed a conviction of truth.
Suppose, he said, that the individuals concerned had been rightly condemned.
1
In such oircuiastances there could be no appeal to humanitarian considerations*
2
The Ukraine endorsed the Soviet arguments an the Polish draft resolution.
Bpland maintained that the First Committee ma quite competent to deal
with a question of a purely humanitarian character.
The Colombian delegation recalled that there had been no capital punish¬
ment in its country for ti» past fifty years and did not think it was possible
for States which had abandoned capital punishment for political crimes to re¬
ject the Boliah appeal far clemency. He was, he said, fully aware of the
legal difficulties, out pointed out that any work of conciliation such as
that proposed by the ihistralian delegation must necessarily consider ques¬
tions which overlapped the domestic jurisdiction of countries. The
Colombian representative went on to add that be hoped that the spirit of
clemency which would be shown by the First uosnnittee in adopting the Polish
proposal would extend to the discussions in the hd Hoc Political Committee re¬
lating to the violation of fundamental and religious rights of Individuals in
certain European countries.^
The representative of Cuba, Mr. alvares, said that his country considered
1. ibid, para. 26.
2. ibid, para. 53.
5. ibid, para. 57.
4. ibid, para. 58.
the Polish draft resolution to he much more a political than a humanitarian
one and therefore might be construed as intervention in the affairs of a
State. His delegation might, however, vote for a specific appeal for
clemency in the case of Catherine Zevgos and therfore he proposed an
amendment to the Polish draft resolution. This amendment replaced the
second paragraph of the Polish draft with the following
She First Committee,
He solves that the Chairman of the First Committee
addresses to the Greek authorities a hunanitarian appeal
for the suspension of the death sentence on Catherine
Zevgos without involving any intervention in the internal
affairs of (k*eece«
Poland accepted the Cuban amendment in the interest of gaining a un-
2
animous decision.
PI Salvador also objected to the Polish jjroTOsal, On behalf of
that country Mr. Castro urged that the matter be considered from a mare
realistic point of view* For a Committee of tlie General Assembly to appeal
for commutation of a sentence passed by a tribunal of one of the iiember States
obviously, he said, meant that pressure was being emrcised in an essentially
domestic question and it was therefore a violation of Article 2, paragraph 7
of the Charter. nevertheless he 3aid, there was clearly something which the
Committee could do in the natter. Mr • Castro went on to recall that in a
similar situation the French delegation had presented a successful proposal
which had merely expressed tlie opinion of the First Committee and had left
it to the Greek delegation to present that opinion to its Government.
Therefore, in accordance with that precedent, he submitted the following
1. ibid, para. 5Sj Doc,A/C .1/434.
2. ibid, para. 46.
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draft resolution*1
Tiie First Committee, .
Beaolves to autiiorise the Chairmen and Vice-Chair aan
of the Committee to approach the repreaentat ivea of Greece
in order to make clear to them the satisfaction with which
the First Cosrjittee would view the Greek CJovernssent's
efforts to eaeroise all possible moderation, as far as is
consistent with justice, in the punishment of acts pre¬
judicial to the internal peace of Greece.
The delegate of the Hiillppinea said that his country favoured in
principle all humanitarian appeals on behalf of political offenders* In the
case in point, the Riillppine representative, Mr, Lopes, said that his country
supper ced tie Cuban delegation's amendment to address an appeal to the Greek
authorities for the suspension of tie death sentence on Mrs* &evgos* It
o
also supported the draft resolution of SI Salvador.
Iraq expressed itself wary of making any appeal to the Greek Govern¬
ment on this account. The Iraqi delegate, Mr* Al-Jaaali, lent his support
to the proposed conciliation coiaaissxon, but said that it was essential to
observe two principlea* The first was that only the lawful government of a
country could take action when subversive elements tried to destroy its
authority* iuy assistance to such rebels would constitute interference in
a State's internal affairs* Hie second was thut a foreign, government had no
right to comment on internal measures tauoan by the legally constituted authori¬
ties of a dt&te fear the purpose of preserving peace within its frontiers*3
In a further statenaeat on the question the Greek representative,
1* ibid, para* 46} Doc*Vfc.l/i8S,
2* ibid, 276th atg», para. 4*
3* ibid, paras. 8-9,
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Mr* Pipinelis, preferred to go into the substance of the charges rather than
rely on. arguments based on Article 2, paragraph 7.*
In the light of the Greek stateiaent on the substance of the matter, the
delegation of El Salvador withdrew its draft resolution and declared its
intention of voting against the Polish draft which it now considered to be
2
based on political rather than on humanitarian considerations.
China said that she objected to the I-oliah proposal for in her opinion,
it was a political manoeuvre in a humanitarian guise, and in addition con-
5
atltuted interference in the internal affairs of Greece.
Like El Salvador, Cuba also decided to withdraw it3 amendment to the
Polish resolution. In the light of the Greek statement, Cuba considered
4,
that the Polish proposal was pointless.
Uruguay indicated her opposition to the Polish draft, but claimed that
her opposition was not based on Article 2, paragraph 7 but on her opinion
5
that the Polish resolution was a political manoeuvre.
Ecuador opposed the Polish draft lest it hamper the work of the
Q
Conciliation Commission.
Turkey, however, opposed the Polish draft because she considered it to
7
constitute intervention in Greece's internal affairs.
1. ibid, paras. 22-29,
2. ibid, para. 36.
3. ibid, para. 37.
4. ibid, para. 38.
5. ibid, para. 40.
0. ibid, para, 47.
7. ibid, para. 49.
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Syria felt that the Polish draft resolution was no longer required since
X
the death sentence on tire. Zevgos had already been suspended*
The United Kingdom seemed to infer that the Boliah draft resolution con-
2
stituted interference in Greece's internal affairs.
jfrance also felt that any approach to the Greek Government would be super¬
fluous, in view of the statement made by the Greek representative to the First
Committee. M, Couve de Murville said that tite Polish proposal had raised two
problems* On the one hand it appealed to humanitarian feelings* On the other
it touched upon the competence of the United Nations. To avoid that situa¬
tion, he had intended, he said, before the statement of the representative of
Greece to propose that the question should be referred to tlie Chairman of the
Coarcdttee so that he could take the necessary measures consistent with the ideas
expressed by the Committee* However, the statement by the Greek representative
had, in his opinion, rendered this unnecessary also*
4
Colombia also cane to the saos conclusion.
India, stated that she favoured the idea of a humanitarian appeal, but in
this instance felt that the efforts at conciliation would have a better chance
5
of success if the Polish proposal were not adopted.
(b) Voting of the Polish proposal
The Polish proposal was rejected by 41 votes to 6, with 9
1. ibid, para. 50*
2. ibid, para. 61.
5. ibid, paras. 62-65.
4. ibid, paras. 64-66.





The opinions voiced in this debate did not differ substantially from
those expressed during the previous year's debate. The majority of delcr¬
ates seemed to be of the opinion that some kind of measures oould be taken
with reference to tho death sentences passed by Gree3:; courts and the reason
no action was, in the final analysis, taken was because the majority of dele¬
gates seemed to feel, that the statement of the Greek delegate made United
Nations action superfluous*
Nevertheless, it should not be overlooked that the type of appeal which
found most favour was again one which was not addressed directly to the Greek
Government, but which left the matter In the hands of the Chairman of the
First Committee* As in the third session, delegates showed themselves wary
of addressing an appeal directly to the Greek Government in such a domestic
matter*
As in the third session a prominent feature of this debate was the
importance which the Soviet bloc oountries attached to humanitarian con¬
siderations* These, in their opinion, seemed to outweigh all legal aspects
of the matter* Of course, the item did not concern any humanitarian question
1, ibid, paras. 75-7^« The details of voting on the whole resolution were
as follows:
In favour: Byelorussian S.S.R., Czechoslovakia, Poland, Ukrainian S.S.R.,
U.S.S.R., Yugoslavia.
Against: Argentina, Australia, Belgium, Bolivia, Brazil, Canada, China,
Colombia, Costa Mca, Cubs, Denmark, Ecuador, Al Salvador, Ethiopia,
Rrance, Greeoe, Guatemala, Honduras, loeland, India, Lebanon, Liberia, Iraq,
Mexico, Luxembourg, Netherlands, New Zealand, Nicaragua, Norway, Pakistan,
Panama, Paraguay, Peru, Philippines, Sweden, Turkey, Union of South Africa,
U.K., U.S.A., Uruguay, Veneouela.
"* * * '"
Jiaristan, Chile, Egypt, Iran, Israel, Saudi-Arabia, Syria,
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which has its situs within their frontiers.
(d) The seoond phase of the debate in the fourth session.
hater on in the some debate, the subject of death sentenoes passed for
political reasons by Greek courts was again brought up. At the 294th meeting
of the First Committee the Soviet delegation complained anew of the politioal
terrorism in Greece Mid introduced the following resolution."*'
Taking note of the fact that the military oourts in Greece
are at the present time continuing to pass death sentenoes on
members of the people's liberation movement and that on 13
October last the Athens military court sentenced to death
eight prominent public figures, heroic fighters against the
Hitlerite invaders - Evangelia Saradgia, Dimitrios Mouratidia,
Artemios,Joanidis, SotixLes Barbounakis, Georgios Iliopoulos,
Jakavoa "Ehaselia, Antoniou Srtelakos and Katharine Telahani
(Zevgos),
The First Committee,
Calls upon the Greek Government to suspend the carrying
out of the death sentences passed on the above mentioned
persons and to repeal these sentences.
The Greek delegate again went into the substance of the charges and did
2
not dismiss them, relying on Article 2, paragraph 7.
f
The United States pointed out that the Committee had repeatedly held that
r 3
it was not competent to deal with individual oases of death sentenoes.
In reply to this, Czechoslovakia said that if objeotion was taken to the
mention of speolfic people in Hie Soviet draft resolution, these names oould be
deleted and the appeal made generalJ*
The Philippines indloated her intention to abstain for, in her opinion, the
question of the executions oould not be dealt with apart from the Greek question
1. G,A.,(IY), 1st Com,, Annexes, a.i.,21, p. 16, Doo.A/C.VSO'?.
2. G.A#,(lV), 1st Com., 294th ratg., paras. 8-19.
3. ibid, para. 35.
4. ibid, para. 60.
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ems a whole
New Zealand inferred that the Soviet proposal amounted to intervention.
Sir Carl Berendaen said that it was possible that the people mentioned in the
Soviet draft were innocent but they might equally well be guilty. Moreover,
he said, even if the Committee was fully acquainted with the facts, it could
2
not make demands of a Member State to suspend measures it intended to take.
Thailand, on the other hand, supported the idea of an appeal to Greece
in principle but indicated her intention to abstain because of the laok of
3
information on the subject.
Mexico also wished to do something for the condemned but was wary of
addressing a direct request to the Greek Government. The Mexican delegate,
Mr. de Alba, said that although the Committee had no right to ask the Greek
Government to show mercy to the eight persons who had been condemned to death,
mentioned in the Soviet draft resolution, it oould send the official records
of the meetings relating to the examination of the question to the President
of the General Assembly and the Secretary-General of the United Nations asking
them to use their good offices to induce the Greek Government to show clemency.
In Greece such a step, while not infringing national sovereignty, would restore
an atmosphere favourable to the settlement of those differences which had brought
the country to its present passJ*
In the opinion of the United Kingdom, the matter wa3 beyond the competence
of the United Nations. The Committee could not, in her opinion, prevent the
1. ibid, paras. 61-62.
2. ibid, para. ?2.
3. ibid, 295th mtg., para. 2.
it-. ibid, para. 5.
Greek Government from administering justice on its own territories or from
passing sentences* The First Committee was not, Sir Terence Shone re*
minded the Members, a oourt of appeal and should proceed without further de¬
lay to deal with matters within its competence *^"
Similarly, Belgium opposed the Soviet proposal because it sought to
2
substitute the First Committee for the Court of Appeals*
Poland, on the other hand seemed to think that humanitarian interests
rendered Article 2(7) of no account*
4
Chile and KL Salvador opposed it more for political reasons*
The position of Ecuador was similar to that adopted by Mexico * Like
Mexico, Ecuador did not want to see any direct approach made to the Greek
Government on this subject, but on the other hand did feel that some measures
should be taken to indicate the feelings of the Members of the Committee*
On the one hand, the Eouadarean representative maintained that the matter
was not entirely within the cbmeatio Jurisdiction of Greeoe* It had, in his
opinion,certain international repuroussions, a view whioh would aeon to indi¬
cate that in his country *s opinion, the United Nations would be competent to
deal with it* On the other hand, however, he thought that the First
Committee was not competent to approach the Greek Government directly. In
his opinion the First Committee could only recommend the conciliation com¬
mission to appeal to the Greek Government in the most suitable manner in order
1* ibid, para* 10*
2* ibid, para* 12*
3* ibid, para* 14*
4* ibid, paras. 17-18; and 19*20 reap*
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to establish an atmosphere of conciliation. Alternatively, if the conciliation
conusission were not to oontinue its work it would, in the opinion of Ecuador, be
in order for the Chainsan of the first Committee to open negotiations and to come
to some agreement with the Greek delegation concerning the suspension of these
executions.1
Colombia recognised that the First Committee was not competent to entertain
specific oases and that only the State concerned could apply laws and impose
sentences. Nevertheless, in her opinion, the First Committee could not turn a
deaf ear to the appeals for leniency and to that end she submitted the following
2
resolution:
In connection with the discussions regarding the death sentences
pronounced by the military tribunals in Greece, and with a view to
seeking an atmosphere of conciliation and justice in the world,
The First of the General Assembly addresses a request
to all the Governments of the world that death sentences already
passed for crimes of a political nature be suspended taking into
consideration that a universal practice of clemency would favour
the plans for the re-adjustment of peace and security.
A general resolution of the type proposed by Colombia found another
supporter in Chile. Her representative said that Chile oould not support a
resolution whioh dealt with specific cases. Suoh a resolution went beyond
the competence of the United Nations. However, he was prepared, he said, to
support one which included all possible cases of political executions taking
3
place in countries in which a state of war existed.
Again, in the 296th meeting of the First Committee, the Mexican delegate,
Mr. de Alba, stressed that the only way in which the Greek Government oould be
4
approached in this matter was indirectly.
1. ibid, paras.
2. ibid, paras. 48-54; the text of the resolution is to be found in G.A. ,(IV),
1st Com., Annexes, a.i.21, p. 16, Doc. VC.1/510.
3. G.A., (IV), 1st Com., 296th mtg., paras. 1-3.
4. ibid, para. 10.
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Conversely, Canada claimed that the natter of the death sentences vas al¬
together outside the competence of the United Nations.*
The humanitarian aspeots of the natter, however, persuaded Paraguay also
that something ought to be done. In her opinion, the problem had a dual aspect,
a legal and a humanitarian one. As regards the legal aspect, Mr. Boettner said
that clearly the First Connittee was not a court of appeal and did not have the
necessary evidence to make a decision. Moreover, if it did so, it night also
be violating the principle of non-intervention in the internal affairs of
States. As regards the humanitarian aspect, however, swathing had to be dons.
In his opinion, the oorreot course for the First Connittee to take would be to
appeal for leniency for those oondenned to death by military tribunals and for
an end to acts of sabotage and terrorism which often resulted in the death of
2
innocent victims.
7110 Soviet Union maintained that it was not a question of interfering in
3
the internal affairs of a State but a natter of conscience.
(•) Other resolutions subnitted on this subject at the fourt session.
In the oourse of this second part of the debate on this item, the delega¬
tions of Uruguay and Ecuador also subnitted resolutions designed to secure
olemency for those under sentence of death.
(i) Thy Uruguayan Draft Res<flut;lon.
A
The draft resolution submitted by the delegation of Uruguay was as follows:
Tyapfi iBSA the problem of criminal
punishment arising out of the discussion of the item on
1. ibid, para. 14.
2. ibid, paras. 24-26. Paraguay submitted a proposal to this effect, Doc.
VC.1/509, the text of which is not, however, reproduced in the annexes.
3. ibid, para. 33.
4. &.A., (IV), 1st Com., Annexes, a.i.21, p. 17. Uoo* i/C.l/51l/Rev.l.
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the threats to the political independence and territorial
integrity of Greece, and with a view to avoiding any a priori
pronouncement, whether explicit or implicit, in connection with
the expressions of disapproval voiced, and,
Having due regard to the ideas and sentiments dominant
in the minds of the representatives who have taken part in
the discussion of this item,
The F^fft Cq^jttae,
Resolves
To recommend the commutation of all death sentences passed
in any of the countries applying this penalty in accordance
with their domestic legislation.
Urglg them at the same time to eliminate this penalty from
their legislation.
(ii) praH
The draft Ecuadorian resolution was as follows: ^
The First Committee.
Requests the President of the General Assembly to
negotiate with the representatives of the Government of
Greece concerning the suspension of death sentences passed
toy military courts for political reasons, as long as the
Conciliation Committee is in existence.
(f) Thp qyeptfop pf Cqapgftmop.
After all these proposals had been discussed the delegates of Venezuela and
Lebanon each proposed that the question of the competence of the Committee to
2
decide on them should be dealt with.
In this case, however, the question of competence was more complicated than
at first sight it seemed, and the resultant votes on this subject did nothing to
clarify it.
there was the question whether the Committee had indeed been competent
to discuss the matter. Secondly, if the Committee was competent to discuss the
matter, it had to be decided whether or not it was competent to adopt any of the
proposals concerned. This latter question was more than usually complicated, for
1. lb$ t, p. 17, Doc. ys.VSl^Rev.l.
2* G.A., (IV), 1st Com., 297th mtg., paras. 19 and 16 resp.
not only had it to be decided whether or not the action proposed amounted to
intervention in the domestic affairs of Greece, but there was also an internal
constitutional problem to be dealt with. As the delegate of Venezuela reminded
the Committee,the First Committee could not make direct recommendations to a
Member State* Only the General Assembly had this power* The First Committee
had no executive power*
When, however, the question of competence was put to the vote, it was not
clear what aspect of the competence problem was being dealt with* Most States
seem to have confined their attention to those aspects of the competence question
which revolve round Article 2(7) • However, it oannot be ruled out that the
internal constitutional aspect also affected their votes*
It must be remembered that this was a matter of urgency* Lives were at
stake, but it is not clear whether the draft resolutions of, for example, the
Soviet Union, Colombia and Uruguay were designed as a direct appeal to the
Members concerned from the First Committee, or were to have been referred to
the General Assembly, which would have been the only legal course of aotion*
If, however, they were intended to have been direct appeals from the First
Committee, it may well bo that this internal constitutional flaw was re¬
sponsible for their being voted incompetent* Unfortunately, however, these
are matters of oonjecture, for the matter was not made clear*
Even the fashion in which the question of competence was posed by the
Chairman of the Committee is not conducive to clarity* With reference to the
.Soviet proposal he said that he would put to the vote the question of whether
2
or not the Committee was incompetent to examine the draft resolution* But
1* ibid, para* 19*
2* ibid, para* 41*
with reference to the Paraguyan and Colombian proposals he put to the vote the
question of the eorapetonoe of the Committee to adopt thera.^ In putting the
Uruguayan draft resolution to the test of competence the Chairman said that
the Committee would vote on the question of competence "with regard to* the
2
Uruguayan draft. 131th reference to the Eouadorean draft resolution, the
3
question put was whether the Committee was competent to take a vote thereon.
It will be evident that these ways of presenting the question of competence
to the Committee do not at all correspond. To ask if the Committee is compe¬
tent to examine a proposal is to ask whether in faot it has the power to discuss
the matter at all. On the other hand, to enquire if the Committee is competent
to adopt a proposal assumes that it is competent to examine it, but that there
still remains some doubt as to the legality of Its adoption, To put to the
vote the question of competence *with regard to* a proposal is to ask for a
vote on all aspects of the competence problem at once.
No doubt the Chairman was under the impression that he was putting the same
question to the vote each time. Unfortunately, he was not and the results of
these votes serve only to further complicate the issue.
The Committee voted that it was not competent to adopt the proposals of the
Soviet UnioaJ" Paraguay,*5 or Colombia,** and that it was incompetent with regard
1. ibid, paras. 42 and 43 reap.
2, ibid, para. 44,
3* ibid, para. 61,
4, ibid, para, 41J 31 votes to 16, with 12 abstentions,
5, ibid, para. 4-2; 4-0 votes to 7, with 10 abstentions.
6, ibid, para. 43 J 39 vote3 to 8, with 8 abstentions.
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to that of Uruguay.^" However, it held that it was competent to vote on the
2
Ecuadorean proposal by 31 votes to 16, with 12 abstentions.
The Committee having decided it was competent to vote on the Ecuadorean
proposal, Ecuador introduced at the next meeting a revised version of its draft
*
resolution which was as follows s
The First Committee,
Requests the President of the General Assembly to ascertain
the views of the Government of Greece concerning the suspension
Of death sentences passed by military courts for political
reasons, as long as the Conciliation Committee is in existence.
4
This resolution was adopted by 40 votes to 4 with 10 abstentions,
(g) Conclusions.
For the eeasons already indicated, it i3 difficult to draw any definite
conclusions from the votes lafoich took place on the question of competence. The
Soviet proposal was addressed to Creek Government, whilst those of Colombia and
Uruguay were addressed to any count ry which imposed the death penalty for such
offences. The fact that in these draft resolutions the First Committee appears
to address the Members directly may well have been the reason for the negative
votes on competence.
Nevertheless, among those states which did rest their arguments regarding
1. ibid, para. 44j 40 votes to 8, with 8 abstentions.
2. ibid, para. 61. The details of voting were as follows:
In favour: Mexico, Netherlands, New Zealand, Nicaragua, Norway, Panama,
Paraguay, Philippines, Poland, Syria, Ukrainian S.S.R., U.S.S.R., Thailand,
Uruguay, Venezuela, Yemen, Yugoslavia, Afghanistan, Brazil, Byelorussian
S.S.R., Cuba, Czechoslovakia, Dominican Republic, Ecuador, France,
Guatemala, Honduras, Iceland, India, Iran, Israel.
Against: Pteru, U.K., Argentina, Belgium, Burma, Canada Chile, China,
Colombia, Denmark, Egypt, El Salvador, Ethiopia, Greece, Lebanon, Luxembourg,
Abstaining: Pakistan, Saudi-Arabia, Sweden, Turkey, Union of South Africa,
U.S.AAustralia, Bolivia, Costa Rica, Haiti, Iraq, Liberia.
3. ibid, 298th ffltg., para. 2.
4. ibid, para. 13. No roll-call was requested.
competence on Article 2(7), rather on the internal constitutional problems,
there was a tendency to say that some kind of resolution on the subject
would haw been competent, while others would not. There was evident again
the same tendency to differentiate between different types of recommendations
and to choose the one which because of its terms, did not seem to contravene
the provisions of the Charter.
As in the previous phase of this matter, it will be noted however that
the type of resolution which was finally adopted was one which did not
address a formal appeal to the Greek Government, but left the matter in the
hands of a United Nations official. It was left to informal talks and
negotiations, there being a distinct aversion on the part of several States
which were concerned to avoid any hint of intervention, to any direct approach
to a Government regarding the conduct of its courts. This does suggest that
such matters were felt by the majority to be within the domestic jurisdiction
of States, thus prohibiting the United Nations from bringing direct pressure
to bear on them to alter their conduct. Squally, however, this debate
suggests that even where a matter is felt to be within tlie domestic juris¬
diction of a Member, an offer of mediation or some other conciliatory move
made informally through an officer of the United Nations does not amount to
intervention therein.
(h) The Fourth Henary Session.
At the plenary session, yet another attempt was made by the Soviet Union
to have the United Nations address a direct appeal to the Greek Government to
suspend various death sentences. At the 244th plenary meeting, Mr, Vyshinsky
introduced the following resolution. ^
1. G.A. ,(IV), Plen., Annexes, a,i.21, p. 68, Doc.A/L080,
Taking note of the fact that the military courts of Greece
are at the present time continuing to pass death sentences on
members of the people's liberation movement and that on IS
October last the Athens military court sentenced to death eight
prominent public figures, heroic fighters against the Hiterite
invaders - Evangelia Saradzis, Dimitrios houratidis, Artemios
Joanidis, Sotirios Barboun&kls, Georgios Illopoulos, Jakavos
Thamelis, Antonios Streklakos and Katharine Telahni (Zevgos),
and that the Military Tribunal in Piraeus has sentenced to
death Dr. Spiros Kritaitis,
The General Assembly requests the Greek Government to
suspend the carrying out of the death sentences in regard to
the above mentioned persons and to repeal these sentences.
In introducing this resolution, the Soviet delegate, Mr. Vyshinaky
maintained that it did not amount to intervention in the domestic affairs
of Greece. It ms more, he claimed, a question of conscience and of the
honour of the United Nations. It was an appeal to huiaanity, not an example
of intervention."1'
These views were not, however, shared by the United Kingdom, which main-
2
tained that the United Nations was not competent to deal with such a subject.
As before, however, it was the middle course which won the day. The
delegate of El Salvador pointed out that the powers of reprieve were vested in
the Greek Government and could be exercised by it alone. In consequence, no
pressure could be brought to bear on Greece as to how or when she should do so.
Nevertheless, while El Salvador was not prepared to ask the Cbreek Government
to quosh the sentences passed by its courts, it was willing to support a move where¬
by the Chairman and Vice-Chairman of the First Committee would be instructed to
consult with the representatives of Greece, so that the latter could communicate
to their Government the tenor of the discussions which had taken place in the
1. ibid, lien, 244th rotg., para. 155.
2. ibid, paras. 165-164.
United Nations and "so that the Greek Government itself, without any pressure
on the part of the United Nations, might take the decision which was most
1
appropriate and moat consistent with Justice".
The Soviet Union withdrew its draft resolution, and the Ecuadorean dele¬
gation introduced a draft resolution requesting the President of the General
g
Assembly to communicate with the Greek Government on the subject. This
draft resolution was in substance the same as that adopted by the First Corn-
s
mittee and was adopted by the General Assembly.
3. The Fifth Session.
So far, the general tendency had been to favour resolutions which placed
on an officer of the United Nations, the Chairman of the First Committee, The
President of the General Assembly or the Secretary General, the responsibility
of making informal contact with the Greek Government in an effort to ensure
commutation of the death sentences concerned. The prevailing opinion seemed
to be that this would not violate /article 2(7) of the Charter. However at
the fifth session of the General Assembly, a Soviet proposal to this effect
was defeated.
The first item on the agenda of the First Committee at the fifth session
was the problem of the independence of Korea but as soon as the proceedings of
the Committee were opened, the Soviet delegate introduced a resolution concerning
the death sentences passed by Greek courts and requested that this matter be
dealt with first as it was a natter of urgency. The resolution was as
4
follows:
1. Ibid, 246th mtg., para. 23.
2. ibid, 268th mtg., para. 130.
3. ibid, para. 151.
4. G.A.,(V), 1st Corn., Vol.1, 346th mtg., para. 11.
Taking note of the fact that the military courts in
Greece are at the present tiiae continuing to paas death
sentences on members of the Greek trade unions and the
people*s liberation movement, the First Committee requests
the President of the General Assembly to enter into
negotiations with the representatives of the Greek Government
concerning the repeal of the death sentences passed by the
military courts on Greek patriots, including the eleven
Greek patriots named in their mother's letter of 18
September last and the eight trade union officials named ,
in the memorandum of their relatives of 16 September last.
However, despite the alleged urgency of the matter, a Philippine pro¬
posal to give priority to the first item on the agenda, viz., the Korean
2
independence question, was carried, and consideration of the Soviet pro¬
posal was postponed till later.
The whole Greek question was taken up at the 592nd meeting. With
particular reference to the death sentences and her own proposal on that
subject, the Soviet delegate urged the Committee to take a humanitarian atti-
s
tude. Turkey, on the other hand, doubted the competence of the Committee to
study the Soviet proposal as, in her opinion, it was incompatible with the
principle of non-intervention. Australia adopted a similar attitude and
remarked that the Soviet views were inconsistent with the stand she had taken
5
on a similar matter in Bulgaria, Ifungary and Roroania#
6
Greece, having replied to the substance of the matter, moved the
immediate suspension of the debate and that a vote be taken on the Soviet
1. The letters referred to are to be found in G.A.,(V), annexes Vol. I, a.i.,22,
p. 51, Doc.A/C.1/561.
2. G.A. ,(V), 1st Com., 546th mtg., para. 25.
5. ibid, 593rd mtg., para. 14.
4. ibid, para. 29.
5. ibid, para. 51.
6. ibid, paras. 17-26.
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draft resolution. The Greek taction was carried, and the Soviet proposal was
5
defeated try 31 votes to 6, with 12 abstentions.
No decision was taken on the competence of the Committee to adopt this
draft resolution. Thus, it is not clear from this vote whether the First
Comoittee had reversed its previous position and decided that it was not com¬
petent to adopt such a resolution, or whether it was merely of the opinion
that the resolution was not opportune. It is suggested that the latter is
a more likely conclusion.
4. The Sixth Session.
During further discussions on the threats to the political independence
and territorial integrity of Greece, the Soviet delegate again brought up the
subject of death sentences passed on Greek nationals by Greek courts. Mr.
4
Malik, the Soviet Representative, introduced the following draft resolution
The Ad Hoc Political Committee,
Drawing attention to the fact that special military
tribunals in Greece are still passing death sentences
against the representatives of Greek democratic organ¬
izations and that the Athens Special Military Tribunal on 16
November 1951 passed death sentences against the following
Greek patriots: Iiikolaos Beloyannis, Slli Ioannidou, Stergios
Grammenos, Dimitrios Kalopholias, Theodora Geargiadou, Aphrodite
Maniati, Aphan&sios Kanellopoulos, Dimitrios Kanellopoulos,
Ratroa Rapapikolaou, Evstaphios Dromazos, Calliope Bapadopoulou
and Liza Kottou.
Requests the President of the General Assembly to enter
into negotiations with the representatives of the Government
of Greece for the remission of the death sentences passed by
the Athens Special Military Tribunal on 16 November 1951
against the said twelve convicted Greek patriots.
1. para. 43.
2. ibid, para. 53.
3. ibid, para. 61. There was no roll-call.
4. G,a.,(VT), Ad Hoc Ebl.Goia., 1st mtg., para. 43.
In presenting this draft resolution, Mr. Malik said that the U.S.S.R.
delegation was motivated by high humanitarian principles and had due regard
for tlie principle of non-intervention in the domestic affairs of Member States
set forth in article 2(7) of the Charter* lie recalled that at its third and
fourth sessions, the General Assembly had adopted a humanitarian approach
towards a similar case and had passed resolutions which had prevented the
execution of several Greek patriots. He recalled that matters both national
and international in character affecting Greece had been discussed by the
United Nations for several years. He went an to maintain that the Com*
mittee'a consideration of the matter to which he had referred would not con¬
stitute interference in the domestic affairs of Greece, but would, on the
contrary, be a humanitarian undertaking by the United Nations with a view
to saving lives.1
This motion was not destined, however, to receive detailed treatment
from the Ad Hoc Political Committee. The Chairman, Mr* Sarper of Turkey,
stated that he would allow the representative of Greece to reply to the
statement of the Soviet Union* However, he indicated that he was opposed
to any discussion of this subject which was, in his opinion, irrelevant to
2
the item on the agenda, and declared he would rule it out of order.
A ruling from the Chair that discussion of this subject was out of order
was upheld by the Committee by 32 votes to 5, with 16 abstentions.5
At the end of the fourth and for the whole of the fifth meetings of the
Ad Hoc Political Committee, a discussion was held as to whether it was in order
far the representative of Uruguay to introduce a draft resolution which
1. ibid, p»ra. 43.
2. ibid, para. 45.
3. ibid, para. 58.
requested the President of the General ^^ssexably to use his good offices to
dissuade the Greek Government from executing the sentence vhich had been
pronounced. however, it ms decided at the fifth meeting that the Uruguayan
draft resolution was irrelevant to the subject under discussion and was there¬
fore inadmissible.
5. Conclusions.
The debates on the Greek question are not conducive to the formation of
any definite opinion on the question of whether a recommendation to a State
concerning its domestic affairs constitutes intervention, or, if some re¬
commendations are permissible, on what type of recommendations are within the
competence of the General Assembly and what types are not. The most that can
be said is that there was exhibited a tendency to view with disfavour any
formal recommendation to a State concerning the conduct of its courts but at
the sauie time there existed, side by side, a general feeling that in human¬
itarian questions, the United Nations, and the General Assembly in particular,
is not altogether powerless. However, such power as the General Assembly has
in such matters would seem, from this case history, to be strictly limited. At
most, it can make the feelings of its Members known to the State concerned, and
this only in a round about manner.
This conclusion, indefinite though it is, is nevertheless of value for it
shows yet again that even where there were such profound doubts as to the
competence of the United Nations to deal with a particular subject, a majority
of Members did not regard that as a reason to eschew all forms of action.
Some action was felt to be competent even if the matter were held to be
essentially within the domestic Jurisdiction of Greece.
II. Spain.
At the sixth session of tlie General Assembly a similar attempt was made
by Poland to have adopted a resolution dealing with certain death sentences
imposed by courts in Spain. However, little of any consequence can be ex¬
tracted from the debate on this matter. Eventually the entire matter was
bypassed by a procedural motion.
In the Third Committee, during a discussion on the draft International
Covenant of Human Bights, the Polish representative introduced the following
draft resolution*^
The Third Committee of the General -assembly,
Concerned over violations of human rights in Spain;
rioting that twenty-four inhabitants of Barcelona, among
them Gregario Lopez Baimundo, have been arranged before a
military court for participation in the Barcelona strike
and that they are under threat of the death penally,
Requests the President of the General Assembly to take
the necessary steps in order that the appropriate authori¬
ties in Spain take measures to ensure the cessation of the
persecution of the above-mentioned twenty-four inhabitants
of Barcelona and their immediate release.
Because of the urgency of this matter, the Palish representative, Mrs.
O
Domonska, requested that this natter be dealt with first. Guatemala and
g
the U.S.S.R. supported the Polish request.
Tire United States, on the other hand, maintained that the Polish pro¬
posal was entirely irrelevant to the subject under discussion. Mrs. Roosevelt
then added that the Chairman of the Ad Hoc Political Committee had ruled that
the Committee was not 'competent* to examine cases involving individuals and
that in virtue of that decision, the Polish draft resolution was out of
1. G-.A. ,(Vl), 3rd Com., 387th mtg. , para. 10; Doc.A/C.5/L.205.
2. ibid, para. 12.
3. ibid, para. 14.
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order."*"
Argentina maintained that the Consaittee mis incompetent to address ob-
2
vations to a State wliich was not a Member of the United nations. Denmark
felt that the Polish proposal was irrelevant to the question at hand and
3
that therefore the Committee was not *competent* to consider it. Haiti
then proposed that the question of competence be settled by vote, a pro-
4
posal later withdrawn.
There mis obvious a great deal of confusion in this debate and at the
suggestion of Mexico consideration of the Polish draft resolution was post-
g
poned for 48 hours to allow time for more factual information to be obtained.
When next this matter was taken up the Committee had before it also a
motion in the names of Brazil, Colombia, Costa Rica, Honduras, the Netherlands,
Nicaragua, Peru, U.K., U.S.A., and Venezuela to the effect that the substance
of the draft Polish resolution being outwith the scope of the draft inter¬
national covenant on human rights, a statement to that effect be placed by
6
the Rapporteur in his report.
1. ibid, paras. 17-18; 57-58. It will be noted that Mrs. Roosevelt*s
Statement is somewhat confused. First, she did not cite the
ruling of the Chairraan mentioned, which makes it difficult to
follow her line of argument. Secondly, no Chairman has power to
rule that a Committee is incompetent to examine a matter. That
is a question for the whole Committee to decide. But he does
have power to rule a matter out of order, and this is doubtless
what Mrs. Roosevelt was auggesting.
2. ibid, para. 56.
3. ibid, paras. 40-42. It will be evident that Denmark i3 also
using the word •competent* in a rather odd fashion here. If a
matter is irrelevant, it is out of order far the Committee to
consider it. The question of competence need not arise at all.
4. ibid, paras. 45; 53,
5. ibid, para. 61.
6. Doc •A/C. 5/L. 220.
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At this meeting,"*" the Chairman, Mrs. Ana Plgueroa of Chile and the re¬
presentative of Mexico spoke as though the Committee had to decide on its
2
competence to entertain the Polish draft# However, it was correctly
pointed out hy Lira. Roosevelt that the procedural motion before them was de¬
signed to avoid a decision on the question of competence. What it called for
was a decision on the relevance of the Polish resolution to the subject under
discussion, the draft international covenant of human rights. In her opinion,
the Polish resolution was not relevant and she pointed oat that the Consaittee
could not, on its own initiative, place new items on its agenda. In this
4
she was supported by Peru. Poland, on the other hand, claimed that her re-
5 6
solution was relevant. Nicaragua claimed that the matter was irrelevant to
the item on the agenda and at the same time constituted an intervention in
7
Spain's domestic affairs, which latter view was shared by Argentina, and
8 9 10 11
Bolivia. Ecuador, the Domlnioan Republic and Prance each felt that the Polish
1* 591st ratg*
2. ibid, para. 4.
3. ibid, paras. 6-10.
4. paras. 12-14.
5. para. 20.
6. ibid, paras. 22-25, a view not in keeping with her vote on the Ecuadorean
draft at the 4th session; see supra, p. 241.
7. ibid, paras. 24-27*
8. ibid, para. 85.
9. 392nd ratg., paras. 65-67.
10. ibid, para. 68.
11. ibid, para. 69.
i
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draft resolution was irrelevant to the matter under discussion.
Other States which spoke were prepared to support the Polish draft resolu¬
tion for a variety of reasons. Afghanistan3" gave it her support for humanita-
2
rian reasons. Haiti said that though the matter of competence had not been
formally raised, she thought that the Committee was competent because it was a
matter of human rights. ifexloo felt that the Polish resolution was purely
humanitarian in aspeot and declared her intention of supporting it.^ Uruguay
said that as it was a matter of human sights she considered it to be within the
i c ^
Committee's competence. Israel and Guatemala both indicated their support
for it on humanitarian grounds. Czechoslovakia felt that it was relevant to
7
the agenda item. In the opinion of the Soviet Union, the Polish draft did not
imply any interference in the domestic affairs of Spain. It did not ask the
General Assembly to intervene but, the Soviet delegate claimed, merely requested
8
the President of the Assembly to find ways and means of using his influence.
However, whether the Committee was oompetent to adopt such a resolution was
not decided in this oaso, for the procedural motion declaring it to be outwith
the soope of the agenda item was adopted by 28 votes to 13. with 13
1. ibid, 391st mtg., paras. 28-31.
2. ibid, paras. 34-38* Yet it should not be overlooked that this same State
had abstained in the -vote on whether the Committee was competent to
adopt the fiouadorean resolution at the fourth session. Haiti's views
on competence seem to bo rather undecided.
3. ibid, 392nd mtg., para. 53.
4. ibid, para. 54.
5. ibid, paras. 58-59.
8. ibid, paras. 60-61»




This debate is not a source of great enlightenment on the attitude of States
towards toe question of intervention. The adoption of the procedural draft
does not really demonstrate anything. It may well be that toe majority of
States did feel that the Polish draft was irrelevant to toe item under discus¬
sion at the time it was presented* On toe other hand* it may equally well be
that they found in tills a convenient method of disposing of an otherwise dif¬
ficult item on which they were not anxious to take any position.
It should be noted however, that the treatment given to this Polish draft
resolution was similar to that meted out to toe Soviet resolution concerning
the Greek sentences of death, presented to the Ad Hop Political Committee at
toe same session whioh was also byepaased by means of the rules of procedure.
It may be that this uso of procedural rules to byepasa the subject demonstrated
a hardening of attitude on the part of States towards what they were prepared
to aooept without raising toe cry of intervention. However, this is a matter
of speculation which is unsupported by any evidence. All that does emerge
from this example of a humanitarian appeal is continued uncertainty.
1, ibid, para. 97
Chapter IX
Post-Repertory Cases. 5"™.,::., .
In the period since the last supple.nent of the Repertory ma Issued, four
principal cases have been discussed in the General .assembly in which the ques¬
tion of doiiiestic jurisdiction was raised, but none of them is particular instructive
concerning intervention. These cases were those concerning Tibet, Oman, Angola and
Southern Rhodesia.
The Tibetan question was fundamentally one of human rights; the Oman! question,
one of aggression and colonialism; and those of Angola and Southern Rhodesia of
colonialism and human rights. Thus each of these cases involved questions which
are generally regarded as not essentially domestic a»y longer and hence the ques¬
tion of competence was not too important in any of them.
1. The case of Tibet.
This matter was discussed at the fourteenth, fifteenth and sixteenth sessions
and of course, in the substantive debates,the communist bloc resolutely adhered
to the strict definition of intervention. The United Kingdom, Prance and Belgium
tended to do likewise.However, the United States continued to maintain that,
2
in any case,discussion of a matter did not constitute intervention, and Finland
indicated her willingness to vote for a resolution of a general character which
3
did not specifically refer to Tibet.
2. The Question of Oman.
This subject was discussed at the fifteenth, sixteenth and seventeenth
1. United Kingdom: G.A. ,(XIV), Flen., 834th mfcg., paras. 18-28; but cf.
| FIga* f Vol m XXX > 1035th • t 95*971
Francei G.A.,(XIV), Flen., 852nd mtg., paras. 115-125; G.iu,(X7l),
Vol. HI, 1085th mtg., paras. 98-101.
Belgium: G.A«,(XIV), Flen., 852nd mtg., paras. 42-47.
2. G.A.,(XIV), Flen., 832nd mtg., paras. 80-94.
5. ibid, 851st mtg., para. 65-66.
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sessions* However, apart from British claims that the matter was domestic
and hence could not he discussed,* there was little concern with the question of
competence* Several States noted that there was a considerable doubt as to
the exact status of this territory and on that ground indicated their intention
2
to abstain from supporting any resolution on the subject. Otherwise this
subject affords little material that is of interest for present purposes.
5. and 4* The Questions of Angola and Southern Rhodesia.
As both these concerned a matter which has almost universally ceased to be re¬
garded as within the domestic jurisdiction of the States concerned, the question
of competence and hence of intervention was not discussed to any great extent.
The Portuguese and British Government3 maintained of course that the matters
were domestic and that therefore the United Nations was not competent to deal
5
with them. However they were almost alone in this.
However, one interesting point of comparison does emerge from these two
cases. The United Kingdom maintained that the United Nations was not
competent to deal with the Southern Rhodesian matter, though it must be admitted
that this has not prevented the British Government from co-operating to a considerable
degree with the Special Committee on Colonialism regarding the matter. However, in
the Angolan case, she adopted a somewhat more flexible approach. At the
sixteenth session Sir Patrick Dean did say that he doubted the competence of the
United Nations to intervene in the matter, but added that he would not go into
1. G*A.,(X7I), Sp.Bol.Cora., 299th mtg., para. 2j ibid, 301st mtg., para. 7.
2. ibid, 305th mtg., in particular, Greece, para. 12? Panama, para. 16;
Mexico, paras. 18-21; Colombia, paras. 22-24; and Sierra Leone, paras.
25—26.
3. Portugal: G.A.,(XVI), Plen., Vol. Ill, 1088th mtg., para. 12; and sue
also the statement of the South African delegate, ibid, 1102nd mtg.,
para. 11;
United Kingdom: G.A.,(XVI), Vol. Ill, 1120th ratg., para. 23.
the legal aspects of the case. Then, In discussing the proposals before the
Assembly he indicated that he opposed some as they ware too near to inter¬
vention; others because they were unsuitable; but said that he could support
some of thenu
1. Q-.A. ,(X7l), Hen., Vol. Ill, 1099th ratg., paras. 40-54,
Chapter
Tfa? V^olat^n of Hufap Rifihtg frn thq Uqion of Soviet S9oi^ipt
Rapublios and the Question of West New Guinea.
The overall picture of the trend in the interpretation of intervention found
in the practice of the General Assembly would not be complete without reference,
albeit brief, to two oases where there was no attempt at all to differentiate
between various types of recommendations. These two oases were the Violation
of Human Rights in the Soviet Union and the Question of West New Guinea, In
neither of these two cases was any attempt made to differentiate between various
types of recommendations, characterising some of them or certain provisions thereof
as intervention but approving of others. In both of then States relied on the
rigid approach to the question of competence, and as such the debates are not
very informative. However, a brief summary of the case histories of each is
included as they provide interesting points of comparison with the opinions
evinced by certain Members of the United Nations in other circumstances,
1* f*99? "if WrtP the Ufflop of Sqvjet Sqq^a^qt Repub^cs.
This case was discussed only at the third session of the General Assembly
and beoause of its legal overtones and the doubts which existed on the compe¬
tence of the United Nations to deal with it, it was referred to the Sixth
Committee,
From the debate in this Committee only two things emerge. First, the
Soviet Union and her allies adhered strictly to the view that where a matter
is within the domestic jurisdiction of a Member State, the United Nations is
incompetent to deal with it in aiy way. Secondly, western States were not
too keen to go into the legal merits of the case.
Despite the fact that the subject here involved concerned the 'right' of
a married woman to leave her country of origin in order to join her husband •
258.
which subject is explicitly dealt with in the Declaration of Human Rights - the
Soviet Union, supported by its allies, maintained, inter alia, that the matter was
within her own domestic jurisdiction.^
Despite Soviet objections, the General Assembly adopted a resolution re¬
commending her to alter her legislation on the subject. The terms of this re-
2
solution were as follows:
pie General Assembly.
Considering the item proposed by Chile on 'violation by
the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, of fundamental
human rights, traditional diplomatic practices and other
principles of the Charter*, which violation has consisted
in preventing the Soviet wives of citizens of other national¬
ities from leaving their country with their husbands or in
order to join them abroad, evenwhen they are married to
persons belonging to foreign diplomatic missions, or to
members of their families or retinue,
Considering that in the preamble to the Charter of the
United Nations all the signatory countries resolve 'to
reaffirm faith in fundamental human rights, in the dignity
and worth of the human person and in the equal rights of
men and women*,
Considering that Article 1, paragraph 3, of the Charter
binds all Members to encourage 'respect for human rights
and for fundamental freedoms for all without distinction
as to race, sex, language or religion', and that in Article
55o of the Charter the Members undertook to 'promote uni¬
versal respeot for, and observance of, human rights and
fundamental freedoms for all without distinction as to
race, sex, language or religion',
Considering that, finally, the Economic and Social
Council, in pursuance of the powers conferred upon it
by Artiole 62, paragraph 2, of the Charter, in its resolu¬
tion 134 (VII)D, dated 23 August 1948, deplored the
'legislative or administrative provisions which deny to
a woman the right to leave her country of origin and reside
with her husband in any other* and that the Universal
Declaration of Human Rights, formulated by tire United
Nations General Assembly in its Articles 13 and 16
1. For Soviet views see, G.A., (Ill/l), 6th Com., 133th mtg., p. 739} ibid, (113/2),
Plen., 196th mtg., p. 153; Czechoslovakia, (ill/l), 6th Com., 137th mtg.,
pp. 7^-749} Poland, ibid, pp. 753-757} ibid, (II3/2), Plen., 196th mtg., p.
149; Yufipqlavifr, ibid, (Ill/l), 6th Com., 138th mtg., pp. 760-761} Byelorussian
ibid* P. 761; Ukrainian S.S.R., ibid, {ill/2), Plan., 197th mtg.,
PP. 157-158.
2* lit'n' a»i»7(42), Doc. A/787, p. 18, para. 6; and seealso, G.A., (II3/2), Plen., 197th mtg., p. I63.
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provides that everyone has the right to leave any country
including his own and that men and women of full age have
the right to marry and without ary limitation due to race
and nationality or religion,
■Declares that the measures which prevent or coerce the
wives of citizens of other nationalities from leaving their
country of origin with their husbands or in order to join
them abroad, are not in oonforaity with the Charter; and
that when those measures refer to the wives of persons be¬
longing to foreign diplomatic missions, or members of their
families or retinue, they are contrary to courtesy, to
diplomatic practices and to the prinoiple of reciprocity,
and are likely to impair the friendly relations among
nations;
Recommends the Government of the Union of Soviet
Socialist Republics to withdraw the measures of such a
nature whioh have been adopted.
The question of competence in this oase was somewhat oompllcatod, for not
only had the Members to deoidt to what extent the United Nations could address
specific reoommendations to a State concerning the observation of human rights
inside its frontiers, but also whether international law had been broken, as
Chile oontended. Had international law been violated, then of courae the
question of competence would not have arisen. However, it is interesting
to note that despite the fact that the iesue of competence presented so many
facets, none of the Western Powers, whioh were usually so opposed to intervention,
dealt thoroughly with it. Nevertheleas, they were able to vote in favour of a
recommendation which issued specific directives to another Member State. This
attitude contrasts strangely with that already seen above.
The statement mads on behalf of the United Kingdom ty Mr. Gerald Fitzmaurice
is singularly lacking in legal analysis of the issues involved. He did not
commit himself either on whether the law of diplomatic immunity had been broken or
on the question of domestic jurisdiction. He said that if the case raised aiy
legal question his Government would support a request for an advisory opinion
from the International Court of Justioe. However, he then added that he did not
propose to argue the legal merits of the action taken by the Soviet Government.
Although Mr. Fitzraurice said that the British Government would support a
request to the International Court of Justice for an advisory opinion on any
2
legal question arising out of the item, he opposed an Australian proposal to
submit to the Court the question of whether or not international law had been
broken by the Soviet action. Speaking of this proposal, he said that he had no
objections to it, but wondered whether it was really necessary. Even if the
reply of the Court were that the Government of the Soviet Union had violated
international law, he said, the principals in the case would still be in the
Soviet Union. And if, on the contrary, the Court decided that the position of
the Soviet Government was legally justified, the authorities of the Soviet
Union would still be in the position of having violated fundamental human rights.
He was doubtful therefore whether a request to the Court for an advisory opinion
*
would contribute to the solution of the problem. Later, in explaining his
vote against the Australian proposal, he said that this proposal would serve no
useful purpose as the complaint against the U.S.S.H. was not a legal matter but a
4
question of human rights.
It should be remembered, however, that while the United Kingdom did not have
any difficulty in voting in favour of a recommendation which indicated to the
Soviet Government specific measures which it had to take, in the case dealing with
the treatment of people of Indian origin in the Union of South Africa, she opposed
similar recommendations, though they too were concerned with questions of human
1. G.A., (IIIA), 6th Com., 135th mtg., pp. 731-733.
2. G.A., (HlA)t 6th Com., Annexes, a.i.42, p. 56, Doc. A/C.6/316.
3. ibid, 6th Corn. 137th ratg., p. 752.
4. ibid, 138th mtg., p. 781.
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rights.
The delegation of the United States likewise did not deal too well with
the legal issues involved, though it did at least commit itself to the view
that questions of human rights are not within the domestic jurisdiction of
1
States.
The French delegation noted that there were both legal and practical
aspects to this question, but unfortunately did not deal too well with the
2
legal. The French delegate said that*
If, therefore, the General Assembly were to have
competence, either there must be an international agree.,
ment, or the situation must be such as to be likely to
impair friendly relations among nations. Even if the
first of those alternatives were not established, the
recognition of the second would make it possible for the
General Assembly to have competence in the matter.
The French delegation therefore considered the Chilean
delegation request to be admissible. The Assembly had
the right to determine whether the nature of the situation
to which the Chilean delegation had drawn attention was
likely to impair relations between nations.
There is much merit to what the French delegate said here. However it
should be noted that what he says regarding the right of the Assembly to
determine the existence of a situation which, is likely to impair the
friendly relations among nations, relates more directly to the question of in¬
clusion of the item on the agenda and the right to discuss it, rather than to
the competence to adopt this specific recommendation. Furthermore, even
allowing for the fact that such a situation did exist, French actions on this
occasion contrast strangely with those taken in the debates on the item dealing
1, ibid, 155th mtg., pp. 755-759.
2, ibid, 157th mtg., p. 750.
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with the treatment of people of Indian origin in the Union of South Africa.
In the present case France waa able to vote in favour of a resolution which
gave specific directions to the Soviet Govemrient regarding her donatio
legislation, and this without coming to a definite conclusion as to compe¬
tence. On the other hand, in the case regarding the treatment of people of
Indian origin in the Union of South Africa, even though a situation existed
which had Impaired the friendly relations among nations (as opposed to the
present case where it was only possible that a situation existed which was
likely to impair these relations) France objected strongly to any recommendation
which issued such directives, end always insisted that any recommendation,
because of the doubts on competence, had to be kept on a general plane. There
is a strange ambivalence of opinion here.
It is, in fact, difficult in this case to avoid farming the impression that
political considerations outweighed the legal.
2. The Question of West Mew Guinea (West Irian)*
In 1948, the Netherlands and Indonesia had signed a 'Charter of Transfer of
Sovereignty', which provided that 'The Kingdom of the Netherlands unconditionally
and irrevocably transfers complete sovereignty over Indonesia to the Republic of
the United States of Indonesia*. However, this Charter of Transfer of Sovereignty
left in doubt the legal status of West New Guinea. Article 2 of the Charter of
Transfer of Sovereignty stated that the status quo of the residency of New Guinea
should be maintained, with the stipulation that within one year from the date of
the transfer of sovereignty to the Republic of the United States of Indonesia, the
question of the political status of New Guinea would be determined through nego¬
tiations between the two states.
1. For further details see Repertory, Suppl. No. 1, Vol. I, p. 44, paras.
70-72.
The negotiations which had been held as a result of this provision had
been unfruitful and the question was brought to the attention of the ninth
session of the General Assembly by the Indonesian delegation by a letter
dated 17th August, 1954*
The question was fundamentally one of the legal status of West New
Guinea, and whether the Charter of Transfer of Sovereignty had or had not
transferred sovereignty over this portion of the Dutoh East Indies to Indo¬
nesia or had left its status to be determined at a later date by negotiation,
2
The First Consnittee adopted the following resolution;
The General Assembly,
having considered agenda item 61, 'The question of lest
Irian, (West New Guinea)',
Recalling that by agreements reached at the Hague in
1949 between Indonesia and the Netherlands a new relation¬
ship between the two countries, as sovereign independent
States was established, but that it was not then possible
to reconcile the views of the parties on West Irian (West
New Guinea), which therefore remained in dispute,
Recalling the dedication of the parties to the
principle of resolving by peaceful and reasonable
means any differencies that exist or arise between them,
Realizing that oo-operation and friendship between
them is the coueaon desire of both parties,
1. Expresses the hope that the Governments of Indo¬
nesia and the Netherlands will pursue their endeavours
in respect of the dispute that now exists between them
to find a solution in conformity with the principles of
the Charter of the United Nations j
2. Requests the parties to report progress to the
tenth session of the General Assembly.
This resolution was adopted by 54 votes to 14, with 10
1. See the statement of the problem by the Dutch delegate, G.A., (IX),
ELen., 508th ratg., paras. 95-120.
2. G.A,,(IX), Annexes, a.i.,61, p. 4, Doc.A/C.1/8,110, sponsored jointly
by the delegations of Argentina, Costa Rica, Cuba, Ecuador, El Salvador,
India, Syria and Yugoslavia. This text was amended by Colombia;
see ibid, p. 5, para. 6, Doc. A/2851.
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abstentions."*"
The debates which took place an this subject are not, however, very
o 5
informative fear present purposes. Several States, e.g. Australia. , Belgium ,
4 5 6 7
the United Kingdom , France , Turkey , and Luxembourg took up the familiar
stand that as the natter was within the doioestic jurisdiction of the
Netherlands, the United Nations was not competent to entertain it. Others,
a 3 9
e.g., south Africa , and Canada , doubted the competence of the United Nations
in the natter. None of these statements, however, contributed anything that
had not already been said many times in the course of other debates.
This resolution was not adopted by the General Assembly as none of its ports
1. ibid, 1st Com., 755th mtg., para. 102. The details of voting were as
follows:
In favour > Bakistan, Paraguay, Beru, Poland, Saudi-Arabia, Syria, Thailand,
Ukrainian S.S.H., U.S.S.R., Uruguay, Venezuela, Yemen, Yugoslavia,
Afghanistan, Argentina, Bolivia, Burma, Byelorussian 3.S.R., Costa Rica,
Cuba, Czecholovakia, Ecuador, Egypt, El Salvador, Ethiopia, Greece,
Guatemala, Honduras, India, Iran, Iraq, Lebanon, Liberia, Mexico.
Againsti Norway, Sweden, Turkey, Union of South Africa, U.K., Australia,
Belgium, Colombia, Denmark, Prance, Iceland, Luxembourg, Netherlands, New
Zealand.
Abstentions: Philippines, U.S.A., Brazil, Canada, Chile, China, Dominican
Republic, Indonesia, Israel, Nicaragua.
2. ibid, 727th mtg., para. 5.
5. ibid, para. 57.
4. ibid, 728th mtg., para. 2.
5. ibid, 731st ratg., para. 40.
6. ibid, 736th mtg., para. 12.
7. ibid, para. 22.
8. ibid, 734th ratg., paras. 50-42.
9. ibid. 735th ratg., para. 55.
received the required two-thirds majority.
The States which voted against paragraph 1 of the operative pert in the
o
plenary session were: Australia, Belgium, Brazil, Canada, Chile, China,
Colombia, Denmark, Dominican Republic, Branca, Iceland, Israel, Luxembourg,
the Netherlands, New Zealand, Nicaragua, Norway, Banama, Beru, Sweden, Turkey,
Union of South Africa, United Kingdom. Guatemala, Haiti and the United
States abstained.
Some of the States which cast negative votes did so because they con¬
sidered that the adoption of this resolution would have amounted to deciding
X
the legal issues in Indonesia's favour. Others voted against it or ab-
4
stained because of political doubts as to its wisdom.
An the States which were concerned with the question of intervention in
this case merely relied on the rigid non-technical definition, their statements
are not prima facie, of great interest. Nevertheless they do, when compared
with the other cases examined above, provide food, for thought.
It has already been seen how, in several of the cases examined above, even
the iaost ardent opponents of intervention in the domestic affairs of other
nations have been prepared to vote in favour of mild recommendations which
limited themselves to calling upon the State concerned to negotiate upon the
matter in question. Essentially, this was all that the resolution before the
1. ibid, Ken., 509th mtg., paras. 295-297.
2. ibid, para. 296.
3. See the statements of the Canadian delegation, ibid, para. 167;
of the Dominican Republic, ibid, paras. 230-237; and of Norway, ibid,
paras. 176-187.
4. See the statements of the delegations of Haiti, ibid, para. 144;
Australia, ibid, paras. 145-151 though Australia also had doubts on
the competence of the General Assembly to entertain the issue; and
Chile, ibid, paras. 152-163.
General Assembly did and yet it flailed to be adopted.
It may be that the failure of this recommendation to receive the required
majority was due mainly to political reasons, although this remains a matter
of conjecture. Nevertheless this case does compare rather oddly with the
others examined in this study."*"
1. This matter was raised again at the tenth session - see G.A., (X), Annexes,
a.i., 65, p. 1, Doo. A/2952. In the General Committee this request for
inclusion was opposed by the Netherlands and France on the grounds of
lack of competence • see ibid, Gen.Com., 104th mtg., paras. 15 and 45. The
General ^ssemb3y however included it and no formal objections were made to
this procedure - see ibid, HLen., 552nd mtg., para. 162. The matter was
referred to the first Committee.
However, before the matter was taken up in the First Committee, it was
announced that the Governments of the Netherlands and Indonesia had decided
to hold a conference to discuss "certain problems concerning New Guinea, it
being understood that with respect to its sovereignty each party maintained
its own position". See G»A*,(XE), Suppl. No. 1, --./3157, p. SO.
The matter was dealt with very briefly in the First Committee - in fact
the discussion took up all of two short paragraphs. The First Committee
limited itself to noting that the above agreements had been reached and
expressed the hope that the negotiations referred to in the joint announce¬
ment would be fruitful} - see ibid, 1st Com., 811st mtg., p. ras. 65-66;
for text of resolution, see ibid, Annexes, a.i.65, p. 4* It was stated
in the First Committee that both the Netherlands and Indonesia had been
informed of the text which had been submitted and that neither objected
to it. It was adopted without objection* Similarly, the General
Assembly adopted this text without objection, see ibid, Plen., 559th
mtg., para. 117.
The question of the status of West New Guinea was not settled however
until 1965 £See 10 U.N. Review, No. 5, p. 6 (1965); and also 9 U.N.
Review, No. 9, pp. 1, 4-5 , 59, (1962)__7 and in the meantime the United
Nations was frequently called upon to consider the matter. However, it
does not appear that in these subsequent debates the matter of domestic
jurisdiction and intervention was raised. This i3 perhaps not surprising
as the dispute between Indonesia and the Netlierlands ended finally in open
warfare.
Chapter XI
Conclusions - The General Assembly.
The practice of the General assembly regarding the question of "the
authority of the United Nations to 'intervene* within the meaning of Article
2(7) of the Charter", examined in the foregoing Chapters demonstrates the
existence of a general though almost unacknowledged trend* Initially, at
San Francisco, the intention was to debar the United Nations from discussing
or adopting any recom erkiation concerning any domestic matter* This, however,
was found to be a particularly difficult rule to follow and one which tended
to circumscribe too closely the workings of the United Nations, and in
particular, the General Assembly, not least because of the difficulty of
deciding when a matter was no longer essentially within the domestic Juris¬
diction of a State* The majority of States which made pronouncements on this
subject continually declared their support for the original intention, but then
by degrees a different pattern of action began to take shape - almost unnoticed*
States which stressed the importance of adhering to the letter of Article 2(7),
as originally conceived, took part in debates on matters which they considered
to fall within the domestic Jurisdiction of some particular nation arid began
to vote for various kinds of mild resolutions which in some degree dealt with
such matters* They began to tacitly accept that mere discussion of such
matters was not an action to which exception should reasonably be taken.
Bven the most ardent opponents of the technical definition of intervention
have done this. Hone of these States have, it roust be admitted, come out
into the open and formally altered their declared interpretation of Article 2(7, .
Furth rraore, it roust also be admitted that when it suits them, they quite easily
revert to their rigid support far the broad or non-technical definition of
intervention. But, if account is taken of their actions in these various
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cases, If account is taken of their voting records in the matters examined in
the foregoing chapters, it is submitted that a general tacit consensus will be
found among the Members of the United Nations to the effect that mere discus¬
sion of and the adoption of certain kinds of recomrnendationa by the General
Assembly dealing with domestic affairs are not now prohibited by Article 2(7).
The typesof recasaaendations which appear to have won general acceptance
are ones which moke a general appeal to States to reconsider some domestic
policy in the light of the principles Inscribed in the Charter or which call
on such States to negotiate with an internal faction with which it is having
trouble. Such recommendations, which confine themselves to expressing the
general feelings of the vast majority of the Assembly and which are directed
principally to finding a solution for some serious situation, albeit an internal
one, have won a fairly general acceptance.
It must be admitted that this acceptance is, at the moment, only, as it
were, on sufferance. There being no formal coasaitiaent to this effect, States
are free to revert to their old rigid positions whenever they wish. This in
itself is to be deprecated. What is perhaps worse, however, is that side by
side with this tacit acceptance of a new definition of intervention, States
still make a show of adhering to the old non-technical definition. On the
one hand they continue to declare that because of Artiel 2(7) the General
Assembly cannot deal in any way with a domestic matter, and on the other, they
go ahead and vote for some kind of mild recommendation which does deal with
such matters or with matters which they maintain are domestic. It is
submitted that it would be to everyone's advantage if account were taken of
the pattern of interpretation which has grown up and some agreement formally
made not to consider any longer simple discussion and those types of re¬
commendations as intervention in the domestic affairs of States.
Two question remain to be considered before attention ia turned to the
practice of the Security Council on the question of intervention* One, is
this development in the meaning of intervention vis A vis the General Assembly
in keeping with the general structure of the United Nations and terms of the
Charter? Two, is this development Itself desirable?
In answer to question One, it is submitted that this development in the
interpretation of the term 'intervene' in the practice of the General Assembly
is in keeping with the general structure of the United Nations and the terms of
the Charter, and that an agreement to interpret this term in this way in the
future would not do fundamental violence to the terms of the Charter* To
avoid repetition, however, the reasons for this submission are not discussed
here, but in Chapter I, Volume III, "The Definition of Intervention in the
Security Council"*
In answer to question Two, it is submitted that this development in the
General Assembly is not undesirable, provided it is properly controlled*
Despite the historical accuracy of the broad or non-technical inter¬
pretation of intervention which, it is submitted, cannot reasonably be doubted
given the drafting history and actual wording and structure of the Charter, it
seems in many respects to have become objectionable given the circumstances of
the present day* It seems out of keeping with the mystique which has come
to surround the United Nations as an entity* It seems to conflict with the
place which the United Nations has come to hold in international society. It
seems antithetical to the spirit which is the driving force behind much of the
work of the United Nations*
The United Nations being an international organization with a written
constitution, it is able to act in accordance only with the powers with which
it has been endowed* But in the minds of men it has come to be son© thing
more than this* It has come to be regarded aa something more than a peace¬
keeping machine, though the importance of this function should not be deni¬
grated in any way, far peace is the condition precedent upon which all else
depends*
Today, it is fair to say that people have come to look to the United
Nations to provide not only peace and security but also those conditions of
stability and well-being of which article 55 speaks. They have come to look
to the United Nations for assistance in raising their standards of living, and
in promoting economic and social progress* They have cone to regard the
United Nations as the chaiapion of human rights and fundamental iVeedoms* In
the period since its foundation the United Nations has come to be regarded as
a universal organization, not only in respect of its projected membership but
also of function*
The functions of the United Nations could broadly be said to be two - the
maintenance of international peace and security and the promotion of social and
economic progress and well-being* In effect, however, these two functions
could be reduced simply to one of a paramount nature - the promotion of the
well-being of the individual. So much of the Charter - if not all - is in
effect devoted to this end. Chapters IX, X, XI, XII and XIII are directly
concerned with the promotion of individual well-being. Even the Charter pro¬
visions dealing with international peace and. security can be looked an as steps
to this end, for interna ional peace and security is not an end in itself, but
rather something which is sought after because of the untold benefit it would
being to people*
This fact of international life, this paramount concern to ensure the
steady improvement in the material and cultural well-being of the peoples of
the world is surely symptomatic of a new attitude of mind in tiie world, a new
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attitude which necessitates & change in the climate of legal thought which
has heretofore governed the relations of States inter se. It is true that
mary nations would never have considered joining the United Nations if they
had envisaged that. lt would, or could, become an omnipotent busybody, going
K>.y . V
round poking its nose into everybody*a affairs. But given the facts of
international life today, the conditions of interdependency which prevail even
far the most powerful of nations, are States not bound to relax the strictures
with which they have surrounded the United Nations? Ey signing the Charter
are States not now, morally at least, under a duty to adopt a much mare flexible
attitude towards what they regard as intervention in their domestic affairs?
Teclinically, discussion of and a fortiori recommendations and studies
concerning the domestic affairs of particular States do constitute invervention.
Ho other conclusion is reasonably possible, given the terms of the Charter and
the drafting history thereof. But in view of the changing world opinion on
many subjects, the doubt which surrounds even the usefulness of the con¬
cept of domestic jurisdiction and the ever increasing interdependency of
nations in almost all respects, can it not he said that irrespective of the
nature of the subject matter involved the General Assembly, under the con¬
ditions which prevail today, ought to have the right, legal as well as moral,
to discuss any matter "brought before it, but to discuss it objectively, with
a view to helping the State concerned to find a solution to its difficulties,
a solution which is not only just but honourable to the State concerned? Sir
Pierson Dickson, the United Kingdom representative, was teclmically correct when
he said:"*"
Now, it has been suggested by some speakers in this
debate that the stand which others have taken on «rticle
2, paragraph 7, of tlie Charter is legalistic. But that
1. (*.A.,(X), Hen., 529th ratg., para. 158.
provision is in the few* This of oourae is not the first time
in hiiinan history that the law has been dismissed as legalistic
when it is found inconvenient. Both the letter and the spirit
of the Charter require that each Member State should be left
to manage its own affairs in its own territories. Should not
that principle una provision appeal to every Member of this
Organisation?
The strength and exactitude of these statements should not be underestimated
or denied. However* the question whioh we have to face is whether the world
can continue to bow to end be governed by such technicalities? Given the fact
that we cannot afford* nor should we wish, to enforce our views on our neighbours,
should not the world organisation through the General Assembly at least be able
to disouss any problem, no matter how remote from a threat to world peace in the
etrict sense of that term, in order that it might be in a better position to lend
whatever assistance it con to a State whioh, for whatever reason, finds itself in
difficulties? M. Spook of Belgium was technically oorreot when he said that the
General Assembly had no right to disouss the question of Algeria just because
blood was being spilled* or because it was of international oonoern. The merit
of his remarks should not be overlooked. The present wording of the Charter
does say that nothing in it shall authorise the United Nations to intervene etc.
But the question which really has to be asked is: In view of the emergent nature
of the United Nations as a world political organization to which the nations and
the peoples of the world look more and more for the solution of their own and
everybody else's problems, to what end should the functions of this body be de¬
voted and directed? dliould it be the principal concern of the Members of the
United Nations to adhere to the unchanging letter of the Charter dedicated as it
is in so many ways to the preservation of national sovereignty or should cogni¬
zance be taken of the caorgent purpose of the Organization and a conscious effort
made to revise oertain aspects of its legal orientation?
It is submitted that the exigencies of present international life predicate
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that the latter course he adopted* International life ia now hardly possible
on an isolationist basis* The peoples of each nation are becoming sore and
store interdependent and in auoh circumstances it seeds rather out of date to
limit the powers of the General Assembly by the X%3 ideas of intervention* It
is submitted that present day conditions demand that nations formally revise their
conception of what they consider as Intervention by the General Assembly in their
domestic affairs and openly accept that objective discussion of and recommendations
concerning any subjeot mentioned in the Charter* albeit that for other legal
purposes it remains essentially within their domestic jurisdiction* no longer
oonsitute intervention* Discussions carried out and recommendations adopted
principally with a view to assisting a State solve its problems should be
permissible in this modem setting.
Of the practical reasons whioh lend support to the above proposal* one in
particular stands out* Unless the General Assembly is in a position to discuss
any topie* irrespective of its nature, and to adopt some kind of recommendation
thereon* it will not be in a position to offer its good offioea to a State whioh
finds itself* for whatever reason, in difficulties* It will be unable to
lend its assistance to such a State to help it in finding a just and honourable
solution to the problem ■«* unless of oourae the State concerned requests active
United Nations help*
This is surely one of the strongest reasons why the General Assembly should
be able to discuss any problem and adopt some kind of oonstruotiv© resolution
thereon and there aeons to be no good reason why it should have to wait till its
assistance is requested* possibly at the eleventh hour* An offer of good offices
or mediation may provide the answer to a serious internal problem which funda¬
mentally affects a State and which under the present Charter falls outwtth the
competence of the United Nations. If the General Assembly could, through an
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offer of good offices, or otherwise contribute to the settlement of any dispute
or situation, albeit that it is domestic in nature, it should be in a position
to make such an offer* It cannot do this if it is unable to discuss a problem
or make its feelings known through a resolution*
That the United Nations should be in a position to offer its good offices
to any State which finds itself in difficulties has been adduced by some States
as a reason far supporting the right of the General Assembly to discuss any
subject mentioned in the Charter* Thus, during the tenth session of the
General Assembly, during the debate on whether or not to include the Algerian
X
Question in the agenda, the Indonesian representative said:
»••* The General Assembly is indeed the proper forum
in which this dangerous International problem should
be discussed* The General Assembly has an obligation
not only to assist the people of Algeria to secure their
inalienable rights, but it also has a duty towards
France to asaiat it to find a just and peaceful solu¬
tion to the question of Algeria in accordance with
the principles and purposes of the Charter.
In conclusion, let me reiterate once again what
it is that we are asking of the General Assembly* We
are asking this body merely to show its proper concern
over the dangerous situation prevailing in Algeria to¬
day. We are asking this Assembly merely to uphold the
basic human rights enshrined in the Charter for all
peoples everywhere. We are asking it, above all, to
try at least to assuage the conflict in Algeria which
has already cost the lives of thousands of innocent
people and which threatens Hie maintenance of peace
and security din that region of the world.
2
Similar views were expressed by the Lebanese delegate. The Librarian
2
delegate expressed his views thus:
The delegation of Liberia holds the view that the
inscription of the question of Algeria in the agenda of
the present session would not be an intervention in the
1* G*A*,(X), Hen*, 529th. mtg., paras. 125-150; emphasis added.
2. ibid, para. 181.
3. ibid, 530th mtg., para. 106.
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domestlo jurisdiction of a State since such inscription would
merely permit free and open discussion of the issues involved,
and the most the United Nations oould do would be to suggest
the urgent necessity of finding an early solution in an
amicable and satisfactory manner* Such a suggestion from
the General Assembly, we submit, would in no way be an inter¬
ference in a State's domestic jurisdiction* Rather it would
be an expression of our oonoem to remove any tension among
the peoples of that area which prove a threat to world peace*
1
The views of India were explained by Mr* Krishna Menon, who said:
We are participating in this in order that a very
diffioult and unfortunate position in Algeria might be
assisted to be solved* Those who disagree with us can
question the wisdom of the course we are taking* They
may even question the estimate and calculations which we
make, but I should like to assure the French delegation
that, so far as we are concerned, we do not approach this
problem with disregard for the great traditions of France,
or for the great contribution whioh it has made throughout
the ages to human liberty, nor do we forget the great con¬
tribution which it has recently made in resolving the long
period of imperial war in Indo-China and the sacrifices whioh
it has made in order to sustain the oause of liberty* There¬
fore, if we do approach this problem, it is in the sense of
trying to find peaceful solutions in order to bring a new
element into the situation*
If the words 'regardless of origin' have any meaning, it
is that there is a general power to use the good offices of the
Assembly for these purposes*
However, one important qualification to this suggested right of disousslon
and recommendation must be stressed* Any disousslon of or recommendation con- /
oeroing the domestio affairs of a particular State must indeed be free from all
elements of ooercion* Such discussion or recommendations must not seek to put
pressure on the State concerned to adopt any particular course*
In this respect it is important to notice the objections voioed by the
United States to the Inclusion of the Algerian Question in the Assembly's
ibid, para* 117 and 143*
agenda at the tenth session. Mr. Lodge noted that what was in faot sought by
those who had requested the inclusion of this item on the agenda was 'the
sanation of the General Assembly to a course of action intended to bring about
fundamental changes in the composition of one of the United Nations' own
Members - that is the French Republic'#* The United States believed that euoh
a course of action brought the proposed item within the provisions of Artiole
2(7) and therefore voted against its inclusion in the agenda#
While the action of the United States in voting for the exclusion of this
item from the definitive agenda is open to orltioism, her reasons for doing so
serve to illustrate the type of action which could not be sought as a result of
a discussion of the domestic affairs of a particular State. Discussions and
recommendations whioh had as their primary purpose the detaohment of part of
a State's territory, against that State's will, oould not be regarded as legal
and would still constitute intervention.
Such an approaoh to the question of intervention would, of oourse. neces¬
sitate a particular, as opposed to a general approach to the question of com¬
petence. It would entail differentiating between different kinds of discussions
and recommendations in order to classify them as intervention or as legal expres¬
sions of ooncern. In retrospeot. it is evident that it was just some such
approach to the question of intervention whioh the delegates of Chile and Thailand
adopted when they advocated the inclusion of the questionsof raoe conflict in
South Afrioa and of Algeria in the agenda of the General Assembly,
However, there seems to be no good reason why auoh a particular approach to
the question of competence should not be adopted, formally. Admittedly, it
would make the task of deciding whether or not a particular discussion or re¬
commendation constituted intervention somewhat more difficult. However, this in
itself is no reason for altogether eschewing a redefinition of the concept of
intervention in United Nations law, vis h vis the General Assembly.
1. Gr.A. ,(X), HLen., 530th mtg. , paras.108-113.
